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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to analyse in detail the metaphysical relation 
between social and individualistic phenomena. Social phenomena are 
taken to include social entities such as institutions or social 
groups, the social properties of these social entities and also the 
social properties of individuals. Individualistic phenomena include 
physical, physiological and mental or psychological properties of 
individuals.
Chapter 1 considers whether social phenomena could be reduced to 
individualistic phenomena. A discussion of reduction, in so far as 
it would be applicable to the metaphysical relation between social 
and individualistic phenomena, reveals that this relation cannot be 
the one which holds between social and individualistic phenomena.
In Chapter 2 a weaker relation than reduction is considered, 
viz. the relation of determination. This is found to hold promise, 
especially in so far as it captures the relation between mental and 
physical phenomena. Reasons are considered which make it likely 
that this relation could be applied to social and individualistic 
phenomena.
Chapter 3 considers a detailed formulation of one specific 
version of determination: supervenience. Again, the relation as it
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is applied to mental and physical phenomena is discussed, some 
objections are raised to it and modifications suggested.
This relation is applied to the social-individualistic case in 
Chapter 4. Examples of its application are analysed and some doubts 
are raised as to the scope of its application. In this version it 
applies only to the social and individualistic properties of people.
In the final chapter, the relation of supervenience is 
generalized in order that its application to the relation between 
social and individual phenomena be extended to cover the relation 
between social entities and their properties as well as the social 
properties of individuals. It is shown that all these aspects of 
the social can be taken to supervene on individualistic phenomena.
In this respect, supervenience is shown to be at least a 
potential candidate far the relation holding between social and 
individualistic phenomena. Some caveats are raised in the 
conclusion.
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"Supervenience is that magical solution which allows us to commit a 
variety of linguistic sins without ontological guilt."
[Macdonald 1986: Mote 1]
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IflTRQPU.CTIQM
This thesis concerns the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena. As the wording of the title might 
suggest, the relation being considered is broader than the relation 
which might hold between social entities and individuals. In 
addition to social entities, the level of social phenomena may 
include social properties of these entities as well as social 
properties of individuals. The individualistic level will include 
people and their non-social properties, which may be psychological, 
physiological or physical, as well as the non-social properties of 
any other non-social entities, such as buildings, pieces of metal 
etc. which may be required.
Recent developments in neurophysiology have fanned the debate on 
the mind-brain relationship which has characterised the philosophy 
of mind. More specifically, these developments have tended to lend 
support to monist or materialist positions, While the type-type 
identity theories, popular in the 1960's, have not generally been 
resurrected, many varieties of token-token identity theories have 
been spawned.
In a number of respects, the debate on the relation between the 
social and the individualistic has, by contrast, been more 
restrained in recent years. Earlier, philosophers such as Popper
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had argued with a moral fervour in favour of the reduction of the 
social to the individualistic, in order to be spared the horrors of 
uncontrollable social forces. Subsequently, among the followers of 
Popper (perhaps best typified by Watkins) and others, these claims 
were replaced by more dispassionate attempts to argue the case in 
favour of reduction. A few papers raising objections to their views 
came to acquire the status of classics te.g. Mandelbaum 1955]. The 
issue, however, was never satisfactorily resolved, having reached 
something of a stalemate in the 1970's.
Subsequently in the mid-1980's, two books emerged which re­
engaged with these issues and which made full-bodied attempts to 
renounce the claims for reduction and to argue against them. These 
books are [James 1984] and [Ruben 1985], Both books and their 
respective authors have exerted an enormous influence on my work. 
However, neither of the books is discussed in any detail in this 
thesis, although Ruben's is referred to on a number of occasions. 
This is not accidental. Rather it is for the following reason: in
this thesis, I shall be looking, instead of at James' and Ruben's 
arguments, at the arguments which have penetrated the philosophy of 
mind. It will be the latter that I shall be attempting to apply to 
the relation between social and individualistic phenomena.
This is the respect in which this thesis aims to offer something 
original. But it is really only possible because James and Ruben 
have cleared the ground and opened up the debate over the social- 
individualistic relation by making two different, but equally
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serious, cases against the reduction of the social to the 
individualistic. Given confidence by these works, I have decided 
not to reconsider the standard arguments for holism and 
individualism.
Reduction, however, is an issue which refuses to lie quietly, 
and it is perhaps unwisely that I have elected to begin with a 
partial analysis of this relation and how it might be applied to the 
social-individualistic relation or, to pre-empt my findings, haw the 
application is doomed to failure. Type-type identity theories 
appeared to embody many of the claims of reduction and,
unsurprisingly the latter, like the identity theories, is open to 
serious objections.
The discussion then moves on to consider some versions of the 
prlma facie more plausible token-token identity theories, The
application of token-token identity theories to the mind-brain
debate owes much to Davidson's seminal formulation of anomalous 
monism C Davidson: 1970] . Many versions have developed in the light 
of this, often motivated by developments in neurophysiology. In 
their formulation, they would usually expect to be able to 
accommodate some of neurophysiology's findings. One such relation 
is supervenience, so once the token-token theories have been
considered generally, this particular one is considered in detail. 
I believe I am unique in attempting to apply a detailed formulation 
of the relation of supervenience to the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena. Admittedly, I am not the first to defend
- 10 -
the claim that the social supervenes on the individualistic, but how 
this claim is to be elaborated, and what the details of such a 
relation would be, have not, to my knowledge, been presented in 
depth. It is this amission which this thesis intends to make good.
It should also be mentioned that the whole thesis deals
primarily with metaphysical considerations. It is concerned to 
analyse potential candidates for the particular relationship between 
social and individualistic phenomena. Epistemological and
methodological questions about this relation are not raised. The 
relation of supervenience is not proposed as one which will help to 
explain social phenomena or promote our understanding of them. Nor
is it intended that it should tell us anything about how the level
of social phenomena should be studied. In this respect,
supervenience, even if successful in characterising the social-
individualistic relation, would not promote the unity of science 
insofar as it could not be used in support of an argument for the 
unity of method. At most, it will tell us something about the order 
of priority of different levels of phenomena. The extent to which 
it is capable of doing this will emerge in what follows.
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CHAPTER .1
REDUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the nature of the 
relation that holds between two theories when one theory is said to 
be reducible to another theory. Throughout, the reducing theory 
will be referred to as T1 and the reduced theory as T2. Much 
philosophical literature has been written on the reduction relation, 
analysing it from different perspectives, in differing degrees of 
detail and with different ultimate ends in mind. The discussion of 
the reduction relation here is intended to be sufficiently general 
and detailed to be applicable to any two theories, T1 and T2, in 
order to evaluate whether or not the claim that T2 could be reduced 
to T1 is actually justified.1 Ultimately, our concern will be to 
see whether or not social theories are reducible to theories of 
individuals. However, such considerations presuppose that formal 
criteria far the reduction-relation have been specified and 
defended. So it is with the latter that the chapter begins.
The motivation for reduction provides a clue to the criteria to 
be satisfied if a relation of reduction is to obtain. The reasons 
for which reduction is proposed should indicate what the relation is 
intended to capture. Once this is known, it will be easier to
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specify how this is to be captured i.e. what criteria are to be 
satisfied.
Most generally, reduction is often taken to be one of the means 
to the unity of science. Unity is achieved via reduction in two 
distinct, though complementary, ways. On the one hand, there is 
explanatory unification, and on the other, ontological unification. 
So reduction is motivated by the desire to have two distinct 
theories subsumed under one common set of explanatory principles or 
explanatory laws, and the desire to link the entities postulated in 
T2 with the entities of Tl, thereby economising on ontological 
commitment. Clifford Hooker has referred to 'metaphysical
coherence' as the motivation for reduction. This is apt since it 
alludes to both types of unification: the explanatory and the
ontological. [Hooker 1981:212]
If this is what the reduction-relation is to encapsulate, the 
task to be confronted is the complex one of specifying just how 
reduction is to capture such ontological and explanatory 
unification. Formal criteria for reduction have been set out by 
Ernest Nagel in what has probably come to be regarded as the 
standard account (notwithstanding substantial criticism) of 
reduction. [Nagel 1961: Ch 11] One reason for beginning with
Nagel’s account of reduction is that it hinges on two formal 
criteria which seem to correspond generally to the two motivational 
criteria mentioned above. Nagel's criteria are the Condition of 
Connectability (CC) and the Condition of Derivability (CD). Vhat
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these conditions entail, and how they may be construed as the means 
to promote ontological and explanatory unity, will now be
considered.
CC requires that:
"Assumptions of some kind must be introduced which 
postulate suitable relations between whatever is signified 
by 'A' Csome term featured in the laws of T2 which does not 
feature in the theoretical assumptions of Tl] and traits 
represented by theoretical terms already present in the 
primary science [TIL" CJTagel 1961:353-3541
CC is thus a way of linking the terms of T2 and whatever entities
they signify with the terms and entities of Tl. Furthermore, it is
specifically restricted to the theoretical terms and entities.
Although the general idea behind CC is that of linking the terms of
T2 with those of Tl, it should not be construed as the predominantly
linguistic exercise of incorporating the vocabulary of T2 into the
vocabulary of Tl. There is much more to the reduction-relation than
connections between terms and vocabulary. Vhat is important are the
entities signified by the terms. These entities will be both things
or objects and their properties or attributes.
If the discussion focusses on these entities then it is possible 
to see how CC may be adapted to do the work of ontological 
unification. If the entities in T2 can be shown to be linked to the 
entities of Tl - where these connections can be established as 
identities - then it follows that the two theories are actually 
referring to the same entities i.e. what was formerly thought to be 
two sets of entities will be reduced - via connectability of objects 
- to only one set. This would constitute a significant ontological
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economy, not necessarily in the sense that the objects of T2 are 
denied existence after the reduction, but rather in the sense that 
the objects of T2 are shown to be the same objects as those referred 
to by Tl.
There is a difficulty for Bagel's characterisation in so far as 
it presupposes, in true empiricist fashion, that theoretical terms 
can be distinguished and separated from observational terms. Bagel 
is then exclusively concerned with theoretical terms. Bot only does 
the presupposition of such a distinction seem unnecessary; in the 
light of much recent literature, it also seems unwise.2
However, I would suggest that the theory-observation distinction 
need not be made to do any work in CC. Indeed it need not even be 
invoked. Entities may be referred to by terms without unhelpful 
attempts to classify the terms as theoretical or observational. In 
considering CC for reduction, it will be necessary to refer to the 
objects of T2 and Tl in the vocabularies of their respective 
theories. The point is simply that it will not be necessary to 
demarcate some terms as theoretical and others as observational, in 
order to consider the ontological links between the objects of the 
theories.
There is a great deal more to be said on just how such 
connections are to be established, but before getting involved in 
the details of this - a discussion of which will constitute most of 
this chapter - it will be worth making a few brief comments on the
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other formal criterion for reduction that Nagel invokes viz. the 
Condition of Derivability (CD). This condition relates to the other 
source of motivation for reduction, explanatory economy. Nagel's CD
asserts that:
"all the laws of the secondary science [T23...must be 
logically derivable from the theoretical premises and their 
associated coordinating definitions in the primary 
discipline [Tl]." CIbid:3543
Given the reluctance to rely upon a theory-observation 
distinction, the restriction in Nagel's CD to the theoretical 
premises of Tl again seems unnecessary. This condition may simply 
be taken to require that the laws of T2 should be logically 
derivable from the laws of Tl, augmented by the correlations 
established by CC.
CD can be satisfied independently of the particular way in which 
CC is satisfied. The relations postulated by CC between the 
entities of T2 and Tl could be weaker than identities. This may be 
enough to satisfy CC without adversely affecting the satisfaction of 
CD. Our concern so far has been that only the establishment of 
identities between entities will allow CC to promote ontological 
unity.
There is a connection between CD and explanation which can be 
fairly readily specified. Under the standard deductive-nomological 
model of explanation, an explanation is a deductive argument in 
which a statement of the event to be explained is logically deduced 
from premises consisting of general laws and statements of initial 
conditions. If all the laws of T2 can ,be deduced from the laws of
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Tl, then it follows that statements about the events explained by T2 
can be deduced from the general laws of Tl and statements of initial 
conditions. Moreover, given the deductive-nomological model, the 
laws of T2 will then be explained by the laws of Tl. This is 
required by CD, The condition would not be satisfied if the events 
explained by T2 were explainable by Tl, but the laws of T2 were not. 
The explanatory principles of Tl must thus be able to 'explain the 
phenomena of T2 as well as the phenomena of Tl. It is in this 
respect that CD promotes explanatory unification.
Such unification is interesting, not least because it brings 
together the three notions of reduction, deduction and explanation. 
Thus far it has been suggested that explanation involves the 
deduction of the explanandum from a suitable explanans, and that 
reduction involves the fulfillment of CD which entails the 
explanation of the laws of T2 by those of Tl and the deduction of 
events explained by T2 from the laws of Tl. In this way, 
explanatory unification is achieved. However, it can be mentioned 
immediately that not all deductions qualify as explanations and that 
not all instances of explanatory unification qualify as reduction 
e.g. if the laws of T2 and Tl were both explained by the laws of 
another theory, T3. In this case, T2 would not be reduced to Tl; 
although a case could be made for the reduction of both T2 and Tl to 
T3,
There is one crucial problem with what has been mentioned so 
far. This is that the link between CD and explanatory unification -
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and thus between reduction and explanation - depends on the 
characterisation of explanation given by the deductive-nomological 
model. Despite being the standard model, deductive-nomological 
explanation has come under severe criticism and its continued use 
would need considerable defence. Without the deductive-nomological 
model, it is likely that the close link between deduction and 
explanation would be severed and with it, the link between 
explanation and reduction. It is not intended to defend the 
deductive-nomological model of explanation here, Nor will much more 
time be devoted to a discussion of CD.
If the spirit of Nagel's analysis is to be preserved, then CC 
will have to be examined in detail before CD can be assessed, as the 
latter makes use of CC to provide connections between the events 
covered by T2 and Tl. These connections are required before the 
possibility of deducing T2 from Tl can be considered.
The discussion of CC alone will provide us with grounds for 
rejecting the possibility of ever reducing social theories to 
theories of individuals. In this respect, this chapter makes no 
claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of reduction. That would 
take a braver and more competent philosopher. For the purposes of 
this thesis on the relation between social and individualistic 
phenomena, only those aspects of the reduction relation which have 
direct bearing on the topic will be considered. This will limit the 
discussion almost exclusively to CC.
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Moreover, this is in keeping with my expressed interest in the 
metaphysical relation between the social and the individual, rather 
than the epistemological or explanatory relation. This should in 
no way be taken to reflect upon the value of the latter as a topic 
worthy of research.
The need for connectability in reduction is perhaps highlighted 
by the distinction which can be drawn between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous reductions. A homogeneous reduction is one where all 
the terms of T2 occur in Tl, while a heterogeneous reduction is one 
where they do not. Heterogeneous reductions will be more difficult 
to characterise than homogeneous ones, as there will be no 
immediately available links between the terms in which T2 and Tl are 
couched. It will not be possible to deduce the laws of T2 from 
those of Tl if the laws of T2 use terms which do not appear in the 
laws of Tl. It will thus be impossible to derive T2 as a logical 
consequence of Tl since, in a deductively valid argument, the 
conclusion cannot contain terms not occurring in the premises unless 
(in their occurrence in the conclusion) they could be replaced by 
any other term, without affecting the validity of the argument. So 
in order to deduce the laws of T2 from those of Tl it will be 
necessary to introduce connections between T2 and Tl.
It is also a reasonable projection that heterogeneous reductions 
are more likely to find interesting practical application. While it 
is conceivable that there may be two distinct theories with the same 
vocabulary, it is unlikely that an interesting relation of reduction
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could be established between them. Homogeneous reductions may be 
regarded as a special case of all reductions: if CC is a criterion
of reduction, then homogeneous reductions are those instances of 
reduction where CC is trivially satisfied since all the terms of T2 
are linked with the same terms in Tl. Consequently the objects 
referred to by those terms in the different theories are identical. 
The following discussion of the connections to be established 
between theories for reduction will focus on heterogeneous 
reductions.
There are different possible cross-classifications of the sorts 
of correlations that might fulfil CC. Nagel considers three kinds 
of correlations:
1) logical connections via the meanings of terms,
2) conventions or definitions, and
3) factual or material connections. [Ibid.:354]
Given that our concerns are not primarily linguistic, the first two 
kinds of correlations will not be considered. In the fallowing 
analysis, factual or material connections established in reduction 
will be considered. It will be shown that these must be either 
relations of identity holding beween the entities referred to in T2 
and Tl, or nomological coextensions between the attributes or 
properties of those entities.
There is a third kind of connection, comparable to factual and 
material connections, viz accidental coextension. However, when one 
theory is reducible to another, something stronger than accidental
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connections between the two theories must be established. 
Accidental connecting relations between the entities of theories 
would never be able to support claims of ontological unity. Hence 
for the purposes of an analysis of reduction, accidental 
correlations or connections will be ignored.
Focus will thus be on identities and nomological coextensions. 
Yet identities and nomological coextensions between attributes do 
not always appear to be necessary for the reduction of one theory to 
another. If it is accepted that the attribute predicates of T2 will 
often be of greater generality than those of Tl, then it follows 
that the connections established between them may link one 12- 
attribute predicate with a disjunction of several Tl-attribute 
predicates. All that CC would appear to require in such cases is 
that the Tl-attribute predicate be a nomalogically sufficient 
condition for the T2-attribute predicate. It need not be a 
nomolagically necessary condition as well. Indeed often it will not 
be, for instance where a group of Tl-attribute predicates is 
connected to a unique T2-attribute predicate i.e. where the T2- 
predicate may be variably realised by different Tl-predicates. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that a necessary connection, 
where a unique Tl-attribute predicate is a nomolagically necessary 
condition for several T2-attribute predicates, (the converse of the 
nomologically sufficient conditions described above) would not 
ensure reduction. Such connections do not allow the unambiguous 
derivation of the laws of T2 from those of Tl.3
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In considering the connections between theories in reduction it 
will be necessary to consider them holding between things and 
between the attributes or properties of these things. The 
possibilities to be considered for the satisfaction of CC will thus 
be thing-identities as well as attribute/property-identities, 
coextensions (from now on it will be assumed that the coextensions 
referred to are nomological) and sufficient conditionals. Much 
headway in analysing these connections has been made by Robert 
Causey [Causey 19773 and at this point it will be most helpful to 
consider some of his work.4
Causey's analysis deals specifically with a special class of 
reduction viz. micro-reduction, in which all the objects in the 
domain of Tl are shown to be proper spatial parts of objects in the 
domain of T2. The ontology of T2 is thus shown to be included in 
the ontology of Tl. Causey classifies objects according to their 
kind. The defining characteristics of kinds of objects will have to 
be spelled out, but first it should be mentioned that the objects of 
a theory are classed as either basic or compound. (There need not
necessarily be compound elements in every theory.) A basic element 
in the domain of a theory is an element of that domain which is not, 
from the point of view of that theory, a structured whole whose 
parts are elements in the domain. It may however be a structured 
whole from the point of view of some more basic theory. By 
contrast, a compound element is a structured whole of at least two 
parts, where these parts are basic elements in the domain. 
CIbid.:553
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The structure of compound, elements is important for Causey's
analysis of reduction and is described in terms of basic thing- 
predicates and attribute-predicates as follows: certain types of
basic elements are classified into compound elements in accordance 
with a structural description i.e. basic elements combine in a
certain structure to farm a compound. Two compound elements are
thus of the same kind iff they have the same structure.
This seems intuitively clear. Unfortunately though, Causey's
characterisation of basic elements is rather less clear:
"Any two basic elements are of the same kind iff they have 
exactly the same classifying attributes, both primitive and 
defined." CIbid.:62]
Classifying attributes are attributes, predicable of objects, which 
refer to features salient for the classification of objects into 
structured, compound kinds. For example, the atomic structure of 
hydrogen would be a classificatary attribute, salient far 
determining how that element combines to form the compound, water, 
Classifying attributes characterise those relations according to 
which basic elements are combined into compound elements. So it 
seems that kinds of basic elements are defined in terms of the 
compound elements they may form. This characterisation has the 
implausible consequence that any basic elements classified as 
compound elements in accordance with the same structural 
description, would have to be identified as basic elements of the 
same kind i.e. it would not be passible to have compounds of the 
same kind composed of basic elements of different kinds. This will 
most likely not pose a problem for chemical compounds such as water,
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but it could be disastrous for certain social entities such as money 
which might be variably realised under different circumstances by 
very different kinds of entities.
It is a counter-intuitive aspect of Causey's analysis that basic 
elements are characterised in terms of compound ones rather than the 
other way round. However, it should be remembered that the compound 
elements referred to so far are in the same theory as the basic 
elements, so Causey's analysis of kinds of elements has not
prejudged the reduction issue by defining the entities of T2 in
terms of Tl. T2 and T1 are most likely to have both basic and 
compound elements in each of their domains.
In a heterogeneous reduction, connecting sentences between
thing-predicates will not be analytic. For instance, to use 
Causey's example, if the empirically smallest sample of water is 
correlated with an H^O molecule, the connection between 'empirically 
smallest sample of water' and ' H^O molecule' will not be analytic, 
as the two expressions do not mean the same thing. If they did mean 
the same thing, and if all thing-predicates of T2 could be 
correlated with thing-predicates of Tl with the same meanings 
respectively, then the reduction would be homogeneous, not
heterogeneous. Rather, the connection here is synthetic. It 
remains to consider if it may be a synthetic identity i.e. whether 
or not it asserts that the expressions refer to exactly the same 
thing, albeit by different names.
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Assume the connection is a synthetic coextension of the form 
Ts:X = Tix, where T* is the thing-predicate 'empirically smallest 
sample of water1 and Ti is the thing-predicate ' ftaO molecule'. It 
is necessary for reduction that the coextension be namological. 
Such a nomological coextension could be a law-sentence. But if it 
were, it would encapsulate a causal correlation (or some other kind 
of correlation if you do not believe that all laws are causal 
correlations) which would itself require explanation, Causey claims 
that in the example the connection between 'empirically smallest 
sample of water' and ' Hs.-0 molecule' is not a law. This is because 
it does not make sense to postulate a causal relation (which should 
be causally explained) between the two thing-predicates. A demand 
for a causal explanation as to why an H^O molecule is correlated 
with the empirically smallest sample of water would be absurd, since 
an H2 O molecule simply is the empirically smallest sample of water.
This is a claim for the identity of thing-predicates in order to 
satisfy CC for the entities of two distinct theories. Causey 
substantiates this identity claim with an additional argument based 
on the logical structure of thing-predicates. This argument hinges 
on the fact that thing-predicates function as names for basic 
entities.
"Thing-predicates involved [such as 'empirically smallest 
sample of water'] function simply as names for homogeneous 
natural equivalence classes (kinds) of elements. As names, 
they do not refer to any attributes these elements might 
have as a matter of empirical fact. This is even true of 
compound thing-predicates defined with the help of 
structural descriptions. The structural description of a 
compound element is used as part of the definition of this 
element. Therefore, it is analytically true that a certain 
type of compound element has the structure it has, and 
hence we cannot causally explain why it has that structure.
Now, relative to a given set of classifying attributes, 
the various kinds of elements are the various homogeneous
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natural equivalence classes, and the latter are denoted by 
the thing-predicates of the theory. Therefore, if two such 
thing-predicates, even from different theories, are coexten- 
sianal...there is no way such a co-extensionality could be 
causally explained. This is because the coextensionality 
merely asserts that the two thing-predicates name the same 
thing i.e. a certain homogeneous natural equivalence class. 
Therefore...[the coextension of thing-predicates such as 
'empirically smallest sample of water^ and 'HaQ molecule'] 
should not be interpreted as a causal law-sentence, but 
rather as a sort of identity, namely, a thing-identity, 
which asserts the identity of two kinds of things." 
CIbid.:81]
Causey's argument seems to run as follows:
A. (i) Thing-predicates function as names
(ii) Hames do not refer to the attributes elements have as a
matter of empirical fact
(iii) Thing predicates do not refer to the attributes elements 
have as a matter of empirical fact.
B. (i) Any predicate that does not so refer cannot be causally 
explained
(ii) Given A, thing-predicates cannot be causally explained.
C. (i) Suppose two thing-predicates are coextensional
(ii) This means they function as names for the same equivalence 
class
(iii) Given A and B, it follows that the coextensionality cannot 
be causally explained.
There is a problem with this argument. From the assertion that, 
if a predicate does not refer to the attributes which an element has 
as a matter of empirical fact, then it cannot be causally explained,
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it does not automatically follow that if two predicates (which do 
not refer to the attributes which elements have as a matter of 
empirical fact) are coextensional, the coextensionality cannot be 
causally explained. However, if it is accepted that thing- 
predicates, functioning as names, are part of the definition of the 
objects of which they are predicates, then it does follow that two 
coextensional thing-predicates define the same entity. If this is 
the case, then their coextensionality must be underpinned by an 
identity.
The coextension of thing-predicates, thus interpreted, does 
ensure their identity. Vhat though of nomologically sufficient 
conditions between the entities of the theories for reduction? As 
discussed above, such connections would appear to satisfy CC as 
well. The same arguments that Causey advanced to show that the 
coextensians between thing-predicates must in fact be identities, 
can be used here, provided that one assumption is granted. This is 
the assumption that it is possible to form the disjunction of all 
such nomologically sufficient conditions for any T2 entity. Given 
that the aim of reduction is taken to be ontological economy, this 
assumption should be acceptable. There could be no serious claim 
for ontological economy if entities of T2 were agreed to be 
correlated with disjunctions of entities from Tl, but which entities 
the disjuncts referred to could neither be specified nor determined.
This may seem to be a rather harsh way of dealing with 
reduction. It is, however, not the last word on the possibility
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that the connections between theories may be nomologically 
sufficient conditions. A discussion of these will form part of 
later chapters where weaker relations between theories than 
reduction come under scrutiny. For the purposes of this chapter, it 
has been decided to construe reduction as being motivated by a 
desire for ontological and explanatory economy. CC is thus 
construed as specifically advancing the cause of ontological 
economy. Bearing this in mind, it seems reasonable to require, in 
order to reduce T2 to Tl, that the thing-predicates of T2 be 
identified with the thing-predicates of Tl. Consequently, CC will 
only be satisfied if identities can be established between the 
theoretical objects of the reduced theory and some objects of the 
reducing theory.
This is only part of CC. In addition to connections between the 
entities of the reduced and reducing theories, CC also involves 
connections between the attributes or properties of the objects. 
These will now be considered.
Attribute-predicates, unlike thing-predicates, do not function 
as names for the objects of which they are predicates. Moreover, 
they do often refer to attributes those objects have as a matter of 
empirical fact. So the arguments presented above for the identity 
of coextensional thing-predicates cannot be applied to attribute- 
predicates. New arguments will have to be considered.
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As in the case of thing-predicate connecting sentences in 
heterogeneous reductions, attribute-predicate connecting sentences 
are not analytic. The question to be considered is whether the 
connections are synthetic coextensions or synthetic identities. 
Traditionally, it has been argued that attributes cannot be 
identical unless the statement asserting the coextension of the 
attribute-predicates is analytically true. Yet, as has been 
mentioned, in a heterogeneous reduction, the sentences connecting 
the attribute-predicates of T2 with some from Tl will not be 
analytic. Causey, however, claims to have independent arguments far 
their identity.
Reduction aims to explain the phenomena of T2 in terms of Tl and 
to do this it requires connecting sentences between the attribute- 
predicates of T2 and Tl. But if these connections themselves 
require explanation - and the correlations between attribute- 
predicates do seem to call for explanation - the reduction will 
never be achieved. The connections between attributes must thus be 
identities, Causey argues, which are non-causal and require no 
explanation. Indeed, he claims that if we look at the reductive 
connection between such attribute-predicates as the pressure of a 
gas and the statistically averaged change of momentum of gas 
molecules per unit area and time, we will find that, although the 
connection is supported by empirical evidence, it is nowhere 
explained. So the connection must be an attribute-identity after 
all. Consequently he asserts that the identity of attribute- 
predicates is a formal requirement for reduction.
- 29 -
That there are difficulties obstructing Causey's arguments for 
attribute identity should be apparent. Clearly the desire for a 
connection to be an identity is insufficient to warrant the 
assertion that the connection is an identity. The mere facts that 
the connecting sentences in reduction must not require additional 
explanation, that non-causal connections require no additional 
explanation and that identities are non-causal are not sufficient 
grounds for asserting in this case that the connections are 
identities. In the case of thing-predicates, the additional claim 
that they function as names did justify the claim for their 
identity. Attribute-predicates do not function similarly as names. 
An independent argument in support of the claim that the connections 
between attributes are identities would be required. Causey fails 
to provide this.
There is another problem with Causey's account. This is that it 
offers no criteria for distinguishing identities from mere 
coextensions. The coextension of two attributes appears to be all 
that can be established empirically. There appears to be no factual 
difference between attribute identities and attribute coextensions. 
It is not permissible to invoke identities, as Causey has done, 
merely to remove the ' nomological danglers' CFor more on this 
problem, see Ch. 2] and thereby allegedly remove the need for an 
explanation of the correlations. If some criteria were found for 
distinguishing identities from coextensions, then a case might be 
made for establishing certain correlations as identities in order to
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explain them. However, the problem of finding criteria capable of 
distinguishing identities from mere coextensions remains.
Causey appears to recognise this problem when he cites the 
example of the reduction of temperature to mean kinetic energy, 
claiming that:
"when dealing with a particular case, such as this contro­
versial temperature example, it may be quite difficult to 
decide whether it is an identity or a correlation.1"[ Ibid.:883
Yet he makes no attempt to suggest how this difficulty might be
resolved. If the correlation between temperature and mean kinetic
energy - an example so often quoted as a paradigm of reduction - is
regarded as problematic by Causey, then the prospects for his
analysis being able to decide whether or not a reduction-relation
holds between any other two theories, seem rather slim. So while
Cauesy's account seems to cope reasonably satisfactorily with the
connections to be established between thing-predicates in reduction,
it fares less well with the connections required between attribute-
predicates.
Alternative ways of construing these connections will have to be 
considered. I shall now turn to some of the work of David Lewis 
[Lewis 1970, 1972] to see if this can throw any light on reductive 
connections between attributes or properties. One of Lewis' most 
important claims with regard to these connections is that the 
empirical evidence which supports a synthetic, nomological 
coextension between attribute-predicates or properties may provide 
sufficient justification for a claim of identity and consequently of
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reduction. Indeed, he claims the empirical evidence may necessitate 
the stronger claim of reduction. The argument for this is dependent 
upon Lewis' unique characterisation of theoretical or T-terms. 
Theoretical terms as Lewis uses them are not to be contrasted with 
observational terms. In his terminology, they are contrasted with 
'old' or O-terms in the following way: a T-term is one which is
introduced by a given theory at a particular stage in the history of 
science, while an old term is any other term, an original term, one 
that is understood prior to the introduction of the new theoretical 
term. CLewis 1970:79, paraphrased]
Lewis contends that T-terms can be characterised exclusively by 
familiar old terms of the theory in which they are introduced. The 
characterisation takes the form of a Ramsey sentence in which the T- 
terms are replaced by existentially bound variables. In order to 
apply the Ramsey technique, it is necessary to assume that all 
newly-introduced T-terms can be reformulated as names so that they 
can be treated as singular terms in the Ramsey quantification. For 
instance, the clause 'x is an electron' would be replaced by 'x has 
the property electronhood' . Lewis claims that it is reasonable to
assume that this replacement can be effected with little or no cost.
"Ve may stipulate that our T-terms are names, not predi­
cates or functors. Uo generality is lost, since names can 
purpart to name entities of any kind: individuals, species,
states, properties, substances, magnitudes, classes, rela­
tions or what not." CIbid.:80]s
This acomplished, it is passible to replace the postulate
introducing the T-terms by a Ramsey sentence which only makes use of
old terms. The Ramsey sentence will have the following form:
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(.3xi,..... , XnMEach xi stands in a certain, specified relation
to the theory in question, where this relation can be specified 
using exclusively old terms, )
It is important to consider just how Lewis construes the
relation between the variable standing in for the T-term and the
theory in which it is introduced. Basically he thinks that T-terms
are introduced into a theory by an implicit functional definition
according to which 
the eni
named b^
What is important is that these causal roles and causal relations 
define the entities named by T-terms. This leads Lewis to make the 
very strong claim that anything which occupies the specified causal 
role i.e. which realises the Ramsey-sentenee for a particular 
variable, must be identified as the entity named by the T-term. By 
implication, if there is more than one name which can be substituted 
for any of the Xi i.e. if the Ramsey-sentence admits of multiple 
realisation, then the identification of the entities named logically
These arguments have important consequences for the Condition of 
Connectability for reduction. Under more traditional accounts of 
reduction, the necessary identities depend on independent bridge 
laws linking the terms of T2 with those of Tl. Lewis rejects this 
because he denies that the bridge laws are independent. Rather, on 
his account
"they may follow from the reducing theory, via the defini­
tions of the theoretical terms of the reauced theory. In
roles;
follows.
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such cases it would be wrong to think that theoretical re­
duction is done voluntarily, for the sake of parsimony, when 
the reduced and reducing theories are such as to permit it. 
Sometimes reduction is not only possible but unavoidable.*1 
[Lewis 1970:78]
What Lewis is claiming is that the empirical introduction of a new 
T-term by a functional definition of its causal role in 0-terms 
would be sufficient to ensure that the T-term is reduced to O-terms. 
It is important to stress that * reduction' here refers only to the 
satisfaction of CC, and the ontological economy it encompasses. 
Lewis is not arguing for a position of explanatory unity and 
consequently his position would not satisfy the dual conditions for 
reduction discussed earlier in this chapter.
Unfortunately, there are problems for Lewis's technique of 
establishing CC for reduction. It will be noted that Lewis' account 
depends on the possibility of replacing T-terms by names. In the 
discussion of Causey's analysis of reduction, it was mentioned that 
Causey used thing-predicates as names for kinds of things. In view 
of his very general construal of all grammatical predicates as names 
and his characterisation of basic and compound things or elements in 
terms of their characteristic structures, this seemed quite 
acceptable. The problem that arises for Lewis, however, is whether 
or not attribute- or property-predicates can be similarly assumed to 
be names of attributes or properties. This is in the context of 
Lewis' much more rigorous construal of names, where the names of 
properties are treated as singular terms.
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One difficulty with this is that reformulating the property of 
'being an electron' as the name 'electronhoad', as Lewis' theory 
requires, is not intuitively plausible. The name 'electronhood' is 
not normally used in theories. What then is Lewis' justification 
for insisting on it? Lewis' motives for the reformulation are quite 
simple: it is only where the variables of the Ramsey-sentence range
over singular terms, that multiple realisation would imply 
identification of the entities named by the singular terms. If the 
variables ranged over properties and it was discovered that more 
than one property fulfilled the causal role specified by the Ramsey- 
sentence, then it would follow only that the properties were 
nomologically coextensive, and not that they were identical. This 
in turn, for the reasons discussed above, would not necessitate 
reduction.
It seems that Lewis is stipulating the reformulation of names 
specifically to achieve identification and hence, connectability for 
reduction. Although this raises a suggestion of trickery, no 
charges can be laid unless examples of T-terms could be provided 
which were incapable of reformulation. I am not able to provide 
any.
There is an additional problem, though. Lewis' account depends 
on the possibility that the reformulated T-terms can be given a 
functional definition in terms of their causal role. In defending 
such a position, Lewis is in good company. Sydney Shoemaker
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advocates a similar method for the identification of properties and 
this will be considered.6
This causal criterion for the identification of properties may 
be construed as a way of accommodating a possible objection to 
Lewis' account of the identity of properties. Reduction generally, 
and hence CC as well, are most often taken to describe a relation 
between two theories, each of which functions as a systematised 
whole. Yet Lewis' account seems to focus on T-terms rather than 
theories. In what sense then, it may be objected, would Lewis's
account of CC form part of an analysis of reduction?
Firstly it should be noted that the T-terms in Lewis' theory are 
not considered in isolation. The postulate characterising the 
theory in which the T-terms are introduced, always refers to a range
ti,  to of T-terms (over which the variables of the Ramsey-
sentence range). Lewis' account specifically caters for a number of 
T-terms being introduced simultaneously. However, it is far more 
important to note that even though a T-term might conceivably be 
Introduced on its own, it would nonetheless not be defined in 
isolation. T-terms are defined in terms of their causal roles in 
the theory and their causal relations with other terms in the 
theory.
"The T-terms have been defined as the occupants of the 
causal roles specified by the theory T; as the entities, 
whatever those may be, that bear certain causal relations 
to one another and to the referents of the 0-terms."
[Lewis 1972:2543
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The causal roles of terms in a theory will be inter-related and
dependent on other terms in the theory and the roles of these terms.
Thus the causal criterion for property identity reflects the way in 
which a theory generally functions as a unified, inter-related 
whole.
Consequently a complete definition of a property P in terms of 
its causal role would need to take account of the causal roles of 
other properties in the theory as well. To this extent, the causal 
role of P may be construed as an IITUS condition for P's identity, 
the full condition involving other properties in the theory7 . This 
dependence of P on other properties presumably accounts for Lewis' 
insistence that his theory only applies to a system where the 
interpretation of the O-terms is fixed. If the meanings of the 0- 
terms could vary, there would be no possibility of giving a fixed, 
causal definition of the T-terms.
Lewis' proposal to identify properties in terms of their causal 
roles and relations seems to be the most promising way of getting 
the connections between properties that are required for CC in 
reduction. However, he does not offer a detailed account of
exactly how causal roles and relations furnish properties with their 
identity. Fortunately, such an account has been provided by
Shoemaker [Shoemaker 1984].
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An essential preliminary to Shoemaker's account is his 
restriction of the analysis to 'genuine' properties, excluding
'mere-Cambridge' properties.
"A property is genuine if and only if its acquisition or 
loss by a thing constitutes a genuine change in that thing" 
CIbid.:207-8]
while a ' mere-Cambridge' property is any other. What this amounts 
to is that a genuine property is one that makes a contribution to 
the causal powers of the object that has that property. So 
Shoemaker's account is not applicable to any properties which could 
not affect the causal power of the abject of which they are 
properties e.g. mathematical properties would not be construed as 
genuine properties on this account. Shoemaker emphasises that it is 
certainly not the case that for every predicate there will be a 
corresponding genuine property.
Although different from Causey's characterisation of attributes 
in terms of their classificatory powers, Shoemaker’s 
characterisation of properties in terms of their causal salience is 
in some ways comparable to Causey's. Causey's classificatory 
attributes were only of use in the classificaton of things into 
kinds: they cast no light on attributes per se. Shoemaker's causal
salience can certainly be applied to the attributes or properties of 
an object - indeed it is most likely that the causal powers of an 
object will be partly determined by its attributes. So there is a 
prima facie case for Shoemaker's analysis succeeding where Causey's 
failed in helping to furnish the formal conditions for the sort of 
connections required between attributes in a reduction-relation.
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It has already been insisted that the connections between 
attributes should not require additional explanation or it will 
never be possible to achieve the explanation of T2 in terms of Tl
and the connecting sentences that reduction requires. It has also 
been claimed that identities between properties would be a suitable 
relation, because the identity of properties needs no explanation 
while their coextension would. So it seems reasonable to consider 
whether or not Shoemaker has been able to provide acceptable 
criteria for property-identity, criteria which Causey failed in his 
attempt to provide.
Properties do not exist on their own, they are always properties 
of things. Shoemaker contends that genuine properties should be 
individuated according to the potential they have for affecting the 
causal powers of objects that possess them. Two properties will be 
identical if they make the same contribution to the causal powers of 
the things that have them. It is necessary to specify what the
'causal powers' of objects are and how they are to be evaluated.
"An object has power P conditionally upon the possession of 
the properties in set Q if it has some property r such that 
having the properties in 0 together with r is causally 
sufficient for naving P, while having the properties In Q is 
not by itself causally sufficient for having P...Vhen a thing 
has a power conditionally upon the possession of certain 
properties, let us say that this amounts to its having a 
conditional power...Properties are clusters of conditional 
powers." CIbid.:212-13, emphasis in the original]
So a property, r, is specified in terms of what it gives an 
object the power to do when that object has r in conjunction with 
another set of properties. In isolation, a property may have no 
conditional power worth mentioning, i.e. it is likely that an abject 
with a unique property will have highly restricted causal potential.
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But most often an object has a number of properties and the 
conditional power of the object is dependent on the simultaneous 
possession of all these properties. The causal potential of a 
property will depend on its being realised in conjunction with the 
other properties. The properties that cluster together to yield the 
causal power of the object of which they are properties, should have 
a certain causal unity. In particular, the abject should have 
greater causal power when an additional property is added to the set 
of properties than it had before. There should be no properties 
which contribute nothing to the causal power of the object.
From this the following characterisation of property-identity 
may be inferred: two properties are identical if their
coinstantiation with a set of properties, Q, gives rise to the same 
causal powers for the object which has these properties. Shoemaker 
admits that this does not provide a definition of the identity of 
properties:
"This is, if anything, even more circular than it looks.
For it crucially involves the notion of sameness of powers, 
and this will have to be explained in terms of sameness of 
circumstances and sameness of effects, the notions of which 
both involve the notion of sameness of property. And of 
course there was essential use of the notion of a property 
in my explanation of the notion of a conditional power."
[Ibi<i.:22f]
Although this will prevent the reductive definition of properties in 
terms of causal powers, it does cast light on the way in which 
properties and causal powers are related. It will be remembered 
that what was initially sought were criteria of identity for 
properties. Vhat Shoemaker has provided is not so much a criterion 
of identity, as an indication of the way in which properties and
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causal powers are inextricably interrelated. This will suffice for 
CC in so far as it provides a way of establishing the identity of 
properties once it has been discovered - and presumably this can be 
achieved empirically - that the causal powers to which the
properties give rise i.e. the causal powers of the objects which 
have these properties, are the same.
In addition to this, it seems reasonable to require of two
properties, before they are identified, that they should give rise 
to the same causal powers for the object that has them, when they 
are instantiated in conjunction with any set of properties that the 
object can possess, where this conjunction increases the causal 
power of the object in question. This should establish the 
requisite generality of property-identity. It is not enough for
property identity that properties have the same causal power under a 
particular set of circumstances; rather their causal potential must 
be identical in all circumstances in which they might be
instantiated.
Admittedly, this account of the identificaton of properties in 
terms of their generalised causal potential is very stringent. 
However, it may be shown to apply to such pairs of properties as 
'having a certain temperature' and 'having a certain mean molecular 
kinetic energy', or 'having a certain colour' and 'reflecting light 
of a certain wavelength' . These satisfy our intuitions about 
properties which are identified by means of synthetic connections. 
This causal criterion provides a sufficient condition for
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establishing the identity of properties. There may of course be 
other sufficient conditions for property identity, but this is not 
of importance here. The discussion above will suffice to show how 
CC can be fulfilled for properties.
It has now been shown haw CC for reduction generally might be 
satisfied: correlations between both the things and properties of
T2 must be established with the things and properties respectively 
of Tl. In considering Causey's analysis, it was seen that if thing- 
predicates are taken to function as names for kinds, then the 
discovery of a coextension of thing-predicates will ensure the 
identity of the kinds of things. Causey's analysis was less 
successful in dealing with the connections to be established between 
properties. An exposition of Lewis gave an initial insight into how 
the identification of properties might be achieved, and Shoemaker's 
account of property identification provided the detailed means for 
doing this. Shoemaker's correlations between properties require it 
to be necessary de re that the properties realise the same causal 
potential in the objects that possess them. These will constitute 
sufficient grounds for establishing the identity of any properties 
that achieve this.
Admittedly, it will be extremely difficult, or impossible, to 
justify a claim for the identification of properties empirically. 
The introduction of a modal operator immediately removes the 
correlation from the realms of the empirically testable. Moreover 
there are problems in specifying exactly haw the potential causal
- 42 -
powers of objects are to be estimated or compared. This is indeed a 
problem for reduction, but it should not be taken to vitiate the 
analysis of this chapter. All that it was intended to offer here 
was a characterisation of the formal criteria for satisfying the 
condition of connectability for reduction. This has now been 
specified. Before a relation of reduction could plausibly be 
asserted, however, it would be necessary to provide comparable 
formal criteria for the Condition of Derivability as well. Both 
sets of criteria would need to be satisfied for reduction to obtain.
Finally, consideration will be given to the implications of the 
analysis of this chapter for the relation between theories of social 
phenomena and theories of individualistic phenomena. Is it 
plausible that CC could be satisfied between theories of these kinds 
as the first step in establishing that the relation between them is 
one of reduction? These considerations will be brief, since I take 
it that CC as specified above as one of two conditions for reduction 
makes reduction rather too rigorous a candidate to be taken very 
seriously for the socio-individualistic relation. In addition, it 
might well rule out other pairs of theories where the relation 
between them is far more uiversally accepted to be one of reduction. 
This should not be taken as a very serious objection to the present 
discussion, since weaker relations between theories will be 
developed and discussed in subsequent chapters.
There are a number of respects in which the relation between 
social and individualistic theories will struggle to satisfy CC.
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Firstly, with regard to the connections to be established between 
the entities of the two kinds of theories, Causey's analysis, on 
which my discussion largely relies, concentrated on micro-reductions 
in which the entities of T2 were taken to have parts which were 
found among the entities of Tl. This assumption cannot be accepted 
in the socio-individualistic case. Admittedly, social entities have 
parts which are individuals. The problem is that many social 
entities like clubs, institutions, organizations, political parties 
etc. have past and future members too who, while they may be 
individuals, are the entities of individualistic or psychological 
theories in a very tenuous sense only. This makes it impossible to 
identify such a social entity with any specific set or group of 
individualistic entities. Ve can never know, for instance, which 
individuals to include in the membership of an institution.® This 
is one sense in which the whole i.e. the social entity, is greater 
than the sum of its individualistic parts.
The socio-individualistic relation will also fail to satisfy CC 
for properties. The criterion for property identity of necessarily 
equivalent causal relevance requires that every social property make 
a causal contribution which is necessarily equivalent to the 
contribution of the individualistic property or properties with 
which it is correlated. It seems unlikely that the relation between 
social and individualistic theories will ever fulfil this criterion. 
Firstly there are the practical difficulties which will be 
encountered in implementing this criterion. Exactly haw the causal 
relevance of social and individualistic properties is to be
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evaluated and compared is far from clear, There is no obvious scale 
of causal relevance. Moreover, while it may be the case that 
physical theories are formulated rigorously, their social 
conterparts generally are not: a social theory is seldom available
as an integrated system of laws with the causal roles of all its 
properties precisely and unambiguously specified. This is 
admittedly merely a practical difficulty for the criterion, but 
there is a more serious conceptual one to be considered.
Social properties are generally used in a social context. Vhile 
they will not always be possessed by social objects or events (e.g\ 
an individualistic entity, say a woman, may have the social property 
of being Queen of England), social properties nonetheless convey 
social information - 'that Elizabeth II is Queen of England' is a 
social fact. By definition, the content of these properties is 
social and their relevance in a causal relation will be a social 
relevance, even though it may influence individuals. 
Individualistic properties function in exactly the converse way. 
Vhile they may be predicated of social objects, as in 'the Queen is 
right-handed', they will convey individualistic information and have 
individualistic causal relevance. In this instance it is the Queen 
as an individual and not as the Queen who is affected by being 
right-handed.
In the light of this, it is very unlikely that the causal 
significance of social and individualistic properties may ever be 
equated. Even if the two kinds of properties were possessed by the
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same objects - say the properties were necessarily coextensional - 
they would have different content, reflected by their different 
causal relevance in different contexts. Explanatory contexts may be 
cited as a case in point where it is very unlikely that an 
individualistic explanation - depending exclusively on 
individualistic entities and properties - could be substituted in 
all contexts where a social explanation was proffered without loss 
of explanatory content.
In this respect, the relation between social theories and 
theories of individuals will fail to satisfy CC. Given that CC is 
an essential part of reduction, it follows that the relation between 
social and individualistic theories cannot be one of reduction. 
This conclusion may seem premature, given that virtually nothing has 
been said about the condition of derivability, and the possibility 
that the relation between social and individualistic theories may 
satisfy this. It is possible, even plausible, that notwithstanding 
the difficulties encountered in obtaining rigorous correlations 
between the entities and properties of T2 and Tl, Tl may be able to 
explain everything that T2 can explain and the laws of T2 may be 
derivable from the laws of Tl.
Such considerations fall beyond the scope of this thesis. They 
would take us away from the metaphysical relation between social and 
individualistic theories which is our concern and into questions of 
epistemology and methodology. For this reason they are not being 
considered at all. Admittedly this leaves the discussion, as a
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discussion of reduction, incomplete. Yet as a discussion of the
conditions required for the metaphysical relation between social
theories and theories of individuals to be one of reduction, I hope
it is less so.
The relation between social theories and theories of individuals 
fails to satisfy the conditions for reduction. In particular, 
social entities and properties cannot be identified, by the criteria 
of identification discussed, with individualistic entities and 
properties. Where does this leave the discussion? One obvious line 
to pursue would argue that the theories are nonetheless related, but 
not by the relation of reduction, since the connections between
their entities and properties are weaker than identities. It is 
this possibility which will be considered in the next chapter.
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\CHAPTER.£ 
P.HISICALISM ASP DETEEMIEATIQH
Serious doubts have been cast on the possibility of ever 
establishing the reducibility of social theories to theories of 
individuals i.e. of reducing the social sciences to the psychology 
of individuals, neurophysiology and physics. The possibility of 
providing identities between social phenomena and individualistic 
phenomena seems unlikely to be achieved in practice or indeed to be 
achievable in principle. It is now time to consider what follows 
from this. In particular, in this chapter, an alternative position 
will be considered which, while denying the identities necessary for 
reduction, nonetheless asserts the priority of the physical and the 
dependence, in a way that will be elaborated, of all other levels 
of phenomena on physical phenomena. Such a view has been variously 
called physicalism, materialism or monism by those who have attacked 
or defended it.
It will be partly the purpose of this chapter to show that it is 
possible to defend such a position without simultaneously being 
committed to the existence of general identities between the 
phenomena of the two levels being related. In particular the 
physicalist position of Geoffrey Paul Heilman and Frank Vilson 
Thompson [Heilman and Thompson 1975] will be detailed and contrasted
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\with some alternative physicalist positions viz. those of Thomas 
Nagel [Nagel 1965] and Jaegwon Kim [Kim 1979], Some problems with 
this relation that have been discussed by Jaegwon Kim [ Ibid. ] and 
David Paplneau [Papineau 1985] will also be considered. I hope to 
show that the objections they raise to the theory of physicalism can 
be countered.
First it may be helpful to point out that in what follows, it is 
again only ontological or metaphysical considerations that will be 
of interest. The issues - no doubt important ones - of how events 
in the social realm are to be explained and whether or not such 
explanations can be comprehensive without including ineliminable 
reference to social phenomena, will not be touched on at all. This 
will simplify and focus the discussion considerably, without however 
removing all difficulties and points of philosophical interest.
There is one particular philosopher who has defended the 
position of physicalism without reduction and who has exerted a 
seminal influence on the debate. This is Donald Davidson, in his 
paper, "Mental Events" [Davidson 1980], In this paper, Davidson 
defends the position he calls anomalous monism. It is not my 
intention to assess Davidson's position in depth in this thesis. 
Suffice it to say that the premises on which the position is based 
and the arguments Davidson puts forward in support of it are not 
uncontentious. But any detailed evaluation of them would not be 
complete without a discussion of the broader philosophical position 
Davidson defends. This would lead into a philosophical detour which
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\I would not be confident of being able to conclude satisfactorily 
and which would not advance the main argument of this thesis.
Consequently, all that will be offered here is a brief outline 
of Davidson's position of anomalous monism. Some of its unique 
features will be highlighted. Then in the more detailed discussion 
which follows of Heilman and Thompson, Bagel, Kim and Paplneau, 
every attempt will be made to relate these positions back to the 
general context of Davidson's anomalous monism. This approach is 
not without difficulties, as Bagel's work on physicalism predates 
Davidson's, so there is no question of the former's position being 
Influenced by, or defended as a response to, the latter's. 
Botwithstandlng this, it is Davlsdon's anomalous monism which will 
be used as the starting point for this chapter, because it offers a 
prima facie plausible position which is weaker than reduction but 
nonetheless defends the priority of the physcal with regard to the 
mental.
Davidson's position emerges from the reconciliation of the 
following three premises which might, Initially, appear to be 
inconsistent.
i) The principle of causal interaction. This is the claim that at 
least some mental events cause physical events and at least some 
physical events cause mental ones. Examples of both kinds of 
interaction are not difficult to find.
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ii) The principle of the nomological character of causality. This 
principle asserts that all Instances of cause and effect relations 
are lawlike; any two events related as cause and effect fall under 
some strict deterministic law in virtue of being causally related.
iii) The anomalism of the mental. There are no strict 
deterministic laws in accordance with which mental events can be 
explained or predicted.
Premise <iii> entails that there are no strict psycho-physical 
laws. Consequently, causal relations between mental and physical 
events cannot rely on psycho-physical laws. Yet, in accordance with 
the principle of the nomological character of causality, premise 
(ii), they must rely on same laws. It follows, argues Davidson, 
that these laws will have to be physical laws. But physical laws 
relate events under physical description. Therefore physical events 
will be causally related to mental events under physical 
descriptions. Thus these mental events will be physical events i.e. 
there is a token-token identity between each of these mental events 
and some physical event. This token-token identity is significantly 
weaker than the type-type, or general, identity which would be 
required between events if a relation of reduction were to be 
defended. This provides an outline of Davidson's position of 
anomalous monism, a position which combines the causal depedence and 
the nomological independence of the mental with respect to the 
physical.
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The precise nature of the relation between the mental and the 
physical marks one of the strongest paints of disagreement among 
philosophers variously defending monism, physicalism or materialism. 
Are mental phenomena identical to physical phenomena and, if so, 
how exactly is this relation of identity to be interpreted? In 
addition to this, there is the question of whether or not the mental 
can be nomologically independent of the physical. These issues will 
emerge repeatedly in the ensuing discussions of the positions of 
Heilman and Thompson, Nagel, Kim and Papineau.
For Heilman and Thompson, there are two independent conditions, 
the joint satisfaction of which is necessary and sufficient for 
their position of physicalist materialism. These are the Principle 
of Physical Exhaustion (PPE) and the Principle of Physical 
Determination (PPD). The first condition, PPE, is individually 
necessary, but not sufficient for physicalist materialism. This 
condition represents the purely ontological claim that everything 
that there is, is exhausted by mathematical-physical entities. The 
second condition, (PPD), captures the idea that once the physical 
realm is fixed, all other levels of phenomena are thereby fixed as 
well.
Let us consider these two principles more closely, since it is 
their detailed formulation, and that of PPE in particular, which 
renders Heilman and Thompson's characterisation of physicalist 
materialism rather surprising and, I will argue, uniquely 
attractive. PPE asserts that
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"everything concrete is exhausted by basic physical 
objects, without thereby implying that everything is in 
the extension of a basic, physical predicate." CHeilman 
and Thompson 1975:555]
Heilman and Thompson take it as a sufficient condition for something
to be a physical entity that it satisfies a basic, positive,
physical predicate at a place. A list could be drawn up of all such
basic, physical predicates with their places of instantiation
specified i.e. where they apply to objects in space-time. Then, for
any object, a subset of the above set may be formed, whose elements
are all the physical predicates applicable to that object. This set
of predicates, given that its place of instantiation is specified,
will be satisfied by a unique object. In other words, the subset of
predicates has an extension at a concrete place which is satisfied
by one entity alone. This entity may then be said, in Heilman and
Thompson's vocabulary, to be exhausted by physical entities.
However there need be no one physical entity with which it is
identical; nor need this entity fall within the extension of any
single, basic, physical predicate.
The same reasoning may be applied to all entities. Consequently 
any entity, say a social entity such as the London Stock Exchange, 
can be given a characterisation in terms of multiple, basic, 
positive, physical predicates which will characterise that entity 
uniquely. This is the extent to which the social entity is 
exhausted by physical objects. Yet this does not imply that the 
entity is itself in the extension of a basic physical predicate i.e. 
the social entity is not identical (.pace Davidson) with any physical
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entity. Consequently, this does not make the object a physical 
object since it is the satisfaction of a basic, positive physical 
predicate at a place that constitutes a sufficient condition for an 
object's being a physical object.
It has been mentioned above that PPE is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, for Heilman and Thompson's position of 
physicalist materialism. The point is simply this: PPE is too weak
to cover the determination of all entities or phenomena by physical 
entitles or phenomena. The notion of physical exhaustion is a weak 
one in so far as it says nothing about the priority of the physical 
level over other levels of phenomena. It merely asserts that each 
object can be given some characterisation or other in terms of 
physical predicates, but it makes no claim that this physical 
characterisation underpins the object or is more fundamental than, 
say, the social characterisation of a social object.
In order to establish the priority of the physical, the 
Principle of Physical Determination is required. This principle,
PPD, states that if a comprehensive characterisation of the 
phenomena has been given in terms of physical predicates, then one 
and only one characterisation in terms of social or psychological 
predicates can be given with which it is compatible. In other 
words, once the physical level has been fixed, the social and 
psychological levels will also have been fixed if the physical level 
determines the social and psychological levels. Another way of
expressing this, would be to say that
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"If one kind or realm of facts determines another, then, 
at a minimum, the truth values of sentences expressing 
facts in the latter realm cannot vary without variance of 
the truth values of sentences expressing facts of the 
former kind." [Ibid.:558]
An analogous version of the principle can be given for references of
the terms of one level determining the references of the terms of
the other level.
There are two points related to PPD which are worth noting. The 
first is that PPD will Involve the establishment of connections
between the terms of the determining and the determined levels of 
phenomena. Heilman and Thompson call these connections 'bridge 
laws', which is potentially misleading, since these so-called 
'bridge laws' are by no means sufficient conditions for reduction 
(which is arguably the sense in which bridge laws have been used by 
others, notably Ernest Nagel [Nagel 1961: Ch.11]). The second
point to note in connection with PPD is that it is making a modal
claim viz. that the truth values of sentences at the determined
level cannot vary without a variation in the truth values of 
sentences at the determining level. The strength of this modal 
operator needs to be specified. Heilman and Thompson are very 
precise on this: the modal operator refers to scientific
possibility. Thus PPD ranges over different possible worlds in all 
of which the laws of science hold.
These two principles, PPE and PPD, jointly constitute the
version of physicalism which Heilman and Thompson believe is 
plausible. Before we will be in a position to assess their claim,
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it will be helpful to see how this position differs from reduction. 
If all entities are exhausted by physical entities and if physical 
phenomena determine all the phenomena there are, then there seems to 
be at least a prima facie case for claiming that Heilman and 
Thompson's position is just a version of reduction. The grounds on 
which they deny this charge will be considered. To do this, another 
of their principles needs to be introduced, viz. the Principle of 
Physical Indiscernibles. This principle, which is a version of 
Leibniz' Law, states that two objects which have all their physical 
predicates in common, will necessarily be the same object. This is 
very close to the claim made by PPD for the relation between the 
truth values of sentences at the determining and determined levels.
From the Principle of Physical Indiscernibles, together with
PPE, it can be inferred that if two objects have different social or
psychological predicates, then there must be a difference in their 
physical predicates. The latter point amounts to the claim that 
there can be no social/psychological difference or change without 
some physical difference or change. These two claims can be 
expressed formally as follows, where y ranges over physical 
predicates, y ranges over nonphysical predicates and u and v are 
arbitrary objects:
1) (t/u) (Vv) (Vy) i (y u e yv) -» (u = v)>
2) fl/y) (Vu) (Vv> C3y) {(yu & -yv> -* (yu & -yv)>
There is a crucial difference between the claim expressed by <2> and 
that of (3):
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3) (ty> t3y) (Vu) (Vv) {(yu & -yv) -» (fu & -fv))
(3) Implies the following claim, as Heilman and Thompson have 
pointed out, by first order quantifier logic, provided / is neither 
universal nor null CIbid.:556, JTote 81:
3') <Ky) i3f) <Vu) (yu e fiu)
Their qualification has to be taken to rule out the possibility of 
(3) being true, purely by virtue of yu being false. If yu is false, 
(yu & -yv) is false and so <(yu & -yv) -» <yu & -yv>> is 
automatically true.
However, in this scenario, it would be quite possible for <3') 
to be true. This would contradict Heilman and Thompson's claim that 
(3) implies (3*). For this claim to hold, yu must not be false. On 
reflection this is not an unreasonable caveat, as their whole 
position hinges on the physical predicates attributable to objects 
which underpin the non-physical predicates of those objects. They 
have no need to consider predicates, physical or otherwise, which 
are not attributable to objects.
The difference between (2) and (3) can be illustrated by the 
following example in which (2*) and <3*) differ in an analogous way: 
(2*) Everyone loves someone.
(3*) There is someone everyone loves.1
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(3) and <3*) amount to the claim that every non-physical 
predicate is extensionally equivalent to a physical predicate, This 
may be construed as a weak form of reduction, implying that a 
definition of any non-physical property can be given in terms of 
physical properties, or at least that a coextension between the two 
can be established. Heilman and Thompson's claim, (2), does not 
assert this. Indeed, they deny that their position of physicalist 
materialism makes any claims about reduction, or even about 
accidental extensional equivalences between physical and non­
physical predicates. It is essential for an understanding of their 
position that the difference is recognized between PPE, an 
ontological principle, and (3) and (3‘) above.
PPE asserts that every object is exhausted by physical objects; 
it is linked to (2) above, which is a claim about predicates, 
asserting that for every predicate distinction at the nonphysical 
(e.g. social) level, there is a physical predicate which makes the 
same distinction. Ho generalization, accidental or lawlike, is 
implied by Heilman and Thompson's claims. By contrast, claims (3) 
and (3') are much stronger, to the extent that they require the 
existence of identities or coextensions between the predicates, or 
possibly the properties, of the physical and non-physical levels.
Heilman and Thompson's ontological claim and the stronger claims 
of (3) and (3') are independent. Non-physical objects may be 
exhausted by physical objects, in the sense detailed earlier, even
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though there are no coextensions between nonphysical and physical 
predicates or properties. It is fairly intuitive to see that claim 
(2) above does not imply claims (3) or (3'), since it is weaker than 
them. But Heilman and Thompson have also shown that the 
definitional claims, (3) and (3*), do not imply the exhaustion of 
one level of phenomena by the other. In particular, they have 
demonstrated the possibility of constructing a simple theory in 
which all macro-predicates are definable in terms of micro- 
predicates, yet in which the macro-entities are not exhausted by 
micro-entities CIbid.:557]. This completes the proof of the 
independence of the ontological claim of physicalist materialism and 
any claims for the identity or co-extensionality.2
To develop an ontological claim for physicalism, which requires 
neither identities nor coextensions between entities, is the great 
advance that Heilman and Thompson have made in this debate. In so 
far as it was the establishment of identities between properties of 
the reduced and reducing levels which brought serious attempts at 
reduction to grief, this position is superior, having avoided all 
such problems. However, whereas reduction is essentially a programme 
that accommodates scientific advance and the development of new 
laws, linking phenomena which were previously thought to have been 
of distinct kinds, Heilman and Thompson’s physicalist materialism 
has no claim to be such a naturalistic doctrine. The establishment 
of their ontological claim is extremely artificial and is mostly 
likely to satisfy philosophers only. Hontheless, it cannot be 
denied that it contributes to a defence of the priority of physics
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by offering a unique characterisation of how everything might be 
physical, without each non-physical entity being identical with some 
physical entity.3
Notwithstanding differences with regard to the identity of the 
mental and the physical, there is a certain prima facie agreement 
between Heilman and Thompson on the one hand and Davidson on the 
other since Heilman and Thompson's physicalist materialism does not 
rely on the existence of any lawlike generalized biconditionals 
(psycho-physical laws) between mental and physical predicates.
Heilman and Thompson's position of physicalist materialism has 
now been considered in some detail. However, they are not the only 
ones to have defended such a position. It will be instructive to 
draw some comparisons between their position and some of the other 
physicalist positions. Firstly, Thomas Nagel's position in [Nagel 
19651 will be considered. Nagel defines physicalism as
"the thesis that a person, with all his psychological 
attributes, is nothing over and above his body, with all 
its physical attributes." [Ibid.:339]
Presumably this characterisation would be broad enough for Heilman
and Thompson to have no quarrel with it. It is also correspondingly
vague and, consequently, not especially interesting. But Nagel goes
on to specify a more precise typography of four different versions
of physicalism of varying strengths. Nagel's typography is as
follows:
"i)An implausibly strong physicalism might assert the 
existence of a general identity between each 
psychological condition and a physical counterpart.
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ii)A weaker view would assert some general identities, 
particularly on the level of sensation, and 
particular identities for everything that remains.
iii)A still weaker view might not require that a 
physical condition be found identical even in the 
particular case with every psychological condition, 
especially if it were an intensional one.
iv)The weakest conceivable view would not even assert 
any particular identities, but of course it is 
unclear what other assertion by such a theory about 
the relation between mental and physical conditions 
might amount to a contention of physicalism."
[Ibid.:340]
This typography relies on two main distinctions: firstly there
is the distinction between particular and general identities, 
secondly there is the rather looser distinction between 
psychological states of the sensation variety and those of the 
intensional variety. With regard to the latter distinction, Nagel 
is surely right to assume that it will undoubtedly be easier to 
establish firmer correlations between sensation states and physical 
states than between Intensional states and physical states. This 
distinction between kinds of mental states has not been invoked 
above, not because it is irrelevant or implausible, but rather 
because we have been concentrating on the more difficult states to 
characterise physically, viz. intensional states, on the assumption 
that if a physicalist position can accommodate these, it will almost 
certainly be able to accommodate the sensation states as well. So 
Nagel's second distinction will not be of undue concern to us.
The first distinction, between general and particular identities 
will be important, however. One way of understanding this 
distinction is to see it as parallelling the distinction between
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type-type identities and token-token identities. Characterised 
thus, it will also enable us to relate the physicalist position of 
Bagel back to Davidson's anomalous monism, since the latter is 
formulated in terms of token-token identities.
Bagel himself seems to think that, while it may be passible to 
get general identities between some kinds of sensation states and 
physical states, this would be most unlikely, if not impassible, for 
intensional mental states. From this it fallows that version (ii) 
of physicalism is the strongest one he would wish to defend. The 
only versions he considers seriously are (ii) and (iii), since he is 
uncertain that (iv) is a statement of physicalism at all. If we 
restrict ourselves to Bagel's typography for the moment, then it 
seems that the only version of physicalism which Heilman and 
Thompson could be seen as defending would be (iv). This should not 
be surprising, when it is remembered that Heilman and Thompson 
specifically deny the existence of identities between types or 
tokens of non-physical and physical entities or predicates. Heilman 
and Thompson's characterisation of physical exhaustion and physical 
determination are meant to provide just such another assertion
"about the relation between mental and physical 
conditions [which] might amount to a contention of 
physicalism." [See category (iv) of Bagel's typography, 
above]
However, it remains slightly puzzling just what the relation is 
between non-physical and physical predicates for Heilman and 
Thompson. They describe it partly as physical exhaustion, but this 
is rather metaphorical. While they clearly mean to rule out the
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possibility of the connections between non-physical and physical 
predicates and entities being type-type identities, it is not quite 
so obvious why the connections could not be token-token identities. 
At one point, Heilman and Thompson describe the connections as 
bridge laws [Heilman and Thompson 1975:5593, but this is rather 
misleading since they appear to construe 'bridge laws' as provided 
by any connections between phenomena of the two levels.
The existence of bridge laws is not supposed to conflict with 
their claim that
"the truth of physicalism is compatible with the utter 
absence of lawlike or even accidental generalized bicon­
ditionals connecting any number of predicates of the 
higher-level sciences with those of physics."
[Ibid.:5543
This, in turn, must be taken to be consistent with the following:
"physicalism without reductionism does not rule out 
endless lawful connections between higher-level and 
basic physical sciences." [Ibid.:5523
This makes the Heilman and Thompson position a fairly complex one to
put together. Let us construe it as the claim that, although there
may be some instances of lawful connections between non-physical and
physical predicates and entities, (presumably these would take the
form of lawlike generalized biconditionals), other non-physical
predicates and entities may not even be related to physical
predicates and entities by accidental generalized biconditionals.
Nonetheless, even the latter non-physical predicates and entities
are exhausted and determined, in the senses of PPE and PPD discussed
above, by physical predicates and entities.*
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The important thing to consider is surely the status of these 
so-called exhaustive connections which may be weaker than accidental 
generalized biconditionals. There seem to be two options: either
they are not generalized, or they are not biconditionals. If they 
are biconditionals, but not generalized, then surely Heilman and 
Thompson's position is in agreement with Fagel's version (ii) of 
physicalism, since particular biconditionals are just what Fagel has 
in mind for the sorts of identities possible between intensional 
mental states and physical states. Furthermore, I can make no sense 
of particular biconditionals other than to see them in Davidson's 
terms as token-token identities. Mere coextension will not suffice 
even for Heilman and Thompson's position.
However, given that Heilman and Thompson deny that they rely on 
identities, perhaps this is not what they have in mind after all. 
Perhaps their connections are not biconditionals. This still leaves 
open the possibility for them to be either generalized or not. This 
canstrual is possibly more in accordance with one of the formalized 
claims of their position given above. Once again, y and y stand for 
non-physical and physical predicates respectively, and u and v for 
arbitrary objects.
2) (Vy) (Vu) (Vv) (3y) ((yu & -yv) -» (yu & -yv>>
The logical connective here is very clearly not a biconditional. 
Indeed they explicitly deny the version of this claim, with the 
quantifiers' positions switched, which would support a
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biconditional. So the more plausible way to construe their 
physicalism would seem to be without biconditionals. If
biconditionals are necessary for identities, their position does not 
assert identities and is thus not analogous to Fagel’s version (ii) 
or (iii). It would then have to be categorized under Fagel’s 
category (iv). Furthermore, on the issue of generalization, Heilman 
and Thompson’s claim is generalized to the extent that it covers all 
nan-physical predicates, but it is not generalized in so far as it 
asserts only a token-token connection for each particular 
instantiation of every non-physical predicate and not a generalized 
or type-type connection.
There seems to be one outstanding question: is the token-token
connection which Heilman and Thompson assert between each non­
physical predicate and some construct of physical predicates not the 
same sort of connection as Fagel would term a particular identity, 
and Davidson a token-token identity? I am inclined to think that it 
is, notwithstanding Heilman and Thompson's claim that the physical 
component of the connection will usually not be the extension of a 
basic, physical predicate, but will more often be a composite 
predicate, consisting of multiple, basic, positive physical 
predicates. Of course, to call such a connection an identity, does 
not undermine the distinction between their position of physicalism 
and reduction, since such particular, token-token identities could 
never provide the identities between types or kinds of non-physical 
predicates and the physical predicates which reduction requires. 
Ultimately, however, it can make little difference whether or not
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the connection is called an identity. Some of the remarks below 
will have greater bearing on this issue.
Nagel is concerned to defuse the standard objections to identity 
theories by showing how the version of physicalism he is defending 
is not susceptible to them. (Of course, if Heilman and Thompson 
really can do without Identities, then they would not have to answer 
these objections at all.) The objections are fairly standard ones:
i. if mental states are Identical to physical states, then how is 
it that physical states have a definite location whereas mental 
states do not?
ii. Physicalism appears unable to account for the privacy and 
incorrigibility of our mental states - if we are in a certain 
mental state, then we cannot fail to be aware of this, whereas 
the same could not be said of our brain states.
Nagel's response to these is three-fold, with (a) and (b) 
addressing objection (i), and (c) addressing (ii).
a. The first objection is that any projected mind-brain identity
theory will conflict with Leibniz' law which states that any two
identical things will have all their non-modal and non-intensional
properties in common. To avoid this objection, Nagel proposes to
consider the identities, not between mental states and brain states
per se, but rather the identification of
"a person's having the sensation Cor other mental 
state! with his body's being in a physical state, or 
undergoing a physical process. Notice that both terms 
of this identity are of the same logical type,
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namely...a subject's possessing a certain attribute." 
tNagel 1965:341]
Thus the identification is not between a mental state and something 
physical i.e. a brain state, but rather between the mental state of 
a person and that person's physical state. At least on the question 
of their location, this identification seems to be relatively 
unproblematic.
b. Nagel's second response is to distinguish between strict 
identities and theoretical identities and to opt only for the 
latter. Let us consider this distinction. Strict identities are 
those which conform to Leibniz' law, and the relation of strict 
identity may hold between things, events or conditions. Theoretical 
identities are weaker than strict identities and depend, for Nagel, 
on the common possession of causal and conditional attributes. 
(This is closely analogous to the identity criteria for properties 
discussed in the previous chapter on reduction.) Two entities which 
are strictly identical will automatically have all their causal and 
conditional attributes in common and will thus be theoretically 
identical as well. However, in the case of events or attributes 
which are not strictly identical, it may nonetheless be possible to 
establish that they share all their causal and conditional 
attributes.
This would follow from the discovery of the general laws in 
virtue of which the causal relations are, or would be, instantiated. 
This is the procedure most often used when reductive identifications
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are established in the natural sciences e.g. the identification of 
temperature with mean kinetic energy could be construed as having 
been established in this way. Vhat has been established in this 
case is that temperature and mean kinetic energy have the same 
causal potential; they have the same actual and potential causes 
and effects. It is on the basis of this sort of identity that Hagel 
wishes to establish his version of physicalism. It is also on the 
basis of this claim that his position differs most sharply from some 
other physicalist positions, notably that of Davidson.
If they are to satisfy this condition of theoretical identity, 
the connections between mental and physical attributes or properties 
will have to be more than constant conjunctions. Indeed both 
particular and general theoretical identities will have to follow 
from general laws or a general theory. This might seem to be a 
surprisingly strong criterion at first glance. However, it is 
qualified, for Hagel recognises the possibility that
"the common possession of conditional attributes can 
follow for a particular case from general laws, without 
its being true that there is a general correlation 
between macroscopic and microscopic phenomena of that 
type." [Ibid.:348]
Vhat this qualification amounts to is the recognition that
mental (or other macro-) properties may be variably realised by
physical (or other micro-) properties, so the correlation between
them may be one-many. Each mental-physical disjunctive, theoretical
identity must, however, hold in virtue of a general law.
"The technical sense in which even in such cases the 
particular identity must be an instance of a general one 
is that it must be regarded as an instance of the 
identity between the macroscopic phenomenon and the
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disjunction of all those microscopic phenomena which are 
associated with it in the manner described, via general 
laws." [Ibid.:348-493
Hagel concedes that not all cases of variable realisation will 
hold in virtue of general laws. Very briefly, he describes such 
correlations as evidence of a non-symmetrical relation of 
’...consists of...', which he denies is a variety of identity. In 
these cases, the disjunction of micro-states will be too diverse to 
fall under any general laws. Fagel cites the example of World War 
II and all the actions and events which constituted it as an example 
of a macro-property-micro-property relation where the correlated 
micro-property is a conjunction of properties which are too numerous 
and diverse to fall under a general law as a unique entity.
It seems highly likely that this will be the case for most 
macro-micro relations at the social level. Of more immediate 
significance, though, it seems that Heilman and Thompson’s relation 
of physical exhaustion would fall under this category too, as it is 
extremely unlikely that there would ever be general laws between 
mental predicates and the complex constructs of basic physical 
predicates on which their connections depend. Thus if Nagel's 
characterisation of identity is accepted, then it would certainly be 
passible to accommodate the connections between mental and physical 
phenomena which Heilman and Thompson envisage, without insisting 
that they are identities. This argument will be revisited later in 
this chapter when Papineau's position on the determination of the 
social by the individualistic is discussed.
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c. Finally, Nagel's third response to the objections raised against 
identity theories concerns the issue of the inherent subjectivity of 
mental states.
"The feeling that physicalism leaves out of account the 
essential subjectivity of psychological states is the 
feeling that nowhere in the description of the state of 
a human body could there be room for a physical 
equivalent of the fact that I (or any self), and not
just that body, am the subject of those states."
[Ibid.:3543
His response to this is largely to defuse the objection by showing
that it is certainly not an objection unique to physicalism. Rather
it is one which has to be answered by all theories of the mind which 
construe psychological states as attributes of a substance. 
Consequently, it is of no great significance if physicalism cannot 
answer it, since most alternative theories fare equally badly.
I would agree that if the subjectivity of the mental is a 
problem for physicalism, then it is also a problem for other 
theories of the mind. But is it in fact such a problem?® To claim 
that there is a problem seems to beg the question against 
physicalism. It also seems to make an intensional fallacy: the
fact that we can know incorrigibly that we are in a given mental 
state should not be taken as an argument against the claim that 
mental properties and events are identical with physical properties 
and events. Identity claims, even those involved in strict 
identity, only cover non-modal and non-intensional properties. But 
my subjective awareness of my mental states is surely intensional, 
in which case it does not create a problem. To take it as non-
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intensional i.e. as objective in some sense, is certainly to 
prejudge the issue against any identity theory.
The subjectivity objection will not be considered further, since 
it has little direct bearing on the debate as applied to the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena. The main 
difference between Hagel's physicalism and Heilman and Thompson's 
physicalist materialism thus appears to be that Hagel sanctions 
identities between mental and physical properties and events whereas 
Heilman and Thompson deny that physicalism depends on these. 
Heilman and Thompson thus provide substance to Hagel's version <iv) 
of physicalism. Moreover, Hagel Insists that identities should hold 
in virtue of general laws established between the mental and 
physical, whereas Heilman and Thompson deny that psycho-physical 
laws are necessary to establish physicalism.
Ultimately in this thesis I intend to apply some such relation 
as is being considered here, to the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena. In this domain, the existence of general 
socio-individualistic laws linking each social predicate or property 
to some individualistic predicate'or disjunction of the same, looks 
extremely unlikely. Consequently, a position which required there 
to be laws would fail to be applicable from the outset. A position
which did not rely on laws would be more attractive. This must
count in favour of Heilman and Thompson's physicalist materialism
and against Hagel's physicalism. Moreover, their position, in this
respect, is broadly in favour with Davidson's position. However,
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there is a significant difference between their respective
positions: Heilman and Thompson do not rule out the possibility of
such laws linking mental and physical phenomena, while Davidson
does.
In this respect, for the following reason, Heilman and 
Thompson's position seems more plausible than Davidson's. Many 
human industries would appear to rely totally on the possibility, 
and indeed the instantiation, of psycho-physical laws. Consider, 
for example, the chef, the perfume-maker or the piano-tuner: Each
relies on the evocation of specific mental states, admittedly
phenomenal ones, through the performance of certain physical 
actions. This would surely rely on wildly implausible coincidences 
unless there were at least generalized conditionals known to hold 
between these mental and physical states. Admittedly it is 
considerably more difficult - perhaps impossible - to find examples 
of similar generalized conditionals between intensional mental 
states and physical ones.
Yet Davidson's anomalous monism is certainly intended to be
generalizable to all mental states, both intensional and phenomenal:
"In order to establish anomalous monism in full 
generality it would be sufficient to show that every 
mental event is cause or effect of some physical event;
I shall not attempt this." [Davidson 1970:2243
So the above examples suggest that, while Davidson's monism nay be
generalizable, the anomalism of it might not be. Heilman and
Thompson's position is not open to this sort of criticism and for
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this reason seems to be preferable. It is on this particular issue 
- whether or not laws linking the two levels of phenomena in a 
relation of determination can be provided - that Jaegwon Kim enters 
the debate.
Kim endorses the view that the possibility of psycho-physical
laws between all mental states and some physical states cannot be
ruled out. In the following passage, Kim is arguing specifically
against Davidson, but effectively against any position which
advocates physicalism without the existence of laws linking physical
pheomena with non-physical phenomena:
"Davidson's arguments for mental anomalism are geared 
specifically to intentional mental attitudes, such as 
beliefs, desires, hopes, and regrets, and appear to 
ignore altogether those mental events often called 
'phenomenal' or 'phenomenological', namely raw feels, 
visual images, and the like. It seems to me that it is 
an important working assumption of those engaged in 
neurophysiological and neuropsychological research that 
there are lawlike correlations between sensory events 
and neural processes, and that the uncovering of these 
correlations is an extremely important goal of their 
research." CKim 1979:34]
Kim goes even further than this, to question the reasonableness
of asserting token-token identities between mental and physical
events (intensional or phenomenal ones) without relying on any
psycho-physical laws. His argument against law-independent token-
token identities is the following: on what basis would it be
decided that the projected physical instantiation of a mental event
was the right one?
"It is difficult to see how such neurophysiological 
descriptions can be chosen apart from our discovery of 
psychoneural correlations between phenomenal mental 
events, such as pains and tinglings, on the one hand, 
and certain underlying neural processes on the other.
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Moreover, it is difficult to see why such correlations 
should fail to be 'lawlike' in any relevant and 
appropriate sense of this expression. For they seem to 
be just the sort of empirical correlations that are 
subject to confirmation by observation of favorable 
instances, and that can support counterfactuals."
[Ibid.:33-43
Perhaps it is unfortunate that Kim's arguments are couched in 
terms of phenomenal identities, since for these it seems relatively 
easy to concede (pace Davidson) that there most probably are, or 
will be, psycho-physical laws. The more difficult case to prove 
must surely be the one for intensional mental states. Yet Kim's 
arguments can be directly applied to these as well. Davidson 
insists that token-token identities between intensional mental 
events and physical events can be established. But then, how could 
it be ascertained that the correct physical token had been 
correlated with the intensional mental token? Or, more generally, 
what are the criteria of token-token identity?
This is surely a serious criticism of Davidson's position and 
one which seems to undermine the very core of anomalous monism. 
Davidson, to my knowledge, does not defend himself here. However, 
before continuing to consider Kim's proposal for a solution to this 
dilemma, it should be noted that not all physicalist positions would 
be open to the same objection. As has been mentioned, Heilman and 
Thompson do not deny the possibility of laws linking the determined 
and determining levels of phenomena. Moreover, their Principles of 
Physical Exhaustion and Physical Determination provide formalised 
criteria for the relation between the phenomena in question. That 
they are not described as criteria of token-token identity simply
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reflects the fact that Heilman and Thompson deny that the relation 
is one of identity.
But to return to Kim and his quest for identity criteria for 
token-token identity: he claims that all we have are lawlike
psycho-physical correlations; we rely on psycho-physical laws for 
establishing physical correlates for both phenomenal and intensional 
mental states. However, this by no means solves all the problems. 
On the contrary, this raises new difficulties far physicalism in 
connection with psycho-physical causation. It is the discussion of 
these difficulties which will concern us for most of the rest of 
this chapter since it seems to be of crucial importance for any 
physical ist theory that it should be able to deal with them. 
Furthermore, a discussion of them can serve to highlight the 
defensibility or otherwise of Kim's position.
Vhat then are the problems for physicalism that causal laws 
introduce? According to Kim there are three interrelated 
difficulties which arise in connection with psycho-physical 
causation. He calls these:
i) The problem of pre-emption,
ii) The problem of spurious overdetermination, and
iii) The problem of spurious partial cause.
Mare generally, (i), (ii) and (iii) are jointly referred to as the
problem of nomological danglers. Consider the following example: 
the desire for chocolate (a mental event) causes X to reach out her
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hand and grab some <a physical event). Let the mental event be It 
and the physical event, P. So M causes P. But, according to Kim's 
position, M is nomologically correlated with some physical event, 
say Q. M and Q are 'simultaneous nomic equivalents' [Ibid.: 351. Ve 
seem to be faced with a case in which M causes P and Q causes P 
simultaneously. The problem of pre-emption relates to the apparent 
pre-emption of M by Q as the cause of P. The precise example that 
Kim uses concerns pain causing the withdrawal of a limb. The pain, 
M, he argues, is correlated with some neural state, Q, which, in the 
light of our theories of neurophysiology, is more likely to be 
construed as the cause of the limb withdrawal, P. But then the pain 
appears to be pre-empted as the cause in this relation.
The second problem, that of spurious overdetermination, arises 
if both It and Q, the pain and its neural correlate, are construed as 
each being an individually sufficient cause of the limb withdrawal. 
In this case there would need to be two laws, (all causal relations 
are subsumed under general laws), one linking M and P and the other 
linking Q and P. Hence this is a case of dual causation and faces 
the immediate problem of why it is not an instance of causal 
overdetermination. Intuitively though, the limb withdrawal does not 
seem to be overdetermined.
Thirdly, there is the problem of spurious partial cause which 
arises when both M and Q are taken to be the cause of P. From this 
it follows that both are linked to P in accordance with laws. Thus 
it would not be physically possible to set up an experiment in which
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P and only one of the causes was present. Hence there is no reason
for denying that each event, M and Q, is only part of the cause, but
that neither is sufficient on its own. But this too runs counter to
our intuitions.
"Thus, given that M and [Q] are simultaneous nomic 
equivalents, we need an explanation of why it is wrong 
to think of them as only necessary causes of the 
motion of the limb, rather than individually 
sufficient causes of it." [Ibid.:36]
These three problems can be summarised as follows:
"If a mental event M has a simultaneous physiological 
equivalent, it becomes a dangling cause, dangling from 
its physical correlate, and its causal role is 
threatened. Given what we know of the essentially 
discontinuous nature of our mental life, there is an 
irresistible push toward accepting the physical 
correlate as the real substantive cause of whatever 
the mental event is initially thought to cause. The
causal potency of the mental is in need of
vindication. " tIbid.]
There are a few comments to be made on this issue of nomological 
danglers. Firstly it seems to be no accident that Kim’s example for 
all three problems uses pain and its neuronal correlate. This is no 
doubt an area where neurophysiology is relatively well developed. 
Quite a lot is known about how the brain is affected by pain. 
Consequently, it is not unduly difficult to construe the neuronal 
correlate of pain as the cause of the limb withdrawal. However, 
consider again the example of the desire for chocolate causing X to 
reach out and grab some. In this case it would be far less
intuitive to think of a neuronal state as pre-empting the desire in
its causal role. This might be because, even if a neural state 
coextensive with the desire were to be discovered, we might still be 
doubtful of attributing causal powers to it in this example because
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we lack a general theory of the neural states which underpinned 
states of desire. The problem of nomological danglers here is not 
so much eliminated as defused. Vhere there is a scientific theory 
which supports and possibly explains the correlations, we might be 
ready to accept that the more fundamental phenomena play the more 
basic causal role. Indeed it is more than likely that such a theory 
would convincingly endorse psycho-neural identities, thereby 
eliminating the problem of nomological danglers altogether.
So we are not unduly bothered to construe the neuronal state as 
pre-empting the pain because we are ready to accept the beginnings 
of a neurophysiological theory of pain, which identifies pain with 
certain neurophysiological states. Ve are less happy to think of a 
neural state pre-empting desire, primarily because we doubt the 
plausibility of a neurophysiological theory of desires or of 
intensional states more generally. In this respect, is Kim not 
wrong to concentrate his argument exclusively on the phenomenal 
case, since it seems unlikely that the intensional case will follow 
by the same reasoning? Moreover, it seems that intensional states 
are going to be the more recalcitrant, and consequently the more 
interesting, for any position of physicalism to incorporate. In 
connection with these mental states, my sympathies lie with Davidson 
and his denial of psycho-physical laws or more specifically with 
Heilman and Thompson who simply manage to do without them. Also, it 
has been pointed out above that Heilman and Thompson's position does 
indeed offer criteria for their relation, albeit not for identity.
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Nagel too, in defending his position of physicalism, offers 
criteria for identity. Nagel’s distinction between strict 
identities and theoretical identities - according to which the 
latter were established on the grounds of conditional attributes or 
causal potential - can be accepted as providing reasonable criteria 
for token-token identity. If it can be established empirically that 
certain mental states have the same causal role as some neural 
states, then the mental and neuronal states can be theoretically 
identified. The problem of nomological danglers could be solved in 
this way for him. The overdetermination would not arise as a 
problem since the two causes, mental and neural, would be correlated 
precisely on the grounds of satisfying the same causal role. 
Similarly, it would not be reasonable to construe one cause as pre­
empting the other: rather they should be construed as dual
manifestations of the same cause. Finally, no experiment could
yield the effect preceded by one cause without the other because 
they were one and the same cause. They would be parts of a joint
whole in a sense analogous to the one in which different
descriptions of one thing may all be required for a fully
comprehensive description of that thing.
Ve have seen that the problem which Kim sets out to resolve, 
while it is probably fatal for Davidson's position, is not equally 
damning for the other physicalist positions under consideration. 
Indeed Heilman and Thompson and Nagel offer their own resolution for 
their respective positions. For various reasons as discussed above, 
our sympathies have come down in favour of Heilman and Thompson.
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Thus far, various attempts to characterise a position which 
defends the priority of the physical, without endorsing the 
reduction of all theories to physical theories, have been 
considered. Although the problems detailed in Chapter 1 ruled out 
the possibility of establishing type-type identities and hence the 
Condition of Connectability for reduction, the establishment of 
token-token identities, or something comparable in the case of 
Heilman and Thompson, seems to be plausible. Token-token identities 
would support a position of physicalism without reduction. 
Different versions of physicalism have been examined. In 
considering the token-token identities which these theories endorse, 
it has been discussed whether or not they rely on causal laws.
Kim has argued that, where there are no critera of token-token 
identity, all we can establish, on the basis of psycho-physical, 
causal laws, are simultaneous nomic equivalences between physical 
and non-physical states or properties. However this introduction of 
causal laws into the analysis raises problems which he attempts to 
resolve.
Kim's solution to the problems of pre-emption, overdetermination
and partial cause is set out in far greater detail in his defense of
supervenience as the relation between mental and physical phenomena,
an account which
"does not deprive the mental of its causal powers; it 
holds only that their causal powers are dependent an 
the causal powers of underlying physical processes."
[Ibid.:48]
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Some such resolution is mandatory before the discussion can move on 
to consider an individualistic analogue of the relation of 
physicalism which could be offered as a serious candidate for the 
relation between social theories and theories of individuals.
The remaining chapters of this thesis will consider supervenience in 
detail and its application to the social sciences in particular. 
Any doubts about token-token identity which remain will be dealt 
with there. Before concluding this chapter, though, and moving on 
to consider supervenience exclusively, it will be worth examining 
the work of some other philosophers who have considered the problem 
of nomological danglers, particularly in the form that most directly 
concerns us, viz. in the relation between social and individual 
phenomena. To do this most effectively, I wish to highlight an 
issue which has been touched on in passing in this chapter. It will 
have direct bearing on the discussion which follows.
This is the issue of the diversity of properties from the 
lower-level or determining theory i.e. physical properties in the 
physical-mental relation, individualistic properties in the 
individualistic-social relation. It will influence an assessment of 
the nomological dependence or independence of the two theories and 
the priority of one over the other. The suggestion that properties 
in the lower-level theory may be so diverse as to make it impossible 
far them to yield laws reflecting the laws of the higher-level 
theory has been emerging throughout this chapter. By drawing the 
threads together, their significance should become clearer.
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Heilman and Thompson's position has featured prominently in this 
chapter. Their Principle of Physical Exhaustion is the first 
statement suggestive of diversity. This principle draws a 
distinction between objects which are in the extension of basic, 
physical predicates and basic physical objects. Heilman and 
Thompson claim that every entity can be characterised by a 
collection of physical predicates although it may not be 
characterised by one basic, physical predicate. The determining 
base here may be imagined as a vast collection of bits - the 
physical predicates - which are collected at particular times into 
all the different physical objects. In this respect, Heilman and 
Thompson's position is different from other physicalist positions. 
Furthermore it bears little resemblance to any scientific theory. 
Consequently it seems fairly safe to say that the physicalist base 
in their theory is unlikely to have its own laws. But perhaps this 
would have been too much to expect from such an unorthodox theory 
anyway. What though of the other theories which offer a rather more 
traditional approach to interpreting the lower level theory?
Consider Nagel's theory. His position centres around a claim 
for theoretical identities between the two levels of phenomena in 
question. These identities depend on the common possession of 
causal and conditional attributes and the causal relations 
reflecting this are instantiated in general laws. However, Nagel 
concedes that while a specific instantiation of two entities having 
common causal properties may follow from a general law, there may 
not always be a general law linking such specific higher- and lower-
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level entities [Nagel 1965:348]. In particular, the connection 
between higher- and lower-level entities m y  be one-many, where one 
higher-level entity m y  be correlated with m n y  different lower- 
level entities. This of itself is rather uncontroversial, but Nagel 
goes on to admit that in some instances, the one-mny connections 
m y  not hold in virtue of general laws at all. This is the more 
interesting case for our purposes.
Nagel describes a relation of "...consists of..." which 
sometimes holds between the entities of two levels of phenomena. It 
too is an asymmetrical, one-mny relation but it does not hold by 
virtue of a general law. This is because the lower-level disjuncts 
are simply too diverse and possibly also too numerous to fall under 
any general law as a unique entity. While Nagel’s position here 
seems intuitively plausible, it lacks any rigorous argument to 
support it. If our intention is ultimtely to claim that such a 
relation obtains between social and individualistic phenomena, 
thereby denying claims about general laws between them, or denying 
the existence of individualistic laws mirroring social laws, then 
some stronger argument in favour of the position will be required. 
Fortunately I believe that it has been provided by Jerry Fodor.
Like Nagel, Fodor argues for identities between the higher- and 
lower-level of phenomena. Thus, where S is a predicate relating to 
a kind in the higher-level science, say psychology, and P is a 
predicate in the lower-level science, say neurology, he claims that
every event which consists of x's satisfying S is
identical with some event which consists of x's
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satisfying some or other predicate belonging to the 
disjunction Pi v P2 v ... v P,-,." [Fodor 1981:139]
Yet Fodor denies that a natural kind at the higher level will always
be correlated with a natural kind at the lower level. Alternatively
there may be instances where there is a correlation but it is not
nomological. This is very close to a restatement of Nagel's
relation of "...consists of...". However, Fodor does show how
predicates in such a relation fare when the nomological issue is
confronted. Diagrammatically, Fodor has represented his position in
the following way [Ibid.]:
Law of special science: Six -> SzX
Disj unctive 
predicate of
Laws of reducing 
science:
P Pn*y v Pz*y v...Pm*y
Although the diagram refers to reduction, Fodor is actually 
attempting to capture a relation of token physicalism which is much 
weaker than reduction as considered in Chapter 1 and more in keeping
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with the positions discussed in this chapter. Fodor accepts the
possibility that the reducing level may comprise
"a heterogeneous and unsystematic disjunction of 
predicates”CIbid.:1383.
These are not kind predicates in so far as the reducing disjunction
here is not a natural kind. Consequently, the links between the two
sciences, the 'bridge laws', cannot in fact be laws. At best they
can be true empirical generalizations, since
”a necessary condition on a universal generalization 
being lawlike is that the predicates which constitute 
its antecedent and consequent should be kind 
predicates.” tIbid.:1393
I propose to accept this condition on laws in order to 
concentrate on what follows from it.e What the figure shows is that 
laws of the higher-level theory are connected to a disjunctive 
antecedent and a disjunctive consequent at the lower-level theory by 
bridge laws which do not actually have all the characteristics of 
laws. Yet each specific antecedent and consequent are lawfully 
related, barring exceptions. However this does not entail that the 
whole disjunction of antecedents is lawfully related to the whole 
disjunction of consequents. The two disjunctions do not reflect 
natural kinds of the lower level theory. From the figure we have 
the following logical statements for each antecedent- and 
consequent-disjunct, excluding the given exception, P'x:
1) Pi x P2*y
2) PrzX Pm*y
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3) P,-, -» Pi*y
The question then is whether or not the following holds in virtue of 
the above: -
4) (Pi v Pzx v. ..v P nX) -) <Pi*y v P2 *y v. ..v Pm*y>
Fodor shows that is does not, providing it is granted that 'it is a
law that...' marks a truth-functional context.
1) has the form A -» X
2) has the form B -» Y
4) has the form (A v B) -* (X v Y)
From <1> and (2) we have t (A -» X) & (B -» Y)3
But C (A -* X) & <B -* Y)] £ C (A v B) -» (X v Y>]
To make the point, consider the following analogy:
1') If inflation begins to fall then the Chancellor will lower 
interest rates.
2') If war breaks out in the Gulf then oil prices will soar.
4') If inflation begins to fall or if war breaks out in the Gulf
then the Chancellor will lower interest rates or oil prices will 
soar.
(4') does not follow from (1') and (2') because (4') allows for the 
possibility that either inflation and oil prices could be directly 
related, or war in the gulf and interest rates. But neither of
these claims follows from (1') and <2').
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The result of all this is that there may be true empirical 
generalizations identifying higher-level phenomena with disjunctions 
of lower-level phenomena without these generalizations being laws. 
In addition, the lower-level phenomena may not represent natural 
kinds or types in the way that the higher-level phenomena do. 
Consequently the full disjunctions at the lower level will not 
feature in the scientific laws of the lower-level theory. Fodor's 
argument here is appealing and helps to add credence to the claims 
of Heilman and Thompson and Vagel that there may not be laws linking 
higher- and lower-level theories on the basis of the diversity of 
predicates at the lower-level. This argument will be used in the 
discussion of the relation between social and individualistic levels 
of phenomena.
Let us now return to the main thread of the chapter in which 
Kim's resolution to the problem of nomological danglers was 
considered. Before interrupting to discuss the issue of diversity, 
we were about to examine how the issue of nomological danglers had 
been considered in the context of the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena.
The issue has been discussed in connection with prediction by 
David Papineau CPapineau 19853. Davidson notwithstanding, Papineau 
supposes that we have some laws in the special sciences on the basis 
of which it is possible to make predictions. If we accept some 
version of physicalism or materialism with the attendant
correlations between the social and the individualistic, then there
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must be bridge laws of some description connecting the social
antecedent and the social consequent of any social law with 
individualistic phenomena.
These bridge laws will only link social and individualistic 
types of phenomena as laws if the social is reducible to the 
individualistic. If we have token-token identity instead of
reduction, as in the versions of physicalism discussed above in
connection with Heilman and Thompson, Nagel and Fodor, then the 
bridge laws will be considerably weaker. In particular, in view of 
the possibility of variable realizability, bridge statements have to 
be allowed which link social phenomena with a long disjunction of 
individualistic tokens, or link a mental event with a long 
disjunction of physical events. In these cases, the disjunction may 
not necessarily pick out a psychological or physical type. In
Fodor* s terminology, it is not a kind predicate in the reducing 
science. From this, Fodor has argued that the lower-level 
disjunctions are too heterogeneous to feature in any general law at 
the lower-level.
Papineau*s problem with the above schema is that if the social 
consequent can be predicted on the basis of a social law, then it 
would appear to be overdetermined. It is determined at the social 
level, in accordance with the social law, by its social antecedent. 
Yet it is simultaneously determined at the psychological level by 
the psychological antecedent which is linked to its psychological 
consequent. But this consequent is in turn linked by the bridge
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statements to the social consequent. The trouble here is not so 
much the overdetermination per se, but rather the enormous 
coincidence that, at two distinct levels, the antecedents determine 
exactly the same social'consequent.
In the case of reduction, the coincidence would not be 
remarkable, since the social and psychological outcomes, being 
strictly identical in virtue of nomologically necessary bridge laws, 
would be legitimately constrained. The question that Papineau wants 
to raise is: In the token-token identity case, what constrains the
psychological outcome so that it always turns out to be identical, 
with the social outcome? The much-weakened, disjunctive, bridge 
statements cannot be relied upon to achieve this, since the 
psychological outcomes which they link to the social outcome in 
question, may be so diverse as not to represent a unified kind, of 
psychological state.
This problem hinges on some crucial presuppositions about laws 
and predictions in the special sciences which it will be helpful to 
make explicit here. It has been assumed that social types and 
tokens (phenomena, events, properties) feature as the antecedents 
and consequents in social laws. Similar laws are taken to hold 
between psychological events etc. at the psychological level. But 
are we justified in assuming that there are laws in the special 
sciences, linking social phenomena or psychological phenomena in 
virtue of their causal roles and potential?
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Davidson would deny that we are, since he claims that
"there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis 
of which mental events can be predicted and 
explained." [Davidson 1970:208]
It seems reasonable to assume that he would wish to endorse a
principle at least equivalently strong for social events. Davidson
does not wish to infer from this that mental (and social) events
never feature in causal relations which are subsumed under causal
laws. On the contrary, they clearly do. But they do this in virtue
of their inclusion under physical laws and their description as such
as physical events.
As has been seen in the case of mental phenomena, this position
seems too strong to be attractive: there do seem to be some
instances of social regularities at least, on the basis of which
social events can be predicted or explained. For example, during
periods of unemployment, union membership shows a decrease. This
has been corroborated in the 1930's, late 1970*s and 1980's.
Papineau concedes that we do have a certain degree of predictability
at the social level:
"I realize there are those... who deny that we have 
any such [predictive] abilities. They seem to me 
clearly mistaken. After all, the claim is not that we 
can always predict, merely that we sometimes can, as 
when it is completely obvious what someone will do, or 
inevitable that certain social consequences will 
ensue." [Papineau 1985:60]
notwithstanding this, Papineau is influenced by Davidson's position
when he writes:
"Most crucially, it is held that the laws sustaining 
causal relations between mental events and their 
various causes and effects are ones which apply in 
virtue of the physical descriptions of those events:
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it is their physical, not their mental, properties 
which give mental events their causal powers." 
tIbid. : 583
Fodor's position an laws has a certain amount in common with
this, Fodor assumes that the special sciences are specifically
concerned to establish empirical generalizations which support
counterfactuals. Sometimes these are referred to as 'laws' - Fodor
cites the example of Gresham's law - but it must be remembered that
they will often admit of exceptions. These generalizations or laws
are intended to support predictions ("Gresham's law says something
about what will happen in monetary exchanges under certain
conditions"). However, Fodor also concedes that
"any event which consists of a monetary exchange 
(hence any event which falls under Gresham's law) has 
a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in 
virtue of which it falls under the laws of physics."
[Fodor 1981:133-34]
But we have seen that he goes on to claim that a social event of
this kind will be identical with a whole range of physical events
i.e. with a widely disjunctive physical event. This may not
describe a physical kind (or type) and so the whole physical
disjunction itself will not feature in a physical law. Each
particular physical instantiation may, however, feature in a
physical law, linked with the particular physical instantiation of
the social consequent.
It seems reasonable to accept that there are at least some 
social generalizations and that in some cases we do rely on them for 
making predictions. Their precise relation to the laws of physics 
will, though, prove to be significant.
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The original problem of overdetermination is thus to explain the 
coincidence that the consequent of a social generalization is 
determined both socially and psychologically, and to establish what 
restricts the variable realizations at the psychological level to 
just those which are correlated with the social consequent 
determined or predicted by the social antecedent. Denying that there 
are any constraints on the psychological level would be tantamount 
to denying the token-token identity thesis and consequently to 
denying that we do in fact have any individualistic grounding for 
social events.
At the other extreme, it might be argued that what the lower- 
level realizations have in common is just some characteristic which 
is describable purely in the vocabulary of the lower level. For 
instance, in the standard example of temperature and mean kinetic 
energy, molecular samples which manifest the same temperature all 
have the same mean kinetic energy, a micro-property. It is 
important here that the micro-property does not make tacit reference 
back to the macro-property in question. For instance, in different 
individualistic instantiations of, say, the sale of real estate, the 
common psychological property could not be that all the individuals 
involved believed that they were selling real estate. However, if 
there is a genuine micro-property common to all the variable 
realizations, then surely this justifies the claim that events of 
the social type are being identified with events of the 
psychological type characterised by that psychological property 
which each realization satisfies. This, however, would amount to an
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argument for reduction. In the case of temperature and mean kinetic 
energy this is exactly what we would expect.
If we are looking to defend token-token identity and combine
this with predictability, then some compromise between the two
positions just outlined will be required. Maybe the weaker option,
rejected when considering type-type identity, is worth pursuing.
According to this, the psychological realizations of a social event
are not left completely unrestricted, despite their not having any
psychological characteristic in common. What they do have in common
is precisely that they give rise to, or determine, the social event
that we would have predicted. In the mind-brain debate, this is the
position of functionalism according to which,
"to ascribe a given mental state to someone is to say 
that they are in some physical state with the relevant 
causal role." [Papineau 1985:623
Presumably in the context of socio-individualistic relations, this
would be equivalent to the claim that to ascribe a given social
state to a configuration of individuals is to say, minimally, that
they are each in some psychological state with the relevant causal
role. This psychological state will often be a belief state which
will make ineliminable reference to the social event in question, as
when it is a belief about the social event.
However, Papineau does not consider this to be a satisfactory 
way of solving the overdetermination of predictions in the special 
sciences. He argues that functionalism does not so much explain the 
coincidence of the macro- and micro-consequent as sweep it under the
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carpet. We are still left with the problem of finding what it is 
that constrains the micro-level to have the particular causal role 
that it does and in virtue of which it is selected. Another option 
would be to treat the constraint as a matter of definition. On this 
reading, in the mind-brain case, the neuro-physiological 
instantiation would be a realization of the mental state in virtue 
of the fact that it satisfies a certain causal role viz. that causal 
role without which it would not count as a realization of that 
mental state. To be in a mental state of that kind is just to be in 
a physical state which has the relevant causal role. Realizing the 
mental state is thus part of the definition of the physical state 
correlated with it.
This is not satisfactory, though, as it rules out the very
prediction which it was supposed to be reconciling with variable
realizability. In particular,
"the definitional reading leaves it open that in order 
to identify someone's mental state one would need to 
attend its overall causal role, to check that it has 
the right overall structure of cause and effects. But 
if that were necessary then of course there would be 
no mental predicting, for we would need to know that 
certain effects occurred before we knew that we had a 
given mental state." tIbid.:643
Papineau's solution to the above is to give up the definitional 
approach and turn to the constraints of natural selection to cover 
the mind-brain case: genetic plans selected during the evolutionary
process, he argues, will be those with appropriate arrangements of 
molecules to establish the right structural connections between 
sensory inputs and behavioural outputs. This is an interesting way
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of resolving the situation, but I do not intend to comment further
on it here. What is germane to my purposes is the solution Papineau
offers to the same problem in the social-individualistic case.
Here, evolution is of ho help in explaining how it is that different
individual, psychological states which are identified on different
occasions with a particular social state, should all coincide in
producing the same results.
"Different societies aren't given genetic programmes 
by some process of natural selection to ensure that 
despite their heterogeneity at the level of individual 
psychology they will be causally similar at the macro- 
level." [Ibid.:69]
Indeed not. Yet on occasion we can predict the outcome of a social
event. So the only available option, Papineau insists, is to
concede that the psychological states variably realized by the
social state do reflect a uniform type or kind, such as would
feature in a psychological generalization to predict uniform
results. This amounts to the claim that social kinds can be
identified with individualistic kinds and hence that the social is
reducible to the individualistic.
I would accept that we do have some social generalizations and 
that on the basis of them, we are able to predict. Unless there is 
more to say, the overdetermination of the social consequent would 
appear to be a startling coincidence. However, I wish to resist 
Papineau's adaption of the reducibility of the social by showing 
that his 'only available option' is neither the only, nor perhaps 
the best, one.
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It will be remembered that Papineau ruled out the possibility of 
the psychological states which instantiate a social state on a 
particular occasion being restricted by definition i.e. being 
defined as those which’ bring about the desired results or satisfy 
the required causal role. In the mind-brain relation this may be 
justified on the grounds that it is circular whereas other 
available options, notably that provided by a naturalised solution, 
are not. Yet this solution does seem to have a valid application in 
the social-individualistic case. Consider, for example, a social 
phenomenon such as marriage. It could be argued that the 
Instantiation of such a social phenomenon often does involve, among 
other things, the presence of certain individuals who have beliefs 
about what they are doing which are, in one way or another, beliefs 
about marriage. For instance, on the occasion of a conventional 
marriage in Western society, there has to be someone who at least 
believes he is performing the marriage, two people who believe that 
they are being married and two more who believe that they are 
witnessing a marriage. Other conditions may have to be fulfilled in 
addition (for instance paying a certain fee), but the having of 
these beliefs about marriage is a necessary condition. Without 
these individualistic states, the social event would not have 
occurred i.e. there would have been no marriage.
Yet this does not imply that there is no predictability. There 
are many other characteristics of marriage which might feature in 
social generalizations. For instance, it might be a generalization 
that the rate of marital separation is lower in societies where
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marriages are arranged by the community than in those where they are 
decided on by the couple to be married. It is only a subset of all 
the characteristics of marriage which affect whether or not a 
particular event is or is not a marriage. If the above social 
generalization were true, it would be reasonable to predict, 
(although dangerous, no doubt, to make predictions about specific 
events on the basis of a statement of probability,) that of two 
marriages entered into in Northern India by arrangement and in 
Britain by mutual consent respectively, the former had a greater 
chance than the latter of remaining intact.
The predictability of a social state of affairs or social event 
thus does not depend on the possibility of characterising the state 
exclusively individualistically. The fact that the individualistic 
instantiation may make ineliminable reference to social phenomena, 
as when the people involved in a marriage are characterised by their 
belief that what they are involved in is a marriage, appears to have 
no direct bearing on whether or not claims about marriage may be 
predicted on the basis of social generalisations or laws. All that 
does follow from this is that the social is not reducible to the 
individualistic. But that claim has been tacitly endorsed 
throughout this chapter. Of course, this still leaves the 
coincidence of the social and individualistic events predicted to be 
explained. It is at this point that we need to invoke the arguments 
considered earlier on the variable realizability of the lower-level 
properties in such a relation.
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Not all individualistic instantiations of social phenomena will 
be characterised by individuals having beliefs about the social 
phenomena in question. There are others which may even be 
correlated on occasions with the refusal of the individuals 
instantiating them to believe at first that this is what they are 
doing. It is passible to imagine, for istance, that this may be 
true of a bear market. It is for types of social phenomena such as 
these that Fodor's potentially lengthy disjunctions of 
individualistic predicates seem the most plausible candidates for 
their instantiation. I would agree, especially in this case, that 
the disjunctive predicates would not constitute a natural 
psychological kind, or a specific type
psychological/individualistic phenomenon. So where the former kind 
of social phenomenon might have had some property in common to all 
individuals instantiating it, viz. their beliefs about marriage, the 
individuals involved in the instantiation of a bear market may have 
no single, individualistic property common to all of them.
In this case, it seems most reasonable to take a different line 
in explaining how it is that the social event predicted coincides 
with the individualistic event predicted. My sympathies are with 
Fodor here and in particular with his denial that the whole 
disjunctions of predicates or properties at the individualistic 
level are the sorts of entities which feature in individualistic 
laws. Thus there is no individualistic law which mirrors the social 
law in this example. To this extent then, there is no 
overdetermination or coincidence of the predicted event.
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This should by no means be taken to imply that there are no 
generalizations at the individualistic level. On the contrary, at 
the individualistic level, it is true that the individualistic 
disjuncts of the antecedent may be linked with disjuncts of the 
consequent and these links may be lawlike. Rather the point at 
issue is that in the lower-level science, the generalizations do not 
parallel the generalizations at the social level. Indeed, why 
should it ever have been assumed that they would unless the argument 
for reduction was being presupposed? The social type in the example 
used above, a bear market, involved, let us imagine, in some social 
generalization, need not correspond to any psychological type 
involved in psychological generalizations.
Moreover, there is one significant advantage for this construal 
over Papineau's reductive solution. It allows for the possibility 
of exceptions to the social generalizations, whereas if the social 
antecedent and consequent are reducible to individualistic 
consequents and antecedents which in turn are linked by 
individualistic laws, it would not be possible to accommodate any 
social antecedents which did not in fact lead to the expected social 
consequent. But surely such irregularities have to be admitted in 
the social sciences. Where the whole disjunction of antecedents and 
disjunction of consequents at the individualistic level are not 
linked by law, such exceptions would not be a problem. It seems at 
least prudent to allow that such social generalizations as there may 
be, might admit of exceptions.
- 99 -
In summary, I would make the following points: Firstly, I am
not convinced that the problem being considered is most appositely 
described as a problem about prediction in the special sciences. It 
does not seem to be particularly problematic that the same effect 
can be predicted on the basis of different generalizations as 
following from different causes i.e. the fact that it is a social 
and an individualistic prediction which coincide does not seem 
especially contentious. In the natural sciences it is often
considered an advantage if a particular observational result can be 
predicted by different means.
Rather, in the social-individualistic case, it seems to be the 
coincidence or overdetermination of the consequent which is 
problematic. If this is the case, then what has been discussed here 
bears a very close resemblance to Kim’s problem of nomological 
danglers. In particular, Papineau’s problem is the problem of 
spurious overdetermination. His solution, though, is not the same 
as Kim's: where Kim opts for supervenience, Papineau opts for
reduction.
I would like to suggest that the solution that one favours to 
the problems of causation in the special sciences will depend 
largely on the position one adopts with regard to laws in the 
special sciences, Davidson, who denies that there are such laws, 
faces none of these problems. Yet as Kim has shown, a position 
without laws must deal with its own difficulties. Furthermore, it 
seems unreasonable to insist that the social sciences have no laws
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or generalizations because so often we seem to use them to predict 
and explain events. However, the status of these laws must be 
accepted for the most part to be considerably weaker than their 
counterparts in the natural sciences. The fact that they admit of 
exceptions has already featured in the discussion.
In many cases, it seems unlikely that the social phenomena 
featuring in social generalizations will have individualistic 
correlates which are themselves individualistic types. As Fodor has 
suggested, the individualistic correlates will be heterogeneous 
disjunctions. Furthermore, he has argued that such disjunctions 
will not feature in individualistic generalizations. Each 
individualistic disjunct from the antecedent may be linked by a 
generalization with an individualistic disjunct from the consequent. 
Yet the disjunction of antecedents will not be linked by a 
generalization to the disjunction of consequents.
In these cases, the overdetermi nation problem is vitiated: 
causal relations require laws or generalizations, but the 
individualistic phenomena under consideration, i.e. the composite 
individualistic disjunctions do not fall under any. Therefore it 
must be concluded that the disjunctive individualistic consequent is 
not actually caused by its disjunctive individualistic antecedent. 
The causation takes place at the social level where there are 
generalizations linking antecedent and consequent. Of course, 
particular individualistic disjuncts from the individualistic 
antecedent may be linked by generalizations to particular
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individualistic disjuncts from the individualistic consequent. The 
point is only that these generalizations will not provide the basis 
on which to predict the whole, disjunctive, individualistic 
consequent. These generalizations therefore do not parallel the 
social ones.
There may be other instances in which the individualistic 
disjunctions will not be equally heterogeneous. In particular, the 
case where each disjunct had a certain belief state in common has 
been considered above. Do we not have a case of overdetermination 
here? Again I think not, although here I would offer a different 
reason. This was raised previously in connection with Kim's 
position on pre-emption where it was noted that when Kim offered 
examples of mental and physical correlates, he concentrated on 
phenomenal mental states eg. pain states, at the expense of 
intensional mental states, eg. states of desire. In the case of 
pain, we might be happy to accept that it is in fact the brain state 
which causes the action of withdrawal i.e. we accept that the 
neuronal state pre-empts the pain. It was suggested that this was 
because our neurophysiological theories of mental states such as 
pain, which identify pain with certain neurophysiological states, 
are fairly advanced.
By contrast, theories about intensional states such as beliefs 
and desires seem far less advanced. Consequently, we would be far 
less likely to accept that generalizations about desires could pre­
empt the action. Indeed it seems unlikely that there will be
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individualistic generalizations about desires on the basis of which 
the individualistic outcome can be predicted. Even if bridge laws 
linking desires to actions can be formulated, it is most unlikely 
that the disjunctions of desires will themselves form 
generalizations. So here too the problem of overdetermination fails 
to arise, since the lack of any true, empirical individualistic 
generalizations about desire entails that there is no determination 
at the individualistic level.7
Have we perhaps been considering a quasi problem altogether? I 
think the problem of overdetermination does arise seriously for some 
of the more quantitative social sciences such as economics. To take 
an example, it seems plausible that both unemployment and union 
membership could be characterised exhaustively in purely 
individualistic terms. Let us assume moreover that economics is 
able to provide generalizations about the behaviour of individuals 
who are unemployed and/or union members. In other words, economics 
is able to produce individualistic generalizations underpinning the 
social generalizations of union membership and unemployment. If 
this is so, then the social generalization that union membership 
falls in times of unemployment would seem to provide a case of 
overdetermi nat i on.
In such cases, I would not hesitate to assert that the real 
causation is present at the individualistic and not at the social 
level. I would argue that the level of unemployment is completely 
determined by the number of people who are out of work. Likewise,
- 103 -
union membership just is the number of people who are members of a 
union. I would vehemently deny that unemployment or union 
membership is anything over and above people being out of work and 
people being members of unions respectively. (Whether or not work 
and unions can be characterised individualistically is not at issue, 
since reduction is not being defended.) Consequently I would deny 
that there is any causation present at the social level that is not 
exhaustively captured at the individualistic level. In this 
respect, these cases seem directly to parallel the mental-physical 
cases involving phenomenal mental states. We were happy to rely on 
advanced neurophysiological theories to explain the causal relations 
present there. In the same way, we should be prepared to rely an 
economic theories where they offer to explain social phenomena 
individualistically.
In conclusion, the problem of causal overdetermination should 
not be taken to undermine the position of physicalism, nor the 
position that social phenomena are determined individualistically. 
In this chapter, different positions which defend the priority of 
the physical (or individualistic) over the mental (or social) have 
been analysed. It has emerged that there is the genuine possibility 
of defending such a position, notwithstanding certain difficulties, 
such as the problem of nomological danglers. In the chapters which 
f o l l o w ,  one particular way in which this position can be specified 
will be developed in detail. Subsequently it will be applied to the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena. This 
position is supervenience.
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CHAPTER 3
SUPERVENIENCE I; FORMULATION
Reduction is one possible way that the relation between social and 
individualistic theories might be captured. Yet we have seen that 
theories of social phenomena and theories of individualistic phenomena 
fail to fulfil the criteria for reduction. Specifically, arguments have 
been put forward to the effect that certain types of social entities 
and properties cannot be identified with any type of individualistic 
entities or properties. From this it follows that the Condition of 
Connectability for reduction fails to be fulfilled. Furthermore, if the 
entities and the properties of social theories cannot be 
individualistically identified, then it is unlikely that all the laws in 
a social theory - featuring social entities and properties - will ever 
be deducible from the laws governing individualistic entities and 
properties. If this is the case, then the Condition of Derivability for 
reduction would fail to be fulfilled as well. Thus the central claims 
that follow from reduction will have to be relinquished.
Given that social theories are not reducible to individualistic 
theories, there are two passible alternatives to consider. Either 
theories of social and individualistic phenomena are totally distinct 
from and independent of each other, or, although not reducible, they are 
related by some other relation, weaker than reduction, but which still
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captures some form of dependence of the social on the individualistic. 
Varieties of this relation were considered in Chapter 2. It is one 
particular version of such potential relations that will be examined in 
detail in this chapter, viz. the relation of supervenience.
There is little philosophically new about supervenience as a 
characterisation of the relation between two domains of phenomena 
which appear prima facie to be distinct although not entirely unrelated. 
The idea of a relation of supervenience may be found in writings on 
moral theory, where moral properties are taken to supervene on 
naturalistic ones. This is so implicitly in G.E. Moore CMoore 1922:261] 
and explicitly in R.M. Hare [Hare 1952:145]. It is also to be found in 
work on aesthetics, where aesthetic properties have been taken to 
supervene on physical properties [e.g. Sibley 1959 and Levinson 1983].
More recently, though, supervenience has been introduced into the 
mind-body debate by Donald Davidson [Davidson 1970]. In this seminal 
paper, Davidson has developed a position on the relation between mental 
phenomena and physical phenomena, known as anomalous monism. Central 
to this position is Davidson's classic statement of supervenience:
"Although the position I describe denies there are any 
psychological laws, it is consistent with the view that 
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or 
supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such 
supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be 
two events alike in all physical respects but differing in 
some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some 
mental respect without altering in some physical respect."
[Ibid.:214]
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This has prompted many philosophers to defend a position of 
supervenience in the mind-body debate [ e.g. Kim 1978, Haugeland 1982, 
Teller 1983a], Although the relation between the mental and the 
physical is not my primary concern here, there are at least certain 
respects in which it is parallelled by the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena and Davidson's ideas have certainly been 
influential and inspirational in recent philosophical literature on the 
holist-individualist debate [Macdonald and Pettit 1981 and Currie 1984], 
The application of supervenience to this debate is rather novel and 
this will be my ultimate concern. What I propose to do in this chapter 
is to look, in some detail, at the formulation of supervenience and 
assess its plausibility.
Davidson's statement of supervenience is suggestive, rather than 
explicit. It describes a relation between the characteristics of two 
domains, where there are no laws linking these domains (i.e. no psycho­
physical laws in this case), yet where the characteristics of the
supervenient domain (mental characteristics) are dependent on the
supervenience-base (physical) characteristics. The only elaboration 
Davidson gives about the nature or extent of this determination is that 
two events alike in respect of their base characteristics will be alike 
in their supervenience characteristics and any change in the latter 
will always be accompanied by some change in the former, although what 
change this might be, is not determined by any law.
Davidson proposes supervenience as a relation between 
characteristics. However, it should be noted that for Davidson, mental
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and physical characteristics are the things responsible for
individuating mental and physical events, respectively. For other
philosophers, this role is most often filled by properties and indeed,
perhaps this is all that Davidson means by 'characteristics'. In the
light of this, it is not surprising to find an alternative formulation
of supervenience couched in terms of properties:
"One family of properties is 'supervenient' upon another 
family of properties in the sense that two things alike 
with respect to the second must be alike with respect to 
the first." [Kim 1978:149]
Taking the relata of supervenience to be properties seems plausible,
particularly as it yields easy interpretation of Davidson's claim for
the determination of one domain of phenomena by another which is
central to supervenience. The claim that there can be no change in the
supervenient level without some change in the supervenience base can be
reparsed in terms of properties as the claim that nothing can alter
with regard to its supervenient properties without simultaneously
altering with regard to its supervenience-base properties.
It is necessary for the changes to be simultaneous in order for the 
determinative nature of supervenience to carry any weight at all. For 
any change in an object with regard to one domain of its properties, 
some change at some time in another domain of its properties may be 
found and trivially correlated with the former change. But such a 
correlation would be fortuitous and there would be no justification for 
the claim that the former change could not have occurred without the 
latter. Consequently, on the basis of such a correlation between 
changes in properties, a determinative relation between the two domains
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of properties in question could not be established. As a minimum, the 
changes must be simultaneous in order to fulfil Davidson's stipulation 
that an object cannot alter in respect of its supervenient properties 
without altering in respect of its supervenience base properties. 
Simultaneity is necessary, but insufficient. Most probably, there will 
be additional conditions to be fulfilled once the determinative nature 
of supervenience has been formally characterised. Any detailed 
analysis of supervenience will have to attempt to formalise something 
like Davidson's intuitively plausible criterion of determination more 
precisely.
In Davidson's characterisation of supervenience, the supervenience 
relation is between the mental and physical characteristics of a 
person. The domain of the relation is thus individual people. This is 
also the case for the formal characterisation of supervenience offered 
by Kim. In what follows, I propose to reconstruct Kim's 
characterisation as far as possible and then try to evaluate it.
Kim has cited the motivation behind a consideration of
supervenience as fallows:
"...the main point of the talk of supervenience is to have a 
relationship of dependence or determination between two 
families of properties without property-to-property 
connections between the families." CIbid.:150]
Subsequently though, Kim is farced to admit that,
"...supervenience as defined does not fulfil its promise: it
falls short of being a determinative relationship between 
properties without requiring correlations between them."
[Ibid.:154]
In a later paper, supervenience is motivated slightly differently as,
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"...an attractive alternative [for] philosophers who, while 
rejecting a straightforward physicalist reduction of the 
mental, want to acknowledge the primacy of the physical 
over the mental." [Kira 1984:45]
This is very close to the spirit of Davidson's statement and 
similarly in need of a more explicit formulation. It is the attempt to 
do this which will throw into relief the tension between a 
determinative relation and one which does not depend on property-to- 
property correlations. It will become apparent that Kim is ultimately 
prepared to give up the latter claim.
Kim has formulated two versions of supervenience which differ with 
regard to the determinative strength of the relation they encapsulate. 
The first, weak supervenience, henceforth V.Sv, does without property- 
to-property correlations, but Kim rejects it on the grounds that it 
does not capture the full force of a determinative relation. This 
position is then strengthened to produce strong supervenience, 
henceforth S.Sv, which has greater determinative strength, but achieves 
this only at the cost of introducing necessary correlations between 
properties. Kim's formulations of V.Sv and S.Sv are the following:
1) "A weakly supervenes on B just in case necessarily for any x
and y if x and y share all properties in B then x and y 
share all properties in A - that is, necessarily if x and y 
are indiscernible in B, they are indiscernible in A."
CIbid.:46]
This, Kim claims, is provably equivalent to:
2) "A weakly supervenes on B just in case necessarily far any 
property F in A if an object x has F, then there exists a 
property G in B such that x has G, and if any y has G it 
has F." CIbid.:483
By contrast,
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3) "A strongly supervenes on B just in case necessarily for each
x and each property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a
property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y
has G it has F.M CIbid.:493
In the light of the above formulations, the following are also held
to be true for weak and strong supervenience:
4) "If A weakly supervenes on B, then for each property G in A, 
there is a property H in B which is de facto coextensive 
with G. That is, this G-H correlation will not in general 
be stable across possible worlds," [Ibid.]
5) "If A strongly supervenes on B, then for each property G in A
there is a property H in B such that G and H are 
necessarily coextensive - that is, the biconditional 
(Vx)CG(x) e H(x>] is necessarily true." [Ibid.3
In the evaluation of the formulations (1) to (5) that follows, it will
be considered why Kim finds it necessary to strengthen the
characterisation of supervenience to S.Sv.
A and B are families of properties: the supervenient family and
the supervenience base family, respectively. In the supervenience base, 
B, Kim constructs a B-maximal property, (called G in (2) and (3), H in
(4) and (5) above), which is the base property to be correlated with 
the supervenient property in A. The B-maximal property is a 
construction of the conjunction of all the base properties tliat an 
object x in the domain has and the complements of all the properties x 
lacks.1 Kim admits that this conjunction may have to be infinite if 
there are infinitely many properties in the supervenience base. Thus, 
two people, x and y, share all their properties in B iff x and y have 
the same B-maximal property. A disjunction of the above B-maximal 
properties can then always be constructed to be coextensive with each
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supervenient property. The disjunction of maximal properties may 
likewise be infinite, if the supervenience base is infinite.
The formulations of V.Sv in (1) and (2) represent an attempt to 
capture Davidson's claim that "there cannot be two events alike in all 
physical respects but differing in some mental respect" (quoted above). 
Kim purposefully leaves the status of his modal operators undetermined, 
intending that they be specified only once the particular domains of
phenomena that supervenience is taken to relate are fixed. Presumably,
Kim's use of 'necessarily' here is intended to capture the force of
Davidson's 'cannot'. But all the proposed formulations of V.Sv are 
found to be unsatisfactory, since they are too weak to capture
adequately the modal force implicit in Davidson's intuitive 
characterisation of supervenience.
The following case is levelled against them: whether it is the
supervenient property, F, or F's complement, which is coextensive with 
the B-maximal property, G, depends on the particular instantiation of 
supervenient and base properties in this (or some other) particular 
world. Even if G is correlated with F in this world, it could well be 
correlated with F's complement in another. There could also be other 
possible worlds in which, despite the distribution of base properties 
being the same as that in this world, everything had F or, 
alternatively, nothing had F. This, claims Kim,
"makes supervenience too weak for some of its typical
applications". CIbid.:48]
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Presumably, the 'typical applications' referred to here are those in 
Davidson's statement. In order to formulate supervenience in such a 
way that it can cope with these applications, Kim introduces his 
versions of S.Sv. Before considering these, I want to suggest an 
additional difficulty for Kim's formulation of V.Sv.
The use of 'necessarily' in formulations (1) and (2) seems to serve 
no purpose at all. It has been employed, I suggested above, to capture 
the idea that the supervenient properties cannot alter without some 
alteration in the base properties. However, it must fail to achieve 
this, since both the supervenient and the base properties fall within 
its scope. So all V.Sv as formulated above states, is that if A weakly 
supervenes on B in this world, then it does so in all worlds, where 
'weakly supervenes on' merely amounts to the claim that the 
supervenient property is correlated with some maximal base property 
which is a construct of whatever base properties the object happens to 
have in the particular world in question. This makes the thesis of 
V.Sv trivial far two reasons:
i) it is not so much the case that V.Sv lacks modal force, as that 
the scope which the modal operator has been given is inappropriate, and
ii) the artificiality of the maximal base properties ensures that 
they can always be manufactured in the supervenience relation, from 
whatever base properties the object happens to have or lack in any 
particular possible world. To suppose that such artificial properties 
could play any role in determining' the supervenient properties seems 
implausible when it is remembered that the former have merely been
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constructed artificially. Further difficulties with the construction of 
Kim's maximal properties will be raised in the discussion of S.Sv.
Notwithstanding this criticism of V.Sv, there do seem to be two 
useful paints in the above which it is worthwhile making explicit: 
Supervenience, if it holds at all - in a weak or strong version - will 
hold in all possible worlds. At least this amount of modal force seems 
to be embodied in Davidson's statement and presupposed in all Kim's 
formulations. Also, it should be noted that supervenience, in even its 
weakest version, presupposes the existence of some properties in the 
supervenience base. In Kim's analysis, these are the properties from 
which the maximal base property is constructed. This is a small point 
indeed, but one to be remembered when the supervenience of the social 
on the individualistic is being considered. Once the objects have been 
specified which bear the properties related by supervenience, it must 
be the case that these objects have individualistic as well as social 
properties.
Other criticisms of Kim's formulations, which apply to both strong 
and weak supervenience, will be considered with S.Sv.
In order to overcome the modal deficiencies of V.Sv., Kim 
strengthens the formulation of supervenience to S.Sv with the insertion 
of a second modal operator. Again, like the modal operator in V.Sv, 
this operator is left undetermined until its specific context is known, 
although Kim seems to suggest that in the supervenience of the mental 
on the physical, the necessity invoked should be nomological or
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physical necessity [Kim 1979:42]. I would be inclined to agree with 
this, The second operator is included to ensure that in every possible 
world the maximal base properties determine the same supervenient 
property and not just any supervenient property, which may be the 
complement of the originally considered supervenient property, or may 
not have any bearing on it at all. This is a way of solving Kim’s
difficulties with V.Sv. However, I think there are additional problems 
for supervenience which need to be raised. First, though, a comment 
about the formulations of S.Sv per se.
Formulations (3) and (5) are not equivalent. The base property, G, 
in (3) is only a sufficient condition for the supervenient property. 
The second modal operator ensures that G is a strictly sufficient 
condition, i.e. that it is a sufficient condition in all passible worlds, 
Hot so in (5), where the base property, H, is coextensive with the
supervenient property. Vhen strengthened by the second modal operator, 
the base property thus becomes a necessary and sufficient condition for
the supervenient property in all possible worlds. (In (4) and (5) it
will be noticed that G is being used as the supervenient property and H 
as the base property; but since the property correlations in (4) and
(5) are symmetrical, this should not cause confusion.)
It will also be useful to consider how Kim sees the S.Sv of (5) to 
be related to that of (3), despite the fact that (5) appears to be a 
much stronger formulation of supervenience than (3). In (3), Kim 
claims that a maximal base property can be constructed to be sufficient 
for each supervenient property, S. By the same reasoning, one can be
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constructed to be sufficient for the complement of each supervenient 
property, -S. But if a base property, B, is sufficient for -S, then its 
complement, -B will be necessary for S. Thus there is a base property 
which is necessary and one which is sufficient for S. The disjunction 
of these two maximal base properties will be coextensive with the 
supervenient property, S, i.e. both necessary and sufficient for it. 
This explains Kim's strengthening of the formulation of both weak and 
strong supervenience to (4) and (5), respectively.
All the formulations of supervenience make use of maximal base 
properties and it is now time to consider these directly. The base 
includes all physical properties attributable to individuals in the 
domain. Maximal properties are built up from the conjunction of all 
the physical properties an individual has, and the complements of those 
physical properties he or she lacks. In W.Sv, this maximal property is, 
under the particular circumstances, i.e. in the actual world, a 
sufficient condition for the supervenient property. In S.Sv, this 
conjunction of properties is disjoined with all the other conjunctions 
of physical properties and their complements which could instantiate 
the same supervenient property under different circumstances. In this 
way the maximal properties may be extended to necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the supervenient property. This disjunctive maximal 
property (which, for an infinite base might be an infinite disjunction 
of infinite conjunctions of properties) is then taken to be coextensive 
with, i.e. necessary and sufficient for, the supervenient property in 
all possible worlds in the case of S.Sv. Similar base properties are 
proposed for all other supervenient properties. This construction of
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base 'properties' in Kim's characterisation of supervenience has evoked 
much criticism of his position.
In (5), Kim claims that if A is strongly supervenient on B, then 
the supervenience base can provide, for any supervenient property, a 
base property which is necessarily coextensive with it. We have 
discussed what this claim involves; it is now time to consider whether 
or not it provides a viable characterisation. In order for his 
characterisation to be plausible, Kim has been obliged to stipulate that 
the supervenience base be closed under the Boolean operations of 
conjunction, disjunction and complementation. This amounts to an 
insistence that, for any base properties, the conjunction of these 
properties is also a base property, as is their disjunction. 
Furthermore, for any base property, its complement, i.e. its negation, is 
also to be included as a base property. Such an assumption is 
essential if it is to be possible to construct maximal base properties. 
Forseeing passible abjections, Kim has offered the following 
qualification:
"Hote that these infinite operations are operations on pro­
perties, and are therefore comparable to infinite unions and 
intersections routinely defined over sets, not infinite con­
junctions and disjunctions for linguistic expressions such 
as sentences and predicates. Any dubiousness that may 
attach to the latter need not attach to the former."
[Kim 1983:471
I am prepared to go along with Kim in accepting infinitely 
disjunctive and conjunctive properties, notwithstanding substantive 
criticism of them in the literature [See Armstrong 1978: Ch. 143. Even 
if the criticism were ultimately successful, it would still be plausible 
for Kim to evade it by modifying supervenience slightly to be a
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relation between 'properties', extended properties or disjunctions of 
properties and their complements.
With regard to complementary properties, some such modification 
will probably have to be introduced in the light of the following, more 
serious abjection which has been levelled against them [See Teller 
1983b and Post 1983].
The supervenience base is supposed to contain physical properties 
exclusively, both simple ones and more complex Boolean constructs. 
However, the complement of a physical property is not itself a physical 
property. This can be established by considering the absurd 
consequences which follow from the counter-claim. Each object lacks 
some physical properties. By definition, each object then has the 
complements of these properties. If these are physical, it would follow 
that each object has some physical properties, I.e. is partly physical. 
But just as each object lacks some physical properties, so too will it 
lack some mental-, social-, aesthetic-, moral-, abstract- etc. 
properties. Indeed, it will lack some properties of every kind. But 
then by the above claim, it would have complementary properties of each 
of these different kinds. Consequently, if the complement of a 
property of a certain kind were itself of the same kind, then 
everything would be part mental, social, aesthetic, moral, abstract etc. 
This consequence is intolerable. Thus it must be inferred that the 
complement of a property of a particular kind is not itself a property 
of that kind. The complements of physical properties are not physical
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properties. Hence the supervenience base - contra-Kim - is not closed 
under complementation.
However, the objection does not have the damning consequences for 
supervenience that might have been anticipated. Even if the complement 
of a physical property is not itself a physical property, it does not 
follow that it belongs to some other determinately specifiable class of
properties. Although not physical, the complement of a physical
property is certainly not mental, social, aesthetic, moral, abstract
etc., either.
Consequently, this does not lend support to the claim that the
mental supervenes on any other kind of phenomena as well as the 
physical, a claim which could vitiate supervenience. At worst, it 
necessitates that supervenience be amended to refer to a relation 
between mental properties on the one hand, and physical properties and 
their complements on the other. There seems no reason not to accept 
this.
Thus far it has been established that two families of properties, A 
and B, which are sets of mental and physical properties respectively, 
are in a relation of strong supervenience iff it is possible to 
construct maximal base, i.e. physical properties to be necessarily 
coextensive with each supervenient, i.e. mental property. These maximal 
base properties are constructed from conjunctions of all the physical 
properties and their complements, which fully characterise the 
instantiation of a particular mental property. The conjunctions are
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then disjoined with all other such conjunctive constructs which could 
characterise the instantiation of the same mental property in different 
possible worlds. If this maximal base property is necessarily 
coextensive with the mental property in question, and if the same 
procedure could be used to generate necessary coextensions between each 
mental property and some maximal base property, then the mental can be 
claimed to be strongly supervenient on the physical.
A little more needs to be said about the nature of these necessary 
coextensions before the possibility of providing them between mental 
and physical properties, or between social and individualistic 
properties is considered. Kim's criterion of necessary coextension can 
be unpacked into two narrower claims, both of which would have to be 
satisfied for necessary coextension. They are the claims that:
1) maximal properties from the supervenience base provide 
nomologically/metaphysically necessary conditions for the 
supervenient property, and
2) they provide comparable sufficient conditions.
These strictly necessary and strictly sufficient conditions may be 
infinite disjunctions of infinite conjunctions of single individualistic 
properties.
A brief word is in order about the satisfaction of a strictly 
sufficient condition and a strictly necessary condition in the modal 
context of Kim's formulation of supervenience. A family of properties, 
A, supervenes on another family, B, if VxCM<x) 9 P(x)] is necessarily
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true where MeA, PeB. That is, A supervenes on B if the following two 
statements hold:
i) N(^/x)tP(x) =* M(x)l, and
ii) U( Vx)CM(x) =* PCx)]
(i) represents the sufficiency of the supervenience base and (ii) its 
necessity. At this point, it is important to remember that P is an 
extended property, with a structure something like the following, where 
the p-i-o are single, physical properties:
P =
(pi & pz: &  p a  & - p *  & ~ p s  &...) V  (p-io & pi 1 & -pi a & -pi a &...) V...
Each bracketed disjunct on the RHS represents one configuration of 
physical properties which instantiates a particular mental property in 
some possible world. The whole disjunction on the RHS is typically 
satisfied when one of its disjuncts is satisfied. With regard to 
providing a strictly necessary condition required by (ii) above, the 
disjunctiveness of P poses no problem. P has simply been constructed 
as the conjunction of the base properties and their complements which 
comprehensively describe the actual conditions under which the 
supervenient property is instantiated. This extended property, say 
(pi & p a  8r p3 & -p* & - p s  &...) is then disjoined with other possible 
ones like it, which describe different conditions under which the 
supervenient property could be instantiated. The lengthy, disjunctive 
property is then necessary in all passible worlds. It will be 
satisfied whenever at least one of the disjuncts is satisfied. Hence it 
will be satisfied automatically, as the first disjunct will always be 
satisfied, since it was constructed to be necessary in the actual world.
- 121 -
Thus the condition that the base provide nomologically/metaphysically 
necessary conditions is unproblematically satisfied.
The situation in the case of the sufficiency of P is somewhat more 
complicated. This is because base properties which are individually 
sufficient conditions for a particular supervenient property in 
different passible worlds, are not severally sufficient for it in all 
those possible worlds. In general, the fallowing syllogism does not 
hold:
Pi is sufficient for M in world 1
Pa is sufficient for M in world 2
CP i v Pa) is sufficient for M in (world 1 and world 2)
This syllogism breaks down in the cases where Pi , but not Pa, is
instantiated in world 2, and where Pa, but not Pi , is instantiated in 
world 1. In both cases, the disjunct (Pi v Pa) is satisfied. But in 
the first case, this is because of Pa which is not sufficient for It in 
world 1, and in the second case because of Pi which is not sufficient 
for M in world 2. It makes no significant difference that each 
property P is actually a complex conjunction of physical properties and 
their complements.
Extrapolating from this, it can be claimed more generally that the 
disjunction of all the properties sufficient for M in different possible 
worlds, will not be sufficient for It in all possible worlds. Thus (i) 
above is not satisfied, leaving the sufficiency of the base for the 
supervenient level unproven.
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However, there would seem to be a way of salving the problem of 
the sufficiency of the supervenient base. It will be remembered that 
Kim's formulation originally required the base to be necesssarily 
coextensive with the supervenient level. This was then subdivided into 
two conditions viz. necessity and sufficiency; each of which should be 
nomologically or metaphysically satisfied in accordance with whatever 
interpretation of Kim's modal operator was deemed appropriate. In the 
case of necessity, this was built into the condition by disjoining the 
conditions necessary in each possible world into one lengthy condition, 
necessary in all worlds i.e. metaphysically necessary.
The attempt to do the same thing with sufficiency failed. However, 
I would propose that this is the case, not because of some deep-rooted 
problem with sufficiency per se, but rather, because of the attempt to 
qualify sufficiency with a modal operator. It seems intuitively clear 
that there is a significant difference between a condition which is 
materially sufficient in the actual world, say, and one which is to be 
sufficient in all possible worlds. The latter sufficiency, I have 
shown, is not arrived at by disjoining conditions from different 
possible worlds, each of which might be sufficient in that world, 
merely in the weak sense of material sufficiency.
Rather, I would suggest that the kind of sufficiency embodied in 
Kim's formulation of supervenience, could be better interpreted thus: 
maximal properties from the supervenience base which are genuinely 
sufficient for a supervenient property, are properties which, in every 
world in which they are instantiated, are sufficient for the
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supervenient property in question. Thus, consider again the above 
example, where the sufficiency of (Pi v  P2) for M in 
(world 1 and world 2) was denied, on the basis of the counter-example 
in which Pi satisfied the disjunct in a world where only Pa was 
sufficient for M. The premises used in this example would be 
strengthened under the new interpretation of sufficiency in so far as 
their restriction to a particular world would be lifted i.e. Pi would 
only constitute a genuinely sufficient condition for M if it were 
sufficient for M in every world in which Pi was instantiated.
The same syllogism might then be reparsed as follows:
W CP. => M>
ffCPa => M)
NCCPi v P2) =) M]
This syllogism is clearly valid, with the conclusion guaranteed by the 
premises.
It is thus in this sense that the sufficiency of the base 
conditions in supervenience must be understood. This squares 
comfortably with our intuitions. Consider a familiar example: if pain
is taken to supervene on a certain configuration of C-fibre firings and 
other neuro-physiological states, then the possibility of a world in 
which a subject had the same C-fibres firing and was in the same 
neuro-physiological state, yet was not in pain, is ruled out. Of course 
this does not deny that there may be a world in which pain supervened 
on different C-fibre firings, or on a different neuro-physiological (or 
other) mechanism altogether. The point is merely that, if there is a
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relation of sufficiency between properties in one world, and if the 
same properties are instantiated simultaneously in another possible 
world, then in the latter world too, they must be related by 
sufficiency.2
After all, this would seem to capture the force of supervenience as 
a relation in which the supervenient level is determined by the base. 
Strong supervenience is not supposed to be a relation in which two 
levels of properties just happen to be correlated in some world in 
which they are jointly instantiated. Rather, it is a relation where the 
base underpins the supervenient level, and the supervenient level is 
dependent on the base.
Finally, perhaps the most forceful abjection to Kim's 
characterisation of supervenience is that it could only be achieved, if 
at all, at the expense of the autonomy of the supervenient level. The 
existence of necessary coextensions between each supervenient property 
and some extended base property makes supervenience look very much 
like reduction in a new guise. Perhaps the supervenient level is only 
determined by the base if it is ultimately reducible to it, and 
consequently not autonomous after all. In the words of Post, "How can 
determination be non-reductive?" [Post 1983:165]
Let us confront this objection directly. In the chapter on 
reduction, it was proposed that reduction depended on the satisfaction 
of two conditions, viz. the Condition of Connectability and the 
Condition of Derivability. Both conditions needed to be fulfilled
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before a relation of reduction could be established. CC would be 
satisfied where all the properties of the reduced theory could be 
identified with properties of the reducing theory and it was suggested 
that this might be achieved by identifying their causal powers. CD
would be satisfied when it could be shown that all the laws of the
reduced theory could be derived from the reducing theory.
In the case of strong supervenience, which depends on the 
supervenience base providing strictly necessary and strictly sufficient 
conditions for the supervenient theory, it might appear that CC has
been satisfied. In particular, it might be that the causal powers of 
the supervenient properties would be encompassed by the causal powers 
of the disjunctive properties at the supervenience base. However, in 
the previous chapter it was argued that the disjunctions of properties 
comprising the supervenience base would not form natural kinds. Thus 
they would not mirror the kinds of properties at the supervenient 
level. But then, how could they be expected to mirror the causal 
powers of the properties at the supervenient level?
This point does not need to be argued further, for even if the
causal powers of the properties comprising the supervenience base did 
mirror the causal powers of the properties of the supervenient level, 
this still would not lead the concept of strong supervenience to 
collapse into reduction. This is because reduction depends on more 
than the satisfaction of CC. It depends on the satisfaction of CD as 
well. Vhile CC captures the ontological elements of the relation, CD 
captures the epistemological elements of it. In conncection with CD
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there is an independent case to be made to show why S.Sv. does not 
satisfy it and consequently why S.Sv does not collapse into reduction. 
This is largely Kim's response to the abjection.
Vhile Kim accepts that both reduction and supervenience have in
common the requirement that there be necessary coextensions between
the two levels of phenomena or theories involved in each of the
relations, he insists that reduction requires the satisfaction of
further conditions which supervenience fails to fulfil. More
specifically, he construes reduction as an epistemological relation in
so far as much importance is laid on the increased explanatory power
it affords. This effectively captures the weight of CD. By contrast,
supervenience is an ontological or metaphysical relation, emphasising
how the levels are actually related rather than how we know about their
relation or are able to explain it.
"If you believe the mental strongly supervenes on the
physical, you are committed to there being a physically 
necessary and sufficient condition for each psychological 
state. The physical base may be very complex and may not 
even be humanly discoverable; as a result it may be un­
available for a physicalist reduction or explanation of the 
psychological state. But it must exist if the mental 
strongly supervenes on the physical...
"Thus strong supervenience is not the same thing as the 
reduction of the supervenient family to the base family; 
reduction is an explanatory procedure, and to carry out a 
reduction we must identify for each basic supervenient 
property its supervenient base property. Here 'identify' is 
a somewhat vague but clearly epistemological notion. Such 
identifications are the business of the special sciences (in 
their relation to more basic sciences) and not the business 
of philosophy. By philosophical argument, however, we can 
show that such bases must exist. The strong supervenience 
of A on B points to a possibility of reducing A to B.
Reduction is a complex notion with subtle epistemological 
implications; if reduction is to provide explanatory 
understanding, reducibility will crucially depend on the 
perspicuous describability of the underlying coextensions in
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B of the properties in A. Supervenience alone does not 
guarantee that a theory that will supply such descriptions 
exists or will ever exist." [Kim 1983:49-50]
Teller has added his own, although not unrelated, comment in 
defence of supervenience as a relation distinct from reduction [Teller 
1983b:58-60L Rather than focussing on the correlations between levels 
of properties, his counter-objections concern the base alone, or, more 
particularly, the base properties which are put forward as necessarily 
coextensive with the supervenient properties. These properties are 
physical in such a way that could not conceivably undermine the 
autonomy of the supervenient level. First it must be remembered that 
in order to provide conditions for the supervenient properties which 
are sufficient in all possible worlds, the base will include vast 
amounts of extraneous physical information relevant to the specific 
supervenience context. Among others, it will include physical 
properties which apply contingently to people under particular 
cirmumstances. These properties will all be possible candidates for 
incorporation into the base necessary and sufficient condition.
However, the disjunction of conjunctions of physical properties and 
their complements is just not the sort of property to feature in any 
physical laws, in any event not in physics as practised today. 
Consequently there will be no chance of the lawlike correlations 
between levels linking types or kinds of phenomena. But this is 
precisely what reduction would require. In this respect, the position 
of supervenience discussed here has much in common with aspects of
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Heilman and Thompson's and Nagel's position of physicalism and, in 
particular, with Fodor's position as presented in the previous chapter.3
It has been my intention in this chapter to flesh out the sense in 
which supervenience allows for determination without reduction. 
Perhaps the result is something of a disappointment, for indeed there 
is little of the physical necessity that might be provided by physical 
laws in the determination of the supervenient level by the 
supervenience base. But this is exactly the extent to which 
supervenience captures a weaker relation than reduction. Supervenient 
properties are not reducible to supervenience base properties. 
Supervenient properties are not necessarily coextensive with types of 
properties from the supervenience base. Nonetheless there are 
necessary coextensions between supervenient properties and properties 
from the supervenience base. The base properties, however, are 
heterogeneous and not likely to feature in the laws of the base level 
theory.
Notwithstanding this, there can be no change in the supervenient 
level without there being some simultaneous change in the base level. 
Furthermore, two objects cannot have the same base properties without 
also having the same supervenient properties. These are precisely the 
criteria for supervenience, specified by Davidson, which were introduced 
at the beginning of this chapter. In the course of the chapter they 
have been formalised rigorously in the light of Kim's work on 
supervenience.
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The position of supervenience has thus been developed in detail and 
evaluated. In the chapters which remain, it will be considered whether 
or not this relation could be beneficially applied to the relation 
between theories of social and individualistic phenomena respectively.
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CHAPTER 4
SUPERVEfflEKCE II: APPLICATION
In the previous chapter, the possibility of a determinative 
relation between two levels of phenomena was considered where it was 
not possible to establish the more stringent relation of reduction 
between them. The claim that a family of properties on one level 
determines a family of properties on another level has been shown to 
be central to any relation of supervenience. The relation of 
supervenience, as suggested by Davidson and developed by Kim, and 
its implications were examined. This is useful for the purposes of 
this thesis in so far as it provides a detailed framework against 
which to evaluate the possibility of applying supervenience to the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena.
In keeping with the formulation in the previous chapter, the 
relation to be applied is a metaphysical one, rather than an 
epistemological one. Given that the relation is one between two 
families of properties common to a domain, the discussion in this 
chapter will be restricted to the possibility of applying 
supervenience to the relation between the social properties and the 
individualistic properties (which may include psychological, 
physiological and physical properties) of people. Clearly this is 
limiting, as it ignores anything which could be said of specifically
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social entities (like Parliament, the legal system etc.') and their 
social properties (being democratic, being based on trial by jury 
etc.). Notwithstanding this, supervenience might valuably be 
applied to a significant subset of social and individualistic 
phenomena viz. the social and individualistic properties of
individuals. In what fallows in this chapter, any reference to the 
supervenience of the social on the individualistic will be assumed
to refer only to this subset of social and individualistic
phenomena. In the last chapter, an attempt will be made to
generalize the relation of supervenience so that it can be applied 
more comprehensively to the relation between theories of social and 
individualistic phenomena.
Supervenience can be applied to two kinds of properties in a 
domain only if the elements of the domain instantiate at least some 
properties of both kinds. With people as the domain, this criterion 
is easily satisfied: for instance, a particular person might have,
amongst others, the social property of being Queen, and the 
individualistic property of being right-handed.
Also, if supervenience is to be applied to the relation between 
social and individualistic properties, it will be important that 
there be some means available for distinguishing social from 
individualistic properties. That there is a distinction to be made 
is certainly not contentious, as there are paradigmatic examples in 
each category. As previously cited, 'being Queen' is unquestionably 
a social property, and 'being right-handed' is equally obviously an
- 132 -
individualistic property. There are, however, some rather 
borderline cases, for instance relational properties, such as 'being 
a more senior member than x', and intentional properties with social 
content, such as 'believing y to have been given a fair trial'.
The more properties included as individualistic and excluded as 
social, the easier it will be to prove that the social supervenes on 
the individualistic, as there will be a narrower range of social 
properties for which to find necessary coextensions with
individualistic properties. Moreover the individualistic resources 
from which to provide these will be greater. Yet it is also true 
that the more difficult a case is to prove, the more significant its 
proof will be, if successful. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the distinction will be drawn by fiat, at what seems 
to be the most intuitively sensible point.
The issue of relational properties is not of much help in 
drawing the required distinction. Relational properties can 
themselves be either individualistic or social. Consider the 
following examples: (i) X is older than Y
(ii) X is a member of Club Y.
Initially it seems as though there would be little chance of 
defending the supervenience of the social on the individualistic,
without the incorporation of some relational properties in the 
individualistic base. However, it is perhaps also true that any 
social property could be reparsed as a relational property between 
individuals, where the relation between them was a social one.
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There is thus a subtle danger with relational properties, viz. that 
they may let too much into the base and consequently trivialize 
supervenience. It will be better if relational properties be 
excluded from the base where passible. 'Being a member o f  will 
thus have to be cashed out in terms of signing a token of a specific 
type of piece of paper, paying a certain fee, turning up with other 
people at specified places and times to do certain things etc. 
Needless to say, this will vary from organization to organization 
and will be enormously cumbersome. However, at this stage that 
should not be considered to be an over-riding objection. It will be 
raised again towards the end of the chapter.
Perhaps the case of intentional properties will be of more help 
in delineating social and individualistic properties. This is a 
delicate point as both defendants of individualism [Watkins 1953:97- 
8] and defendants of holism [Ruben 1985: 163-721 as well as
protagonists and antagonists of reduction [Mellor 1982:69 and Ruben 
1985:125-26, respectively] have rested their cases on the 
incorporation and exclusion respectively of such socially 
intentional properties.
D.H.Mellor has defended the distinction between beliefs and 
propositional attitudes about social entities on the one hand, and 
genuinely social properties of individuals on the other. He argues 
that e.g. x's belief that Elizabeth II is Queen of England \  
should be included on the individualistic level, as it makes 
reference, not to the social entity, the Queen, but only to x's
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belief. By contrast, the property that Elizabeth II has, viz. being 
Queen of England, is a social property, as it directly implies the 
existence of a social entity, the monarchy (or, for Mellor, some 
appropriately structured group). In this chapter, I shall adopt 
Mellor's distinction, without using it, as he does, to support 
reduction.
The individualistic supervenience base will thus comprise 
physical properties and mental properties, the latter including 
beliefs about social entities and properties. The supervenient 
level will comprise properties of individuals which make direct 
reference to social institutions e.g. being Queen, which makes 
direct reference to the monarchy, or signing a cheque, which makes 
indirect reference to the institution of banking.
In a different context, a distinction has been defended between 
weakly social and strongly social properties: both can be
comprehensively identified with (individualistic) mental properties, 
but only the former can be reductively so identified i.e. identified 
with mental properties which do not themselves presuppose some 
social property CRuben 1985:1233. The supervenient level will 
include weakly social and strongly social properties. However in a 
discussion of supervenience, the possibility of reductively 
identifying each social property with same individualistic property 
is not what is at issue. Hence the distinction between strongly and 
weakly social properties need not be pursued further here. All that 
needs to be established far supervenience, is that all social
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properties can be linked with individualistic properties in so far 
as necessary coextensions can be established between them and some 
individualistic properties. The latter may include peoples' 
attitudes to social phenomena, but must make reference to them only 
opaquely i.e. within the context of some propositional attitude.
Supervenience requires that for each social property, there 
should be some individualistic property necessarily coextensive with 
it. It will thus be impossible to prove the supervenience of the 
social on the individualistic conclusively by considering a few 
particular social properties. However, if for a typical example of 
a social property, it is possible to construct the appropriate
properties from the individualistic base, then there should be no
reason to assume that the same strategy could not yield necessary 
coextensions for every other social property. If this obtains, then 
there is a case for the general application of supervenience to the 
relation between social and individualistic properties.
Let us now consider the more formal conditions which need to be
satisfied by the relation between social and individualistic
properties before the social can be claimed to supervene on the
individualistic. An adaptation of Davidson's statement of
supervenience would read as follows:
"Although the position I (sic/) describe denies there are 
socio-individualistic laws, it is consistent with the 
view that social characteristics are in some sense 
dependent, or supervenient, on individualistic 
characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to 
mean that there cannot be two events alike in all 
individualistic respects but differing in some social 
respect, or that a person cannot alter in same social
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respect without altering in some individualistic 
respect.” [Adapted from Davidson 1970:214]
Continuing in the same spirit, a version of Kim's strong
supervenience (henceforth S.Sv) would be the following:
"If A strongly supervenes on B, then for each property S 
in A there is a property I in B such that S and I are 
necessarily coextensive - that is, the biconditional 
( Vx)CS(x)«I<x)] is necessarily true.” [Kim 1983:49]
Here x ranges over people, A is the family of their social
properties, B is the family of their individualistic properties, S
is a social property and I an individualistic property. As in the
previous discussion of the formulation of supervenience, I is a B-
maximal property, which may be infinite if the individualistic base,
B, comprises infinitely many properties. The maximal property is a
construction of disjunctions of possible conjunctions of all the
base (individualistic) properties that a person in the domain has
and the complements of all the base properties (s)he lacks. Kim's
criterion for S.Sv in its adapted version will only be satisfied by
the relation between social and individualistic properties if, for
each social property that a person has, there is some maximal
individualistic property (i.e. disjunction of possible conjunctions
of individualistic properties) which is necessarily coextensive i.e.
both strictly necessary and sufficient, for the social property. If
the same procedure could be used to generate necessary coextensions
between each social property and some maximal individualistic
property, then the social could be claimed to be strongly
supervenient on the individualistic.
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This condition raises once again the problem of the type of 
necessity involved in Kim's formulation. The criteria for 
supervenience do not require social properties to be coextensive
with individualistic properties in all logically passible worlds: 
it is perfectly possible to conceive af a world in which the 
coextensions did not obtain. The necessity of the coextensions
between base and supervenient levels will thus be weaker than 
logical necessity. Following Kim's suggestion, mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it will be understood that the coextensions should 
be either nomologically or physically necessary. This will also 
apply to the interpretation of strict necessity and strict 
sufficiency.
In Chapter 3, it was shown that the necessary coextensions 
between the base and the supervenient level could be satisfied by 
two other conditions. Thus a family of properties, A, supervenes on 
another family, B, for S € A, I e B, if
i) K<yx)[S(x) => I(x)], and
ii) lfC^x)[ I (x) =* S(x)] .
(i) represents strict necessity and (ii) represents strict 
sufficiency. The satisfaction of (i) follows immediately from the 
construction of the maximal base property. This was discussed at 
length in connection with the supervenience of the mental on the 
physical in the previous chapter, pp. 120-122. If S and I are 
substituted for M and P, social and individualistic properties for
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mental and physical properties respectively, then mutatis mutandis 
the reasoning here is exactly the same as in Chapter 3. For strict 
necessity, the supervenience base includes all those individualistic 
properties actually instantiated with the social property. These 
are then disjoined with other sets of individualistic properties 
which might have been instantiated with the same social property in 
different nomologically possible worlds. This maximal base property 
does range over all possible worlds. Moreover, it is satisfied, 
since the disjunct of properties from the actual world is always 
satisfied, and the satisfaction of the whole disjunction follows 
from this. So the individualistic base can provide a strictly 
necessary condition for the supervenient level.
(ii) represents the second condition for the base to be 
necessarily coextensive with the supervenient level, strict 
sufficiency. It was shown in detail that more than mere material 
sufficiency is required when it was shown that the following 
syllogism is false. Again, S e A, I e B.
Ii is sufficient for S in world 1
Iz is sufficient for S in world 2
(Ii v Iz) is sufficient for S in (world 1 and world 2)
/
As before, this syllogism breaks down in the cases there Ii, but 
not Iz, is instantiated in world 2, and where Iz, but not Ii, is 
instantiated in world 1. In both cases, the disjunction (Ii v Iz)
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is satisfied. But in the first case, this is because of I2  which is 
not sufficient for S in world 1, and in the second case because of 
Ii, which is not sufficient for S in world 2. It makes no 
significant difference that each property I is a complex conjunction 
of individualistic properties and their complements.
Rather, the necessary coextension between base and supervenient 
level can only be established if there are strictly sufficient 
conditions for social properties in the base. These will be 
provided by individualistic properties which, in every world in 
which they are instantiated, are sufficient for the social property 
in question. This may be represented by the following syllogism:
IKIt => S)
U ( 12  3 S)
M  (Ii v Is) => S]
Individualistic properties which are co-instantiated with social 
properties in different worlds, being sufficient for the latter in 
only some of those worlds, are thus to be eliminated. This ensures 
that if there is a relation of sufficiency between individualistic 
and social properties in one world, and if the same properties are 
instantiated simultaneously in another possible World, then in the 
latter world too, they must be related by sufficiency.
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Hence in order for the social to supervene on the 
individualistic, there must be strictly necessary and strictly 
sufficient individualistic properties for each social property in 
each possible world. It will be important to see that this 
criterion is met if supervenience is to be applied to 
individualistic and social properties.
Enough has now been said about what is required in order for the 
claim that the social supervenes on the individualistic to be 
defended. It is time to consider the relation as it obtains between 
social and individualistic properties in the actual world and to see 
what claims can be made about the relation in other possible worlds. 
For the purposes of the fallowing discussion, the property, 'being 
Queen of England' , will be used as a paradigmatic example of a 
social property attributable to an individual.
The domain of people who could instantiate this property is 
infinite if time is taken to extend infinitely into the future. So 
in a trivial sense, the property could be instantiated in infinitely 
many ways viz. by infinitely many different people. This itself 
does not argue against supervenience though, as the latter is 
perfectly compatible with an infinite domain. Supervenience is also 
compatible with an infinite supervenience base. However, it is 
feasible that each instantiation of some social property, say 'being 
Queen of England', falls within a specifiable range of 
individualistic properties. In so far as it is a social property in 
Mellor's sense, it refers directly to the same social entity, the
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English, monarchy, in each instantiation. This will be elaborated
below.
It does seem plausible that, for each particular instantiation 
of this social property, a complete characterisation of the
situation could be given, purely in terms of individualistic 
properties. For instance, when Elizabeth II, in her capacity as 
Queen, invites a Member of Parliament to form a government, an 
individualistic description could be given in terms of one person 
meeting another, saying certain things and performing certain
actions, where both parties have appropriate and well-informed 
beliefs about their actions and the significance of them. Such 
beliefs, it has already been decided, form part of the
individualistic base, notwithstanding their obvious social content. 
The context in which these actions are carried out could presumably 
also be characterised in terms of the physical actions and
intentional states of numerous other people.
If the role of the Queen in forming a government can be
characterised individualistically as above, there seems no prima 
facie reason why similarly individualistic characterisations could 
not be given for all the other roles associated with the
instantiation of the social property of being Queen of England. 
This looks like a case for an application of supervenience, but does 
it in fact conform to Kim's more rigorous criteria?
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Let us spell out tlie strategy being employed in slightly greater
detail: the instantiation of the social property 'being Queen of
England' is analysed in terms of the fulfillment of certain social
roles viz. forming a government, opening Parliament, being head of
the Anglican Church, leader of the Commonwealth etc. In order for
these roles to be fulfilled, the person in question has to have the
necessary authority conferred upon her. Typically, this will
involve a public ceremony, with the conferral of some physical token
(in this case, for instance, a piece of precious metal, studded with
brilliant crystals which is placed on the person's head) which
allows other people to identify that person as the one with the
authority to perform the specified roles. This ensures that people
have the right beliefs about Elizabeth II. This, in turn, means
that they are able to recognise certain actions she performs as the
fulfillment of her various roles as Queen of England. Thus, as
Me11or has argued,
"All this role, like any role, needs is a suitable dis­
tribution of psychological attitudes among the people 
concerned." [Mellor 1980:69]
The instantiation of the social property 'being Queen of England' is
thus dependent on the appropriate belief states in individuals,
accompanying the fulfillment of certain social roles.
Attention needs to be drawn to one feature of the social- 
individualistic relation in virtue of which it might seem not to 
parallel the mental-physical relation for which supervenience was 
originally intended. In both cases, the domain of the supervenience 
relation comprises people. According to the initial formulation,
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people’s mental properties supervene on their physical properties 
and, although this does not seem to be stated explicitly, it is 
presumably the mental properties of one person which supervene on 
the physical properties of that person. Once it can be shown that 
this is the case for all people in the domain (and there seem to be 
no good reasons for thinking that people are not identical in this 
respect) then the more general claim that the mental supervenes on 
the physical can be asserted.
However, the same is not true for the relation between the 
social and individualistic properties of people. The social 
properties of a person will not be determined by the individualistic 
properties of that person alone. Social properties are relational 
in so far as any social property of a person will be determined by 
the individualistic properties of that person, in conjunction with 
the individualistic properties - notably the beliefs about the 
original person - of a number of other people. In particular, for 
someone to instantiate the social property 'being Queen of England', 
more is required than just that the person believe herself to be 
Queen of England. Other people too will have to have appropriate 
beliefs, justified in some way accepted to be appropriate under the 
circumstances. These widely-held beliefs are essential for the 
social roles to be fulfilled. Let us consider these roles in more 
detail.
My claim is that once the original social property can be 
precisely and unambiguously specified in terms of roles, it will be
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possible to construct a maximal, individualistic property from the 
supervenience base. This will comprise a physical description of 
the actions performed and a characterisation of the attendant mental 
states with which they are performed and with which they are 
perceived and recognised by others. This property will be a 
conjunction of all the individualistic properties instantiated 
(physical and intentional properties included) and the complements 
of those individualistic properties not instantiated when the social 
rale is performed.
It follows directly from the way the maximal base property is 
constructed that it will provide a necessary condition for the 
social property. However, it will be remembered that more than this 
was required from the necessary conditions provided by the base in 
Kim's formulation of supervenience. More specifically, they were 
required to be necessary in all possible worlds. This condition, as 
we have seen, is trivially satisfied: the base property is simply
constructed to be the disjunction of all base properties which are 
necessary for the instantiation of the social property 'being Queen 
of England' in the actual world, disjoined with all other 
configurations of base properties which are necessary for the same 
social property in all other possible worlds in which the property 
is instantiated. This disjunctive property will always be satisfied 
since it must have at least one disjunct satisfied, viz. the one 
which is necessary in the actual world. In this way, the 
individualistic base is able to provide a strictly necessary 
condition for the social property.
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Admittedly, the satisfaction of this condition makes the 
supervenience relation between social and individualistic properties 
look rather superficial. However, the satisfaction of the second of 
Kim's criteria for supervenience will prove to be more exacting. 
According to this criterion, the base is required to provide 
strictly sufficient conditions for each supervenient property.
As in the case of necessary conditions, individualistic base 
properties can be artificially constructed to be sufficient for each 
social property in the actual world. However, this is not enough to 
satisfy the criterion of strict sufficiency. As explained above, 
what is required of the individualistic properties is that they are 
sufficient for the social property with which they are correlated, 
in every world in which they are instantiated.
It remains to be seen whether or not maximal individualistic 
properties from the base provide strictly sufficient conditions for 
social properties. In order for them to be strictly sufficient, it 
must not be possible for an individualistic base property to be 
instantiated without its corresponding social property being 
instantiated. Moreover, where both base and supervenient properties 
are instantiated, that particular individualistic property must be 
the one which is sufficient for the social property.
Perhaps an example will help to clarify this. It is possible 
that the Queen, for instance, could open Parliament in some possible 
world without, say, Mrs Thatcher performing the actions she does,
- 146 -
with the beliefs she has. This would be the case if the ruling
party elected a new leader. The point to be made is merely that in
the actual world, at the most recent opening of Parliament, the 
Queen could not have opened Parliament without some of the 
individualistic properties being as they were i.e. without
performing the actions the Queen performed, without Mrs Thatcher 
performing the actions she performed, and without their beliefs
about themselves, each other, and the significance of what they were 
doing being as they were. These individualistic properties are part 
of the supervenience base on which the social event, the opening of 
Parliament, supervenes.
In addition to these individualistic properties, the 
individualistic base will also potentially include many irrelevant 
features of the social event. It is only those physical and mental 
properties which are relevant to the opening of Parliament which 
must be included in the maximal base property. The Queen might have 
smiled at a certain point, although she did not, without altering 
the social course of events. Similarly, Mrs Thatcher might have 
worn a different hat, or might have had some different beliefs and 
intentions about the forthcoming Parliamentary session. Such 
individualistic features need not be included in the individualistic 
base property. To the extent that Kim proposes to include all 
instantiated base properties in the maximal base property, his 
maximal base properties might seem to be broader than required to 
capture the determination of the social by the individualistic. 
However, this feature will be discussed again in the last chapter,
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when the rationale for his all-encompassing maximal properties will 
come to light.
It has been established that in the actual world, the Queen 
could not have opened Parliament without the base property that was 
instantiated, being instantiated. But strict sufficiency requires 
more than this, viz. that the instantiated base property could not 
have been instantiated without being sufficient for the opening of 
Parliament, and that it could not be instantiated in another world 
where Parliament was opened without, there too, being sufficient for 
the opening of Parliament.
In any other possible world, if exactly the same maximal
individualistic property were instantiated, i.e. one comprising the 
same actions, performed with the same mental states and the same 
beliefs of and about the people involved, then this individualistic 
property would also be sufficient for the Queen's opening 
Parliament. Here it is important that the base includes all the
beliefs about the significance of the social event and the authority 
of the protagonists. In the case where the Prime Minister were 
different, the beliefs of Mrs Thatcher, who in this instance may be 
present, but not as Prime Minister, would be different. Similarly, 
in the case where everyone believed that an imposter was the Queen, 
even if the imposter herself were deluded into believing that she
was the Queen, still the beliefs of (the real) Elizabeth II would be
different, and consequently, the individualistic base would be 
different. Hence in any other passible world in which Elizabeth II,
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Mrs Thatcher and all the other protagonists manifested exactly the 
same individualistic properties, I submit that this situation too 
would be an instance of Parliament being opened by the Queen,
This is in no way incompatible with the possibility of an
alternative, individualistic property, in a different possible
world, being sufficient (indeed, strictly sufficient) for the 
opening of Parliament in that world. This could be possible even in 
a world with exactly the same protagonists as the actual world, as 
long as they do not bear individualistic properties which are
identical to those which are sufficient for the Queen's opening of
Parliament in the actual world. The individualistic property which 
is sufficient for the social property in this world cannot be
instantiated in another world and yet fail to be sufficient for the 
social property in that world. Under such circumstances, the 
individualistic property will in fact always be.different, since it 
will comprise different belief-states resulting from the different 
social state of affairs. This makes it plausible to accept that the
individualistic property constructed from the base is not only
sufficient for the social property instantiated, but is indeed
strictly sufficient.
In this manner, strictly sufficient conditions can be provided 
by the individualistic base for each of the social roles that were 
agreed to be fulfilled when somebody instantiates the social 
property of 'being Queen of England'. These may be conjoined to 
characterise the social property comprehensively.
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The second part of Kim's criterion for supervenience is thus 
also fulfilled by the relation between social and individualistic 
properties. This justifies the conclusion that, according to Kim's 
characterisation of strong supervenience, the social supervenes on 
the individualistic, at least when the relation is restricted to the 
social and individualistic properties of individuals.
It has been objected that conditions far strong supervenience, 
particularly in so far as they include necessary connections between 
the supervenient level and the base, satisfy, in effect, the 
conditions for the reduction of the supervenient level to the base. 
In the rest of this chapter it will be considered whether the 
supervenience of the social on the individualistic, as defended 
above, captures the reduction of the social to the individualistic, 
or whether it is a genuinely distinct, weaker relation between the 
two levels of phenomena. Given the imposed restriction of 
supervenience to social and individualistic properties, it will be 
the reduction of these properties which is considered.
D.H. Mellor has raised this objection to supervenience and he
uses it to argue for the reducibility of the social to the
individualistic. Kim, by contrast, claims that supervenience and
reduction are distinct relations and that the former does not imply
the latter. Consider Mellor's argument in the fallowing passage:
"Supervenience, however, does not entail the strongest, 
reductive claim I wish to make: namely that acceptable
approximations to social laws can be derived by suitable 
bridge principles from those of psychology (physics, 
physiology, e t c.). So let us try to suppose that 
sociology, though supervenient, is not thus
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reducible. . . In that case there would be a law 
(deterministic or statistical) relating two or more 
social attributes of a group, an approximation of which 
is not derivable from the psychology of its members. Now 
we might indeed discover a correlation between such 
[social] attributes...without knowing how to derive 
anything like it. But how do we know that the 
correlation is a law, and not a mere coincidence? To be 
a law, it has to support conditionals... Now I follow 
Braithwaite and others in supposing us to give a 
generalisation this status only if we think it a 
consequence of a true explanatory scientific theory. Ve 
need not know what the theory is, of course; we need 
only believe that there is one. And in this case we know 
that the group law to be derived is sociological; that 
is, it relates attitudes supervenient on its members' 
actions and attitudes. The law acceptably approximate to 
our correlation must therefore be derivable from some 
true explanatory psychological theory. Were it derivable 
from nothing, it would be no law at all; were it not 
derivable from psychology, it would not be a social law.
The reducibility of social science, like its 
supervenience, is thus secured by its own self­
restriction to what depends on human action."
[Mellor 1982:70]
This is Nellor's defence of the reducibility of the social to 
the psychological. At the beginning of this quotation, he claims 
that supervenience does not entail reducibility in the sense that it 
is not passible to derive psychological approximations to all social 
laws. He then uses a hypothetical case where supervenience holds, 
but reduction does not, postulates a social correlation, and goes on
to deduce that if the correlation is in fact a social law, then it
is derivable from psychological theory. In this way he claims 
victory for reducibility. This contradicts the initial assumption 
that supervenience does not entail reducibility.
Of course supervenience itself does not presuppose that there 
are any social correlations or laws, Mellor's claim is merely that 
any social correlations or laws that there are, in a context where
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supervenience holds, will be reducible to psychology. I wish to 
dispute this argument on the grounds that it is based on an 
untenable assumption.
Mellor introduces a hypothetical correlation between social 
attributes. This correlation will only be law-like, he claims, if 
it is explainable. It will only be explainable if it is derivable 
from something i.e. if it is a consequence of a true, explanatory, 
scientific theory. Given the supervenience of the social on the 
psychological in this context, Mellor claims that the correlation 
"must be derivable from some true explanatory psychological theory". 
[Ibid.] In making this claim, Mellor is assuming that there are no 
primitive sociological laws.
This seems precisely to beg the question in favour of 
reducibility. Why does Mellor assume that the correlation should be 
derivable from psychology?2 It should be evident from the 
discussion in both Chapters 2 and 3, that this is a far stronger 
claim than supervenience would defend. The supervenience of the 
mental on the physical or the social on the individualistic is quite 
compatible with absence of any laws at the supervenience base, from 
which supervenient laws can be derived. It is not clear that 
supervenience makes any such claims about laws at all. Moreover, as 
a metaphysical relation, it is unlikely that it would. However, 
more importantly, supervenience has been shown to provide necessary 
coextensions between mental (social) properties and disjunctive base 
properties. But these maximal base properties are heterogeneous and
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do not represent unified types or kinds of physical 
(individualistic) properties. As such, these base properties would 
not be the sort of properties to feature in laws of the base theory. 
Thus the derivability of the laws of the supervenient theory from 
the laws of the base theory, purely on the strength of 
supervenience, is far too much to assume.
The alternative for Mellor would be to assume that the social 
correlation is derivable from sociology i.e. that it is approximated 
by some social law. The fact that this alternative is not 
considered seems (possibly inadvertently) to carry with it the 
implication that sociology is not a suitable candidate for the 
derivability of laws. This might be because it is not deemed to be 
'a true explanatory scientific theory'. But if this were the case, 
then Mellor's argument for reducibility would be vitiated, since 
there would have been nothing in the first place, with appropriate 
theoretical status, to be reduced. Perhaps Mellor should not be 
saddled with this and there may be a way of avoiding these rather 
dire consequences. Nonetheless, the fact remains that his argument 
to show that the reduction of two theories follows automatically 
from their supervenience, has been undermined.
On the apposing front in this debate, Kim has argued that 
supervenience and reduction are distinct kinds of relations, with 
the former weaker than the latter. His arguments CKim 1983:49-503 
will be considered, especially in so far as they are applicable to 
the relation between social and individualistic phenomena. Kim's
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first claim is that, given the supervenience of one level of 
phenomena on another, the supervenience base, however complex it 
might be, must exist. Given the way in which the base is 
formulated, it may exist across different possible worlds. This 
reflects the idea of supervenience as a metaphysical relation. From 
the existence of the base, however, it does not follow that it can 
be used to reduce or explain the supervenient level of phenomena. 
This is the point at which Kim's position differs sharply from 
Mellor's.
Kim maintains a sharp distinction between supervenience, a
metaphysical relation, and reduction, an epistemological relation.
In support of this, he writes:
"Reduction is a complex notion with subtle epistemo­
logical implications; if reduction is to provide 
explanatory understanding, reducibility will crucially 
depend on the perspicuous describability of the 
underlying coextensions in B [the base] of the properties 
in A [the supervenient level]. Supervenience alone does 
not guarantee that a theory that will supply such 
descriptions exists or will ever exist." [Ibid.:50]]
There seem to be two points being endorsed here:
i) Once a relation of supervenience is established, the
supervenience base - providing necessary coextensions between base
and supervenient level - does exist, even though it
"may be very complex and may not even be humanly 
discoverable." [ibid.:49]
ii) Reduction achieves explanatory understanding when the 
coextensions between reducing and reduced theories not only exist, 
but are identified in a perspicuous form.
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This provides the key to the distinction between supervenience 
and reduction, giving backing to the claim that the supervenience of 
two levels of phenomena does not entail the reduction of one to the 
other. The important feature of reduction is that its correlations, 
once identified, should be perspicuous. Reduction is supposed to 
enhance explanatory understanding by bringing two levels of 
phenomena under one common set of explanatory principles.
This is not required by supervenience at all. Although 
supervenience does require necessary coextensions between 
supervenient and base levels, these coextensions have been shown to 
involve properties at the base level which would not enhance 
explanatory understanding. The maximal base properties are 
heterogeneous and they may involve infinite disjunctions of 
conjunctions of properties. Moreover, they range over all 
physically (nomologically) possible worlds. As such, they do not 
represent unified individualistic types which would feature in 
individualistic (psychological) laws. Consequently they would not 
provide individualistic explanations of social phenomena and would 
therefore not enhance explanatory understanding or unity.
In keeping with this, the particular supervenience relation 
which holds between social and individualistic properties, does not 
promote explanatory unity and is thus not reductive.
This conclusion can be supported independently. In the 
supervenience relation between social and individualistic, the
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social level is indispensible for the formulation of the 
individualistic base. Reduction, on the other hand, asserts that 
everything that is explained by both levels, could ultimately be 
explained purely in terms of the reducing level. While the reduced 
level may not be eliminated in all cases of reduction, as, for 
instance, in the example of temperature and mean kinetic energy, 
nonetheless it is generally accepted that there is nothing more to 
temperature than mean kinetic energy. Moreover, if we were prepared 
to sacrifice convenience, then it would be possible to do without 
temperature.
Supervenience between social and individualistic phenomena 
could never achieve this for the following reason. The 
specification and definition of the social roles which must be 
performed for the instantiation of the social property, is crucial 
in the construction of the individualistic base. In particular, it 
is precisely the fact that a specific role is being performed that 
determines which physical and intentional properties of which 
individuals should be included in the base. Obviously not every 
property of every person can be ii^cluded in the base as this would 
rule out the possibility of ever being able to differentiate between 
any two social properties being instantiated simultaneously. The 
only way of doing this, seems to be in the light of the particular 
social property instantiated and consequently, the social roles 
performed. It is because the base depends in this way for its 
formulation on the supervenient level, that the supervenient level
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could never be eliminated. In this respect supervenience cannot be 
accused of being reduction by a new name.3
These arguments should dispel the fear that supervenience is 
just reduction in a new guise. Indeed, they may do more than 
that.They may cast doubts on the value of the purely metaphysical 
relation of supervenience per se. At this stage there seem to be 
two main drawbacks to the application of supervenience to the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena. The first is 
that, thus far, the application has only attempted to incorporate 
the relation between the social and individualistic properties of 
people. Clearly there is more to the social realm than this. Hot 
only are there the social properties of social entities to consider, 
but there are the social entities themselves.
Secondly it may be objected that the supervenience relation is 
too contrived to be able to establish anything useful. The 
construction of the supervenience base is so artificial that it 
undermines the original claim that supervenience captures the 
determination of the social by the individualistic.
Notwithstanding these abjections, the task of this chapter has 
been completed. It has been shown how the relation of supervenience 
elaborated in Chapter 3 can be applied to the relation between the 
social and individualistic properties of individuals. In the 
following chapter, an attempt will be made to deal with the first 
drawback mentioned above by generalising the supervenience relation
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to incorporate all social properties and social entities into the 
supervenient level. If this can be achieved satisfactorily, then 
the general claim that the social supervenes on the individualistic 
will have been defended.
In the conclusion, the significance of this relation of 
supervenience between social and individualistic phenomena will be 
assessed.
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CHAPTER 5
SUPERVEMTENCE III: GENERALIZATION
In the previous two chapters, the relation of supervenience has 
been considered in some detail and an attempt has been made to show 
how this relation might be applied to the relation between social 
and individualistic phenomena. The success of the application of 
supervenience has been hampered by certain features of the relation, 
notably the fact that it related different properties of the same 
object at the base and supervenient levels. In the socio- 
individualistic case this meant that it could only cover, at the 
supervenient level, the social properties of individuals, since it 
was only they who had both social and individualistic 
(psychological) properties i.e. both base and supervenient 
properties. This meant that supervenience was only applicable to a 
small subset of all social properties. Social entities and their 
properties had been overlooked.
In this chapter it will be considered how the supervenience 
relation might be generalized to include a broader and more 
representative sample of social relata. The overall success of 
supervenience in giving a comprehensive characterisation of the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena will depend on 
the success of these efforts.
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Gregory Currie has attempted to generalize the supervenience 
relation in this way [Currie 19843. A discussion of Currie's 
supervenience thesis will provide the starting point for this 
chapter. Some problems for his position will be raised, before 
considering a rather different construal of the supervenience 
relation, viz. that provided by Raimo Tuomela CTuomela 1984, 1985a,b 
and forthcoming]. Although I will show that Tuomela's position is 
inadequate in several crucial respects, it will be used as the basis 
for a generalized version of supervenience.
Currie's work on supervenience has been influenced by Kim. More 
specifically, like Kim, Currie is interested in supervenience as a 
metaphysical relation which may have little methodological or 
epistemological impart. However, consistent with the findings of 
the previous chapter, Currie recognizes that there are problems in 
applying this exact relation to the social-individualistic relation. 
Many social claims, in particular those about social entities such 
as institutions, processes or events, cannot be analysed under Kim's 
relation. In particular, it is not possible to correlate the social 
properties of these entities with some maximal conjunctive 
disjunction of individualistic properties of the same entities. 
This is what Kim's formulation of supervenience requires.
This is because social entities do not possess individualistic 
properties: they possess none of the properties of the
supervenience base. They do not have minds of their own, even in 
some tenuous sense of 'mind'. Hence it is not possible for
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psychological properties to be attributed to them. Consequently it 
cannot be the social and individualistic or psychological properties 
of social entities that supervenience is relating.
Any determinative relation such as supervenience between social 
and individualistic phenomena will need to link social entities and 
their properties on the one hand with individuals and their 
properties on the other. Currie wishes to characterise a relation 
like this. In even the relatively straightforward case where some 
social property of an individual supervenes on individualistic, 
psychological properties, it will often be the case that the social 
property in question is determined, if at all, not simply by the 
psychological properties of the person who has the social property, 
but by a number of other people and some of their respective 
psychological properties as well. Therefore in any plausible 
generalization of the supervenience relation, the domain of objects 
in the base will not be identical to the domain of objects at the 
supervenient level.
This much is conceded from the start in Currie's paper, where
the supervenience relation is described as
"a non-causal, non-reductive relation of dependence 
between facts about social institutions and facts about 
the behaviour of individuals." CCurrie 1984:345]
Here another divergence from Kim's formulation of supervenience
becomes apparent: the re lata are not properties, as they are for
Kim, but facts. Supervenience, for Currie, is a relation between
social facts and individual facts, characterized as follows:
- 161 -
"Social facts I take, roughly speaking, to be facts about 
social institutions and roles, and facts about people's 
actions, where those actions have a social 
significance. By individual facts I mean facts about the 
inner mental states of individuals and facts about their 
bodily movements...It must be acknowledged that the 
specification of a person's mental states requires 
unrestricted reference to social concepts."
[Ibid.:346-47]
More specifically, Currie wishes to characterise global
supervenience as the relation between the totality of social facts 
and the totality of individual facts. The totality of individual
facts of a world w, he calls the individual history of w. In the 
same way, the totality of social facts of a world u he calls the 
social history of u. He then formalises a preliminary relation of 
global supervenience as fallows:
< Vu) ( W )  <if u and w have the same individual history then they 
have the same social history).
This definition is further refined by quantifying over time, t, as 
well:
( V u)< Vw) < Vt)(if u and v have the same individual histories up to
t then they have the same social states at t).
Currie offers very little argument in support of this 
formulation of global supervenience, but he does offer some general 
points to elucidate the relation. Given the relation of global 
supervenience, if we form the class of all passible worlds which 
share their individual histories, then the same worlds will also 
share their social histories. More specifically, from the second 
definition, if they share their individual histories up to time t,
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then they will also share their social states at time t. In other 
words, according to global supervenience, the totality of individual 
facts up to a particular time entails the social facts or social 
state at that time. But the converse does not hold. This is 
because of the so-called 'plasticity of social concepts', also known 
as the variable realizability of social concepts. This is the claim 
that any social property (or fact, or concept) can be realized by 
many different configurations of individuals. Consequently, the 
totality of social facts might be the same in two worlds, but their 
individual facts might not coincide at all. From this Currie draws 
two important conclusions.
The first is that the relation of global supervenience is 
asymmetrical. In keeping with this, it is possible for there to be 
a change at the individual level without any social variation, while 
any change at the social level must be accompanied by a change at 
the individual level. In this respect, the level of individual 
facts is taken to be metaphysically prior to the level of social 
facts.
The second conclusion Currie draws from variable realizability 
is that the social is not reducible to the individual. Yet variable 
realizability alone is surely an insufficient basis for the denial 
of reduction. Even a characteristically reducible concept like 
temperature can be instantiated by the mean kinetic energy of 
infinitely many different substances. The point has to be made that 
in the temperature case, the different substances all have certain
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relevant features in common viz. their mean kinetic energy. In the 
social-individualistic case, there is no such individualistic 
feature which all instantiations share and in virtue of which they 
have the social property. Let us assume that this is the way Currie
wishes to use the plasticity of social concepts to argue against
reduction.
Currie claims that the social is also autonomous with regard to 
the individual. By this he is asserting something stranger than the 
failure of reduction. He argues that the level of social facts is
capable of variation independently of the level of individual facts.
His argument for this runs as follows: two entities are
independent if each is capable of variation independently of the 
other. Then he claims:
"If x is an individual and y  a social institution the
states of x  and y.are capable of independent variation."
[Ibid. : 357]
Here he is arguing that in the social-individual case, it is 
conceivable that there could be a change at the social level without 
any change in a particular individual.1 It is also conceivable that 
the individual may change without effecting any social change. 
These claims, he insists, merely reflect that it is global 
supervenience that is being proposed as the relation between the 
social and the individual. The behaviour of one particular 
individual may not be relevant to what happens at the social level; 
it is the behaviour and mental states of all individuals which
determine what takes place at the social level. The social 
supervenes on individuals, globally construed.
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Finally Currie considers whether or not global supervenience
should be supplemented by a principle analogous to Heilman and
Thompson's principle of physical exhaustion [See Chapter 21. This
would be a principle of individual exhaustion, according to which,
"social entities like institutions are either 
mereologically or set-theoretically constituted out of 
individuals, and perhaps purely physical objects as 
well." [Ibid.:356]
His claim that it should not is supported entirely by reference 
to David Ruben's arguments against the possibility of identifying a 
social entity like France with any particular geographical location 
or collection of people [Ruben 1985: Ch.1]. Ruben's conclusion is 
that there are some social entities which cannot be identified 
individualistically i.e. that the reduction of all social entities 
to individuals fails. Currie extrapolates from this to the 
conclusion that the social is not exhausted, in Heilman and 
Thompson's sense, individualistically.
This is Currie's position. It has been presented in some detail 
because it is immediately attractive to the analysis of 
supervenience offered here to the extent that it broadens the 
supervenience relation to include, at the social level, not only 
social properties of individuals, but all social facts. This will 
include facts about social institutions and their properties as 
well. However, on closer scrutiny, his position encounters serious 
difficulties. These will now be discussed.
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Currie's relation of global supervenience is a relation between 
facts. The advantages of reformulating supervenience in terms of 
facts have been described. Yet there are problems too. The first 
is that Currie offers nothing on the individuation of, or identity 
criteria for, facts p e r  se. On the distinction between social and 
individual facts, he seems to be saying that social facts are facts 
about social things or facts about individuals where these have 
social import, while individual facts are facts about individuals' 
actions and intentional states. This is not particularly helpful as 
it presupposes a prior distinction between social and non-social or 
individualistic properties and entities. In Currie's defence it 
might be claimed that such a distinction between social and 
individual entities and properties could be drawn by fiat, as 
suggested in previous chapters. More seriously though, there are 
important identity questions for facts which Currie does not 
consider, e.g. whether or not facts which refer to the same entity 
by different names or different definite descriptions are the same.
The problem for Currie's global supervenience seems to be even 
more severe. The central claim of global supervenience is the claim 
that if the people of worlds w and u share their individualistic 
properties up to time t, then they will share their social 
properties at time t. Moreover the social entitles of worlds w and 
u will share their social properties at t as well. The second claim 
is largely ignored by Currie since the formulation of supervenience 
in terms of facts instead of properties evades it. Talk of social 
facts blurs the distinction between facts about individuals (who may
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be acting in a social context, or in virtue of social properties), 
and facts about social entities. Both are incorporated as social 
facts and no distinction is drawn between them.
Yet the plausibility of generalizing supervenience to global 
supervenience will surely depend at least partly on the relation 
that holds between social entities and their properties an the one 
hand and individuals and their properties on the other. This has to 
be considered in conjunction with the relation between the social 
and individualistic properties of individuals. Kim's formulation of 
supervenience could be applied to the latter relation. A 
generalized version of supervenience should apply to the former as 
well. If social entities are determined by individuals and their
social and individualistic properties and if the social properties 
of individuals supervene on individualistic properties, then the 
prospects for generalizing supervenience seem good. If on the 
contrary, the relation between social entities and individuals is 
vague, indeterminate or if social entities are autonomous with 
respect to individuals, this will undermine the supervenience 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena.
It seems crucial for any attempt to generalize supervenience to 
address this issue; yet Currie's formulation of supervenience in 
terms of facts, which glosses over these distinctions, appears not 
to do this.
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Perhaps even more detrimental for global supervenience is 
Currie's claim that, although the individual has metaphysical 
priority over the social, the social is autonomous and social 
entities are not reducible to, nor exhausted by, individuals. These 
claims will now be assessed.
With regard to autonomy, Currie's argument was that the social 
was autonomous to the extent that it could vary independently of the 
individual. However, this is surely mistaken. The main problem 
with this claim is that it contains no quantifiers. I would argue 
that Currie only manages to reconcile supervenience with autonomy 
because he is equivocating between universal and existential 
quantification over individuals, x.
Currie argues that the social is autonomous with regard to the 
individual if it is possible for the levels of social and individual 
facts each to vary independently of one another. If he is claiming 
that there is some particular individual, x t which can vary 
independently of some or indeed of all social institutions, j, then 
this seems to be a rather uninteresting claim which poses no threat 
to supervenience. Supervenience could accept that there may be some 
members of the base domain who exert absolutely no influence on the 
supervenient domain. The global supervenience of the social on the 
individual would not be undermined by this.
On the other hand, if his claim is that all individuals x  can 
vary independently of some or all institutions, y } then this most
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certainly does pose a threat to global supervenience. In fact it 
seems to contradict it directly. It will be remembered that one of 
the claims of Davidson's initial outline of supervenience was that 
there could be no change at the supervenient level without some 
change at the base level. It is this claim, amongst others, that it 
has been the business of this thesis to formalise, defend and apply 
to the social-individualistic relation. Yet Currie's principle of 
independent variation seems in direct opposition to it. His 
arguments to show that the tension between independence and 
supervenience is illusory have proved to be inadequate under 
scrutiny.
As additional support for the autonomy of the social, Currie 
alludes to Ruben's argument against reduction to show that a
principle analogous to Heilman and Thompson's principle of physical 
exhaustion cannot be applicable to the social-individualistic 
relation i.e. the social is not exhausted by the individualistic. 
Without going into Ruben's argument which may or may not be
compelling, there seems to be a serious flaw in this claim for 
social autonomy too. I shall argue that Currie misses Heilman and 
Thompson' s po i nt.
Ruben's argument is against reduction, or, more specifically, 
against the reductive identification of a social entity with a
'reducing entity' i.e. set or group of individuals CRuben 1985:441. 
Heilman and Thompson's position [See Chapter 21 is specifically
intended to be compatible with the failure of reduction. In the
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mental-physical case, Heilman and Thompson concede that there may be 
no physical entitles with which to identify mental entities i.e. 
that there may be no case for reduction. Nonetheless they show that 
from the set of all physical predicates, there will be some 
construct of predicates which is identical with each mental 
predicate. In other words, in the social case, the Heilman and 
Thompson analogue would be a claim that there are no individualistic 
constructs with which to identify each social entity. This is much 
weaker than the claim that Ruben is arguing against viz. that there 
are no individuals with which to identify each social entity. 
Consequently, Currie cannot use Ruben's argument to deny Heilman and 
Thompson's claim for the 'exhaustion' of the social by the 
individual. Thus the autonomy of the social, in any sense stronger 
than its mere irreducibility, remains unproven. So too does its 
independence.
I see no way in which global supervenience could be defended in 
conjunction with a claim such as Currie's for the independence of 
the social from the individualistic. In the light of this, in the 
context of this thesis, the most plausible way of defending 
supervenience seems to be to renounce the principle of independence. 
This leaves open the possibility of either accepting the principle 
of individual exhaustion or rejecting it. However, the endorsement 
of its analogue, the principle of physical exhaustion, in Chapter 2 
will certainly tilt the balance in its favour as far as the argument 
of this thesis is concerned.
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It has been shown that Currie's attempt to generalize the 
relation of supervenience - to make it fully applicable to the
relation between social and individualistic phenomena - is 
seriously flawed. In particular, Currie's global supervenience has 
been found wanting in its analysis of the relation between social 
entities and individuals. Any discussion of supervenience which is 
applicable to the complex relation between social and individual 
will have to pay more attention to this.
At this stage, it seems likely that a generalized version of 
supervenience may prove to be a composite relation, comprising three 
main parts:
i) the relation between the social and individualistic properties 
of individuals (as considered in Ch.4),
ii) the relation between social entities and individuals, and
iii)the relation between the social properties of social entities 
and properties of individuals.
The analysis of (ii) will almost certainly have an effect on the 
analysis of (iii).
An alternative analysis of the supervenience relation between 
the social and the individual, viz. that provided by Raima Tuomela 
[Tuomela 1984, 1985a,b, forthcoming] will be considered to see if it 
may prove useful for the formulation of (ii) and (iii).
Tuomela has been concerned primarily to provide an account of 
social action. This is significantly different from an account of
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the metaphysical relation between social and individual phenomena 
which has been considered here. Consequently, it is not proposed to 
give a comprehensive summary of his theory. Rather, some aspects of 
Tuomela's account which could be usefully applied to the generalized 
supervenience relation will be borrowed.
For Tuomela, a social collective or group acts only if its
members act. In this sense social action is constituted by the
actions of individuals.
"If a collective does something X then at least some of 
its members, say Ai...Ak must jointly do, in the right 
circumstances, something Xi...x*, viz. their parts of X; 
and in normal circumstances the performances of these 
parts serve to generate or 'make up' X,"
[Tuomela forthcoming:2]
There are a number of points to emphasise here. The members must
act jointly and in the right circumstances. Presumably neither
'members', 'joint action' nor 'right circumstances' will be
specifiable purely individualistically. Consequently, this account
may look circular. However, when it is remembered that it is not
the reduction of the social which is being considered, then it can
be recognised that this is not a fatal flaw. Supervenience does not
defend the claim that it should be possible to formulate the entire
base level completely independently of the supervenient level.
In spelling out the supervenience base, it is legitimate to make 
reference to social entities, properties or predicates. For 
instance, as has been discussed in Chapter 4, this will more than 
likely be the case in deciding which individualistic properties are
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to be included in tbe individualistic base for a social property 
such as ‘being Queen of England'. First it is necessary to decide 
which, social roles are to be fulfilled before someone instantiates 
the social property in question. Then it can be established which 
individualistic properties are instantiated when these roles are 
performed and which individualistic properties might be instantiated 
in other possible worlds. But what these individualistic properties 
have in common, in virtue of which they will be selected, will only 
be characterisable by reference to the social level. This is one of 
the things that makes the maximal base properties of the 
supervenience relation different from the sort of lower-level 
properties which would support reduction.
The following discussion of Tuomela's work will focus on three
closely interrelated elements of it. They are:
1) the structure of a social institution or group,
2) the rules of group membership and the roles of members, and
3) joint social action.
Vith regard to (1), Tuomela draws a useful distinction between 
two categories of social group, on the basis of their structure. In 
the first category are groups such a crowds. These have a 
relatively loose structure and the group acts whenever individuals 
act as members of that group. For instance, a crowd runs amok just 
in case the members of that crowd run amok.
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By contrast, social groups with a more rigorously defined, 
formal structure act because some or all agents act on their behalf. 
For instance, a bank decides to increase its opening hours when its 
directors vote in favour of longer opening hours and its branch 
managers, under their instruction, implement this.
If the supervenience of social action on the actions of 
individuals is being defended, then both types of social action need 
to be covered. By comparison with the second, the first type seems 
relatively straightforward. Its identity criteria are closely 
approximated by those for sets: that crowd is just the set of
people under certain circumstances which has those members. The 
relation between the group and its members here is more direct than 
in the case of groups with a more formal structure. It is more
complicated to give identity criteria for the latter. The ensuing 
discussion will therefore concentrate on the second type of group, 
on the assumption that if the actions of groups manifesting a formal 
structure supervene on the actions of the group's members, then so 
too will the action of all social groups.
Moreover, this is in keeping with the likelihood that the 
distinction being drawn here is not hard and fast. The formal
structure of a group is likely to vary by degree from group to 
group, with the two examples considered falling at opposite ends of 
a continuous spectrum. Groups such as the family might be thought 
of as being somewhere in the middle, having more structure than a 
crowd, but less than a bank.
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The structure of a group is one of its definitive 
characteristics for Tuomela. Which individual actions will 
constitute an action by the social group depends on the relation 
between the members and the group. This relation depends upon the 
structure of the group. But the structure of a group is to be 
analysed in turn in terms of (2), the roles and rules which restrict 
and delimit what counts as appropriate behaviour for members of the 
group. For instance, a member of a rowing team would not be 
permitted to attach a tiny outboard motor to her oar, whereas a 
member of an Unusual Vatersports Club might be.
Tuomela introduces a tripartite distinction between 'ought-to- 
be' rules, ' ought-to-do' rules and 'may-do' rules. These rules 
specify the roles of members: what they have to do to remain
members, what they may do, and what they should be. The positions 
of individuals in the group are then construed as conjunctions of 
their role-rules. Position-holders should not intentionally violate 
these rules.
The specification of the roles and rules of membership provides 
the social and normative context for the individual action. The 
rules of membership may be construed as the normative aspect in so 
far as they prescribe what behaviour is acceptable and desirable by 
the members.2 The roles of members may be construed as the social 
aspect of the conditions under which members act. Members' roles 
will be specified in relation to other members and to the objectives 
of the institution. The specification of these roles will often
- 175 -
make reference to the institution of which the individual is a 
member and possibly to other institutions as well. For instance, 
the role of the treasury might be construed as looking after the 
finances of the government. This involves references to the further 
social concepts of 'finance' and 'government'. Nonetheless, if 
what the individual members of the treasury have to do in order to 
look after the government's finances can be specified, then the 
treasury may be taken to supervene an individuals. But clearly it 
can be achieved: this is precisely what is offered by any job-
description.
This gives a suggestion as to how part (ii) of the relation of 
generalized supervenience might be specified viz. the relation 
between individuals and social entities. It is to be specified in 
terms of the rules of membership and members' roles. A social 
entity will supervene on those individuals which satisfy the 
conditions imposed by its rules for membership and its members' 
roles. In the case of a group with limited structure, the 
constraints will be minimal, but in the case of a highly-structured 
institution such as the House of Commons, say, constraints on 
members may be formidable. Thus in generalizing supervenience, it 
is proposed that social institutions supervene on their members in 
this way.
The specification of individual actions in terms of social roles 
and rules of institutions is absolutely crucial in turning a series 
of actions by individuals into a joint social action, (3).
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Individuals act in accordance with, publicly acknowledged and
accepted rules. On the basis of these, mutual expectations and
beliefs can be built up about how other members will act under given
circumstances to achieve agreed upon social ends. These mutual
expectations and beliefs form the link between individuals acting
singly and individuals acting jointly to bring about a social
action.3 Much will thus depend on how this notion of joint social
action is analysed. According to Tuomela, it is:
"action performed by several agents who suitably relate 
their individual actions to others' actions in pursuing 
some joint goal or in following some common rules, 
practices, or the like." [Ibid,:5]
So a joint social action is performed when individuals act in an
appropriate context, mindful of the rules and structure of the group
as members of which they are acting. Furthermore, they act
intentionally, in the belief that other members will be acting in
whichever way all operative members believe will bring about the
desired social end. In other words, they believe in the sincerity
of other members' intentions to act.
It should also be mentioned that the actions of the individual 
members will often be qualitatively distinct from the resultant 
action of the group e.g. a committee may act to pass a motion, on 
the basis of its members' actions of voting in its favour. However 
this does not introduce the sort of independence that Currie was 
advocating for the supervenient level. The social action, even if 
it is distinct from its constitutive individual actions, is 
nonetheless determined by them in the following way. For any social
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action or action by a social institution, there will be some 
individuals acting in such a way that constitutes the social act 
under the given circumstances i.e. under the rules and roles 
governing membership of the institution.
On the basis of this Tuomela offers the following definition of 
supervenience in which he aims to formalise the way the actions of 
social groups are constituted and determined by the actions of their 
individual members. A is the supervenient family of predicates, B 
the base family, C is the social and normative circumstances under 
which the group exists, N is an unspecified modal operator, x, y, 
z, v range over action tokens, F(x) reads 'action token x is an 
F'ing performed by the collective' and Gi(yi) reads is an action 
token of Gi'ing':
A actionally supervenes on B, given C iff in C, N(x)<F in A)
[ <F(x)) -» { < 3 y i  >.. • ( 3 y m) )  < ( 3 Gi in B). . . <3Gm in B)>
<Gt <yO&. . .&Gm (ym)>] &
N(z)(G in B)C {(zi ). . . (zm)> <Gi <Z! )&. . .&Gm (zm)> {Gv)F(v))],
for some m. [Ibid.:18]
The idea being formalised here is that, for every token of a 
social action type, there will be a series of individual action 
tokens which instantiate it. Then the RHS of the conjunction says 
that if another series of individual actions are tokens of the same 
type, this series must instantiate a token of the social action type 
originally in question.
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It is my objective to see whether or not Tuomela’s definition of 
actional supervenience could be adapted to provide a formulation of 
part (iii) of the relation of generalized supervenience, viz. the 
relation between the social properties of social entities and the 
properties of individuals. The following paragraphs will show that 
it can be.
In Chapter 4, when supervenience was being applied to the 
relation between the social and individualistic properties of 
individuals, social properties of individuals were spelled out in 
terms of the individuals performing certain roles, which in turn 
could be analysed as individuals acting in certain ways under 
certain circumstances. The analysis being offered here has 
something in common with this. Social action by an institution is
being determined by the actions of individuals who are members of
the institution. They are members by virtue of fulfilling certain 
prescribed social roles and by acting in accordance with the rules 
governing both their membership and the behaviour which is 
appropriate for members.
In this respect, individuals are members of social institutions
in virtue of certain properties that they have. Among these will be
properties pertaining to membership and behavioural roles. Thus at 
the base level of the supervenience relation there will be 
individuals and their social properties. However, in Chapter 4 it 
was shown that the social properties of individuals could be 
analysed in terms of the individualistic properties instantiated
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when the people act under specific circumstances. Thus the
supervenience base can be reformulated to exclude social properties 
of individuals and include the individualistic properties on which 
they supervene instead.
What remains to be achieved by a generalized version of
supervenience, is the reformulation of the supervenient level in
terms of properties of social entities rather than in terms of 
social actions. Once this has been accomplished, and if it can be 
shown that the relation of supervenience still holds between the two 
levels, the argument for a generalized relation of supervenience 
between social and individualistic phenomena will be complete,
Tuomela's definition is of actional supervenience and he is 
considering whether or not the actions of social groups supervene on 
the actions of their members. This does not quite mirror the 
original idea behind supervenience throughout this thesis which has 
been that there should be no change at the supervenient level 
without some change at the base level.
Now some changes at the supervenient level will be actions of 
social groups, but others will not be. So how do the latter fit 
into Tuomela's schema? More specifically, may there not be changes 
to a social group without there being any simultaneous changes to 
the group members with which the social changes can be correlated? 
Was this not the case, for instance, when Sinn Fein was denied media 
coverage? This was not brought about because Sinn Fein members did
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anything. Rather, the change was imposed from outside the social 
group, by another individual or social group. In this case, it 
seems that the social group does not supervene on its members but on 
some other individuals.
There is a delicate balance to be maintained here. On the one 
hand, we have to accept that a change in a social group may be 
caused by, or result from, a change unrelated to the group's 
members. However, on the other hand, it has never been claimed that 
the supervenient level is caused by the supervenience base, nor that 
a change in the supervenient level must be caused by a change in the 
base. What has been claimed is that every change at the 
supervenient level must be correlated with some change at the 
supervenience base. But in the above example, the latter condition 
still holds: Sinn Fein being denied media coverage may be
correlated with Gerry Adams not being interviewed by reporters, with 
voice-overs being added to dialogues between Sinn Fein members and 
interviewers, with newspaper editors deleting stories about the 
activities of known Sinn Fein sympathisers etc.
So even if a social entity changes dramatically as a result of 
some actions unconnected with the actions of its members, there will 
nonetheless be changes to the membership which reflect the social 
changes. Take another example: If the constitution of a club is
changed by law rather than by its members, the members - if they are 
to continue to be members of the changed club - will have to reflect
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the legal changes in their actions and roles. It is these 
individualistic changes which are to be correlated with the social 
changes to ensure that the relation of supervenience is sustained.
One consequence of this is that the sense in which the 
supervenient level can be said to be determined by the supervenience 
base, is very weak indeed. But this is not a new feature of 
supervenience which emerges only in connection with the generalized 
relation of supervenience between social and individualistic 
phenomena. It has been recognised throughout the discussion of this 
thesis.
So we can conclude that the restriction of Tuomela*s account to 
actional supervenience does not make it any less suitable as a 
candidate for a generalized version of supervenience.
Tuomela*s definition of supervenience could then be adapted as 
follows: A and B would be the supervenient and base families of
properties respectively. F(x) would no longer read 'action token x 
is an F* ing performed by the collective,' but rather, *x has the 
property of F* ing. * Gi (y-i) would read analogously ' yi has the 
property of Gi'ing.' Most usually, Gi would still be an action 
token as the property that yi had would be the property of acting in 
accordance with certain rules and roles. The following example may 
help to clarify the formalism: let F(x) read 'the committee has the
property of having passed the motion', while Gi (yi) reads 'member yi
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has the propety of having raised her arm at an appropriate time 
(i.e. voted in favour)'.
It can be seen here that x ranges over social entities whereas y 
ranges over individuals. This divergence of domains had been 
avoided by Tuomela in his use of x and y to range over action 
tokens. However, it will not be possible to retain this in a 
generalized version of supervenience.
Consequently, in the same way that an individual's having a 
social property was determined by that individual identifying and 
performing certain roles, a social institution's having a social 
property is to be determined by its membership - specified in terms 
of certain rules and roles - having certain properties. It then 
follows from this, and from Tuomela's definition, that any change to 
the social properties of the institution must involve some change to 
the properties of the membership. Of course this need not involve 
the whole membership; a change in one important individual may
suffice. This does not imply that any change to the social
properties of the institution must result from changes in the 
properties of the membership as has been discussed above.
This would seem to be exactly what was required to satisfy part 
(iii) of the relation of generalized supervenience, viz. the 
relation between the social properties of social entities and the 
properties of individuals. Together, parts (i), (ii) and (iii)
provide a comprehensive analysis of how the relation of
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supervenience can be generalized and applied to all aspects of the 
relation between social and individualistic phenomena. The 
respective parts of the relation have not been rigorously
formalised, although it should be evident, in the light of both
Kim's formulation of supervenience and Tuomela's version of actional 
supervenience, that this should not pose any special difficulties.
Before concluding this chapter, a comparison will be made
between the generalized version of supervenience offered here and
Kim's initial formalisation. The most significant difference, as 
has already been stressed, is that generalized supervenience is a 
relation between supervenient and base levels which have different 
domains. Kim's supervenience was a relation between different kinds 
of properties of people; supervenience generalized is a relation 
between social entities and their properties on the one hand and
properties of individuals on the other. In its most complete farm, 
generalized supervenience should be used in conjunction with the
social-individualistic application of Kim's supervenience which 
relates the social and individualistic properties of people.
Another difference is that Kim's relation holds between
properties. Supervenience generalized in Tuomela's formulation
relates actions. More generally though, Tuomela takes the domains 
of the supervenient and base levels, A and B respectively, to be 
predicates. However, the version of supervenience which has been 
adapted from Tuomela's formulation once again relates properties: 
of social entities and individuals. Supervenience is also taken to
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cover the relation between social entities per se and their 
individual members. This avoids the problems with infinite 
disjunctions and conjunctions which may arise when formulating 
supervenience in terms of predicates.
Kim initially avoided taking the domains as predicates because 
it was not possible to form a ' maximal-predicate1 to cover all 
possible base instantiations of a supervenient predicate. Infinite 
boolean operations over predicates were not well-formed. This 
problem has not arisen for Tuomela because he has not attempted to 
provide maximal predicates from the base. Generalized
supervenience, however, should be able to accommodate the 
formulation of maximal base properties, if required. Similarly, it 
should be passible to farm maximal sets of individuals as the base 
for social entities.
Another point of comparison is the modal strength of the 
supervenience relation. Tuomela has not elaborated on the modal 
strength of his actional supervenience. As it stands, couched in 
terms of material implication, it amounts to a fairly weak doctrine, 
asserting no more than a coinstantiation between base and 
supervenient predicates. But as was shown in the discussion of Kim 
in Chapter 3, such a version of weak supervenience (generalized or 
not) is inadequate, since it fails to capture the sense in which 
there could not be a change in the supervenient level without some 
change in the supervenience base. This aspect of supervenience is 
only captured if it is necessarily the case that there is such a
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coi list anti at ion between base and supervenient levels, i.e. if it is 
the case in all possible worlds. But if this holds, then it is 
possible to form a maximal disjunction of all possible base 
instantiations. Moreover, this disjunctive instantiation will be 
necessarily co-extensive with the supervenient instantiation. 
However this is only well-formed for properties and not for 
predicates. Consequently, it is not available to Tuomela.
In the case of actional supervenience, the only option seems to 
be to concede that, although the material implication may hold in 
all possible worlds, it cannot be formulated as a necessary co- 
extension. This undermines the plausibility of the doctrine. 
Generalized supervenience, however, would not have a problem here. 
It is compatible with a formulation in terms of necessary co­
extensions which hold in all possible worlds. Throughout this 
thesis, the nature of the modalities involved has been kept vague 
and it is doubtful that anything about the relation of supervenience 
itself dictates how the modal operators should be interpreted. My 
own preference as specified, influenced by Kim, is for the modal 
operator to range over all physically or nomologically possible 
worlds i.e. over worlds which are like our own in respect of the 
laws of physics.
This brings the relation of generalized supervenience 
considerably closer to Kim's formulation. Both relations represent 
a metaphysical relation without apparent epistemological or 
methodological implications. In Chapter 4 it was shown that the
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supervenience relation could be applied to the relation between 
social and individualistic properties of individuals. In this 
chapter it has been shown that the relation can be generalized to 
cover the relation between social entities and individuals and also 
the relation between the social properties of such entities and 
properties of individuals. This completes the generalization of 
supervenience in its application to the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena.
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CQflCLUSIPfl
The consideration of the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena has now been completed. Three candidates 
for this relation have been presented at some length. They are 
reduction, determination and, a special case of the latter, 
supervenience. In discussing all three, the emphasis has been on 
metaphysical relations, holding between distinct levels of 
phenomena. I have been concerned to show what sort of correlations 
between phenomena these three relations postulate, to evaluate these 
and to assess the plausibility of applying them to the relation 
between social and individualistic phenomena. In so far as 
supervenience has appeared to be a likely candidate, it has been 
examined at greatest length. Throughout this thesis, issues of 
epistemological and methodological importance have been largely 
overlooked. Consequently, it has nowhere been considered whether 
the supervenience of the social on the individualistic might offer 
explanatory insight into the social level, nor whether it might 
suggest new or better-methods for understanding the social sciences. 
The concern here has been entirely with what sort of relation can be 
said to hold between social and individualistic levels of phenomena.
In this respect, the discussion of reduction might be criticised 
for being incomplete, since reduction is most usually defended as a 
relation which makes both metaphysical and epistemological claims,
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with the latter often deemed to be the more important. Criticism 
such as this, I would have to accept. In my defence, I would only 
comment that I make no claim to have offered a complete analysis of 
reduction. Reduction in this thesis has only been considered to the 
extent that it has bearing on a metaphysical relation between 
phenomena.
Even a metaphysical relation is open to criticism, though, and a 
few points will be raised about the value of one such relation viz. 
supervenience as considered in the bulk of this thesis. One of the 
strongest claims that Kim has made of the relation is that if it can 
be shown that two levels of properties are related by supervenience, 
then it follows that the supervenience base, at the lower level, 
must exist. In other words, if the social supervenes on the 
individualistic, then an individualistic base does exist. However, 
upon examination, this turns out to be a rather weak claim. In 
particular, it does not follow that the supervenience base could 
actually be established. Indeed, given that it may comprise 
infinitely long disjunctions of conjunctions, it almost certainly 
never will be. Even in principle, the supervenience base could not 
be particularly useful, since its maximal base properties will be 
heterogeneous and disparate. As such, they will not feature in the 
laws of the base level theories and will not provide explanations of 
the supervenient level phenomena. Yet as relata in a metaphysical 
relation, this is not strictly required of them.
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What is required of them, however, is that they determine the 
supervenient level phenomena, to the extent that there could be no 
change at the supervenient level without some change at the base 
level. Moreover, this should be reflected in a claim for the 
priority of the individual over the social. But does supervenience 
achieve this? Yes and no, I would claim. It has been shown that
necessary coextensions can be established between the base and 
supervenient level for each social property. In this respect, every 
social change must be accompanied i.e. will be accompanied in every 
passible world, by some individualistic change. Davidson's initial 
challenge to a formulation of supervenience has been met. But is 
this enough to show that the base level determines the supervenient 
level; do individuals determine social phenomena? The answer which 
supervenience offers to this, if affirmative at all, is admittedly 
only weakly so.
In considering the application of supervenience to the socia- 
individualistic relation and its subsequent generalization, it was 
conceded that the supervenience base would need to make reference to 
the supervenient level. In this respect, the supervenient level 
could never be eliminated; furthermore, the base could never be 
formulated without it. Which individualistic properties to include 
in the base could only be decided once it was agreed, for any social 
property, which social roles needed to be fulfilled before the 
property was instantiated and also, which individualistic properties 
needed to be instantiated in order for the roles to be fulfilled. 
But these individualistic properties would have nothing
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individualistically significant in common. The only common link 
between them would be that they in fact instantiated the social 
roles in question which in turn constituted the instantiation of the 
social property.
Largely the same claim was made in considering how supervenience 
could be generalized. This was achieved by looking to the members 
of social institutions. But always, the individuals and their 
individualistic properties which were to constitute the 
individualistic base were picked out in virtue of fulfilling the 
rules of membership and the roles of members. These rules and roles 
provided the social and normative context in which the individuals' 
actions were taken to determine the supervenient actions or the 
properties of the supervenient institutions. Yet it could never be 
claimed that the social and normative context could be specified 
individualistically.
In what sense, then, can supervenience be claimed to support the 
priority of the individual over the social? This claim can only be 
made in the following very weak sense: without individuals, there
could be no social entities. Social entities could not exist 
without individuals, they could not act without them and they could 
not change without them. The converse claim does not hold: 
individuals could exist, even though there was nothing social about 
them. They could act and change without any social entities doing 
likewise. This much at least has been defended in this thesis as a 
consequence of the relation of superveniece. However, this is not
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to endorse the claim that they could exist/act/change in all the 
ways in which they now do, without social entities.
There is one final issue which I would like to raise. It may be 
objected that my discussion of the application of supervenience to 
the relation between social and individualistic phenomena is rather 
dogmatic. At no point is much consideration given to other accounts 
which directly oppose the application of supervenience to this 
relation. Arguments against supervenience are rather scarce in this 
thesis. Again, such an objection would have to be accepted, with 
the following word said in my defence. In this thesis, I have 
intended to characterise some different possible relations which 
could be claimed to characterise the relation between social and 
individualistic phenomena. To this end, reduction, determination 
and supervenience have been considered. It has then been my 
intention to see whether or not the relation of supervenience, which 
seemed to be the most promising, could be applied to the socio­
individual istic relation. Consequently, in Chapter 4, I was 
expressly concerned to apply the formulation developed in Chapter 3 
to the socio-individualistic relation. I was not concerned to 
defend this relation against other possible candidates.
Throughout the thesis, the force of the argument has only been 
to see whether or not supervenience could be applied to the socio- 
individualistic relation. I believe that I have shown that it can 
be. It has not been argued that supervenience in fact offers the 
best characterisation of this relation, nor that it offers a better
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characterisation than any alternatives which might be defended.
Indeed, as evidenced by the caveats raised in this conclusion, it is 
unlikely that I would wish to defend such a position. But I hope
that will not be taken to undermine the value of this thesis.
Supervenience has increasingly crept into the philosophical 
vocabulary of the 1980's. Some, e.g. Watkins and Ruben, have 
expressed doubts about its potential contribution to the philosophy 
of the social sciences. However, in philosophy of mind, it seems 
likely to be a fixture of some permanence and in this respect at 
least it has seemed to me worth seriously considering its 
application to the socio-individualistic relation. Most
importantly, supervenience accords with the general spirit of 
materialism which I think I am correct in taking to typify many 
areas of philosophy at present. In its application to the socio- 
individualistic relation, it makes it possible to be receptive to 
this trend, without regressing into the well-worn and stubborn 
arguments of the past two decades for reduction.1
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N.Q.TS£
CHAPTER 1
1. Note that my interest is whether or not the reduction could be 
obtained i.e. whether it would be possible in principle as well 
as physically possible to reduce T2 to Tl, rather than whether 
or not T2 actually has been, or will be, reduced to Tl.
2. The force of arguments against the tenability of a theory- 
observation distinction is perhaps best captured in [Maxwell 
1970].
3. This point is developed in some detail in [James 1984:27].
4. In the following discussion of the Condition of Connectability 
it would be impossible to acknowledge point by point the debt I 
owe to the late Ian McFetridge. Most of my ideas on the topic 
were influenced - some to a greater extent than others - by his 
1985 lecture series, "Reduction and Physicalism". Of course 
responsibility for the ideas as expressed here rests with me.
5. It should be noted that the sense in which Lewis construes T- 
terms as names is not the same as the sense in which Causey uses 
names. For Lewis, the name of a property is a singular term, 
while for Causey, who claims that thing-predicates function as 
names, names apply to any grammatical predicate. For instance, 
Causey would accept 'electron' as a name, while Lewis would use 
it in the form 'electronhood'.
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6. It is perhaps worth noting that Lewis' criteria for the identity 
of properties are in a sense overdetermined. Hot only are 
properties defined in terms of their causal roles, Lewis 
asserts that they may also be defined in terms of modal 
operators and passible world semantics. According to the latter 
criterion, a property may be identified by a function from a 
domain of possible worlds into a range that is the set of all 
objects which have the particular property in question in each 
possible world. So to say that two properties are identical, is 
to say that they are coextensional in every possible world i.e. 
properties F and G are identical iff x(Fx = Gx). The
difficulty with this is that the modal operator destroys the
empirical nature of the correlation. The coextension in the 
actual world can be empirically justified, but the extrapolation 
from this to all possible worlds is not capable of such 
justificaton. Consideration of these claims leads into the 
minefield of philosophical literature on the epistemology of 
necessary a priori and necessary a posteriori truth. It is not
clear how a discussion of this would benefit the present
analysis of reduction, so I propose to bypass such 
considerations and concentrate on the identification of 
properties in terms of their causal roles.
7. For a detailed consideration of IHTJS conditions, see IMackie 
1980:623.
8. More general reasons for doubting that social entities can be 
identified with individuals at all have been developed in depth 
by David Ruben CRuben 19853. Since Ruben's arguments are
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extremely comprehensive and I am largely in sympathy with them, 
I have nothing original to contribute to this particular aspect 
of the debate. Therefore I do not propose to enter into a 
discussion of his position.
CHAPTER 2
1. I am grateful to David Ruben for his help in clarifying the 
issue with this clear, common-sense example.
2. Heilman and Thompson's proof that the definitional claims do not
entail the exhaustion of one level of phenomena by the other is
not considered in detail. This is for two reasons: first,
their own exposition [1975:557] is perfectly clear. Second, for 
our purposes, the converse claim viz. that physical exhaustion 
does not entail reduction, is far more significant and this has 
been discussed at some length.
3. It may be objected that at this point I should have considered
the discussion that Heilman and Thompson's position has raised
among other philosophers in the literature. This was indeed my 
intention. However, although the paper is referred to in the 
literature le.g. Macdonald and Pettit 1981:184 and Currie 
1984:350, note 1], it is not, to my knowledge, discussed in 
depth. I can only assume that this is because the argument is 
seen as technically difficult and sophistical.
4. An analogous position which endorses virtually the same claims
as Heilman and Thompson, is the token physicalism defended by
Jerry Fodor [Fodor 1981: Ch.51 . Fador argues that there will
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not be neurological natural kinds which are coextensive with 
each psychological kind, or if there are then the coextensions 
will not always be nomolagical. However, consistent with this, 
he argues in favour of the claim that " every event which 
consists of x's satisfying S [a kind predicate in the higher 
level science, say psychology] is identical with same event 
which consists of x's satisfying some or other predicate 
belonging to the disjunction Pi v P2 v . . . v P,-, [where P is a 
predicate in the lower level science, say neurology]." 
[Ibid.:139]
5. My attention was drawn to this point by Paul Teller in a seminar 
at Cambridge University during the Easter Term of 1988. The 
particular seminar was called, "Subjectivity and knowing what 
it's like," in as series organized by Hugh Mellor on the 
Philosophy of Psychology.
6. If the introduction of natural kinds into the definition of laws 
is considered unpalatable, then, in what follows, 'bridge laws' 
can always be taken to reflect laws, since that is what true 
empirical generalizations must be. To try to settle such a 
long-standing dispute here would not aid the argument of the 
rest of the chapter.
7. This is perhaps too strong, since Daniel Dennett has only
recently produced such a theory of intentional states [See 
Papineau 1988] . Moreover, this work does not appear in a 
vacuum, since others such as Patricia Churchland and Paul 
Churchland are contributing to this field as well. A weaker 
version of the argument could run as follows: there is
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currently no generally accepted theory of intensional mental 
states on the basis of which psycho-physical laws can be 
supported. Furthermore, even if an account such as Dennett's 
proves to be able to withstand criticism, it offers not so much 
a theory which can provide particular laws between, say, the 
desire for chocolate and some neurophysical state, but rather an 
insight into how states of desire generally might relate to 
neurophysical states. Moreover, it is unlikely that such 
acccounts will appease critics such as Thomas Nagel, "who feel 
that the whole approach is blighted by its failure to say 
anything about consciousness." [Ibid.:911]
CHAPTER 3
1. The B-maximal properties which Kim uses are the strongest, 
consistent properties which can be constructed in the 
supervenience base, i.e. they include all the properties the 
object in the domain has and all the complements of properties 
it lacks. The motivation for this is not immediately clear. 
Perhaps some of the difficulties which arise for the maximal 
base properties could be avoided if the base properties were 
somehow restricted to only those base properties required to 
instantiate each particular supervenient property. I think the 
answer to this lies in the fact that supervenience aims to 
capture the relationship between two complete levels of 
properties, rather than between a few isolated properties. 
Kim's reasoning could thus possibly be that there is no hope of
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all supervenient properties together being determined by, or
supervenient on, anything less than the entire range of
properties in the supervenience base.
2. I am grateful to Peter Milne, firstly for drawing my attention 
to this issue and subsequently for helping me to formulate the 
difficulty precisely.
3. The distinction between reduction and supervenience will be
considered again towards the end of Chapter 4. D. H. Mellor
[1982] has argued specifically that the supervenience of
sociology on psychology entails the reducibility of sociology 
to psychology. A discussion of this would thus seem to be more 
appropriate in the context of a general discussion of the 
application of supervenience to theories of social and 
individualistic phenomena.
CHAPTER 4
1. It has been pointed out to me that 'Queen of England' is a 
misnomer and should be extended to 'Queen of England, Scotland 
and Vales' . For ease of exposition, please bear with the 
original formulation!
2. The fact that the social correlation is assumed to be derivable 
from psychological theory, purely on the grounds of the 
supervenience of the social on the psychological, seems to 
pinpoint the place at which Mellor's initial claim that 
supervenience does not entail reduction is renounced.
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3. Further support for supervenience as a non-reductive relation 
may be drawn from David Ruben's distinction between strongly 
social and weakly social properties.
"A social property is strongly social when some of the 
associated beliefs and expectations have propositional 
objects involving a social action type." [Ruben 1985:123]
I would agree with Ruben that strongly social properties
"strike us as most characteristic of what social life is 
like". CIbid.:126]
In particular, the supervenient example used in this chapter, viz.
the social property, 'being Queen of England', is an instance in
point. It was shown that this property supervened on
individualistic properties which captured both the physical actions
and the psychological states of the people involved when various
aspects of the social property viz. the diverse social roles
associated with it, were instantiated. These psychological
properties in the individualistic base were generally the beliefs of
individuals when the social property was being instantiated e.g. the
belief of Margaret Thatcher that Elizabeth II is Queen of England,
when the farmer is invited by the Queen to form a government. Such
a belief has been included in the individualistic base as it is the
belief state of an individual. Yet, that psychological state in
turn presupposes other social properties, relating to the monarchy
and governments in this instance. This is a clear indication that
even if the social properties can be identified (in the weak sense
provided by the necessary coextensions of supervenience) with
individualistic properties, the identification could not be
reductive
"because at least some of the mental properties 
associated with the application of each such social 
property must themselves be beliefs or expectations about 
the instancing of strongly social action types." [Ibid.]
CHAPTER 5
1. This claim will be compared with the previous claim for
asymmetry when Currie's position is systematically evaluated 
below.
2. This must be close to what Emile Durkheim had in mind when he 
argued in favour of holism on the basis of the force which
social entities were able to exert on the individual. The
individual is constrained by the rules of an institution. Yet 
this does not entail that the force of the institution is in
some way autonomous, since the rules are entirely dependent for 
their existence on the decisions and actions of individuals 
prior to and during the formation of the particular institution. 
In the first instance, the rules must be proposed and adopted by 
individuals.
3. On this issue, Tuomela's analysis is not unique. He is not the 
first to characterize the social in terms of individuals and 
their mutual beliefs. A similar account has been worked out in 
detail by D.-H. Ruben in which social properties are analysed in 
terms of nested systems of beliefs and expectations among 
individuals. [Ruben 1985: Ch.31
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CONCLUSION
1. Sam Fendrich, a fellow graduate student at the LSE, remarked 
that 'supervenience* really ought to be used to refer to the new 
range of public conveniences which require the payment of lOp 
before use. Could one dispute that?
- 202 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achinstein, Peter (1974) "The Identity of Properties", in American 
Philosophical Quarterly. 11, No. 4, pp.257-275.
Ager, T.A., Aronson, J.L. and Veingard, R. (1974) "Are Bridge Laws 
Really Necessary?" in Nous. 8, pp.119-134.
Armstrong, D.M. (1978) A Theory of Universals: Universals &
Scientific Realism. Vol.II. (CUP: Cambridge),
  (1983) What is a Law of Nature?. (CUP: Cambridge).
Boyd, Richard (1980) "Materialism without Reduction", in N.Block 
(ed. ) (1980) Readings in Philosophical Psychology. (Methuen:
London), pp.67-106.
Causey, Robert (1972) "Attribute Identities in Microreductions", in 
Journal of Philosophy. LXIX, No.14, pp.407-422.
 (1976) "Identities and Reduction: A Reply", in Nous. 10,
pp.333-337.
 (1977) The Unity of Science, (D.Reidel Publishing Co.:
Dordrecht).
Currie, Gregory (1984) " Individualism and Global Supervenience", in 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 35, pp.345-358.
Davidson, Donald (1967a) "The Logical Form of Action Sentences", in 
Davidson (1980), pp.105-122.
  (1967b) "Causal Relations", in Davidson (1980), pp.149-162.
  (1969) "The Individuation of Events", in Davidson (1980),
pp.163-180.
  (1970) "Mental Events", in Davidson (1980), pp.207-225.
  (1974) "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", in
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, pp.5-20.
  (1976) "Hempel on Explaining Action", in Davidson (1980),
pp.261-275.
  (1980) Essays on Actions and Events. (OUP: Oxford).
- 203 -
Durkheim, Emile (1982) The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected 
Texts on Sociology and its Method, ed. with an introduction by 
Steven Lukes. Trans, by V.D.Halls, (Macmillan: London).
Eng, Berent (1976) "Identity Statements and Microreductions", in 
Journal of Philosophy. LXXIII, Mo.11, pp.285-306.
Fodor, Jerry A. (1981) "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of
Science as a Working Hypothesis)", in Fodor (1981), Representations. 
(Harvester Press: Brighton).
  (1986) "Individualism and Supervenience", in The Aristotelian
Society Supplementary Volume LX. pp.235-262.
Forrest, Peter (1988) "Supervenience: The Grand-Property
Hypothesis", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, Mo.1,
pp.1-12.
French, Peter A., Uehling Jr, Theodore E. and Vettstein, Howard K. 
(ed.s) (1979) Midwest Studies in Philosophy. IV, Studies in 
Metaphysics, (U. of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis).
  (1984) Midwest Studies in Philosophy IX, Causation and Causal
Theories. (U of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis).
Gillespie, Morman Chase (1983) "Supervenient Identities and 
Supervenient Differences", in Horgan (ed.) (1984), pp.111-116,
Hare, R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals, (Clarendon Press:
Oxford).
Haugeland, John (1982) "Weak Supervenience", in American 
Philosophical Quarterly. 19, Mo.l, pp.93-103.
Heilman, Geoffrey Paul, and Thompson, Frank Wilson (1975) 
"Physicalism: Ontology, Determination and Reduction", in Journal of
Philosophy. LXXII, Mo.17, pp.551-564.
  (1977) "Physicalist Materialism", in Mous, 11, Mo. 4,
pp.309-345.
Heilman, Geoffrey (1985) "Determination and Logical Truth", in 
Journal of Philosophy. LXXXII, Mo.11, pp.607-616.
Horgan, Terence (ed.) (1984) The Southern Journal of Philosophy.
Vol.XXII, Supplement, Spindel Conference 1983: Supervenience.
Hooker, C.A. (1981) "Towards a General Theory of Reduction", in 3 
parts, in Dialogue, XX, pp.38-59, 201-236 and 496-529.
James, Susan (1984) The Content of Social Explanation. (CUP: 
Cambridge).
- 204 -
Kim, Jaegwon (1969) ’Events and their Descriptions", in Rescher 
(ed.) (1969), pp.198-215.
 (1978) "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables", in
American Philosophical Quarterly. 15, Mo. 2, pp.149-156.
  (1979) "Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind-
Body Problem", in French et al. (1979), pp.31-49.
  (1983) "Supervenience and Supervenient Causation", in Horgan
(ed.) (1984), pp.45-56.
  (1984a) "Concepts of Supervenience", in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research. Vol.XLV, Ho.2, pp.153-176.
  (1984b) "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation", in French
et al (ed.s) (1984), pp.257-270.
  (1985) "Supervenience, Determination and Reduction", in
Journal of Philosophy. LXXXII, Ho.11, pp.616-618.
Kripke, Saul (1980) Haming and necessity. (Basil Blackwell:
Oxford).
Levinson, Jerrold (1983) "Aesthetic Supervenience", in Horgan (ed.) 
(1984), pp.93-110.
Lewis, David (1970) "How to Define Theoretical Terms", in Lewis
(1983), pp.78-95.
  (1971) "Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies", in Lewis
(1983), pp.47-54.
  (1972) "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications", in
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 50, Ho.3, pp.249-258.
  (1983a) Philosophical Papers. Vol.l. (OUP: Oxford)
  (1983b) "Hew Work for a Theory of Universals", in Australasion
Journal of Philosophy. 61, Ho.4, pp.343-377.
Macdonald, Graham and Pettit, Philip (1981) Semantics and Social 
Science. (Routledge 8t Kegan Paul: London).
Macdonald, Graham (1985) "Modified Methodological Individualism", in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. LXXXVI, pp.199-211.
  (1986) "The Possibility of the Disunity of Science", in
Macdonald and Crispin Wright (ed.s) (1986), Fact, Science And 
Morality: Essays on A.J.Ayer’s "Language. Truth And Logic".
(Blackwell: Oxford), pp.219-246.
Mackie, J.L. (1980) The Cement of the Universe. (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford).
- 205 -
McFetridge, I.G. (1985) "Supervenience, Realism, Necessity", in 
Philosophical Quarterly. 35, pp.245-258.
Mandelbaum, Maurice (1955) "Societal Facts", in Alan Ryan (ed.) 
(1973) The Philosophy of Social Explanation. (OUP: Oxford),
pp.105-118.
Maxwell, Grover (1970) "The Ontological Status of Theoretical
Entities", in B. A. Brody (ed.) (1970) Readings in the Philosophy of
Science. (Prentice Hall: New Jersey), pp.224-233.
Mellor, D.H. (1980) "Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws", in 
Mellor (ed. ) (1980) Science. Belief and Behaviour, (CUP:
Cambridge), pp.105-125.
   (1982) "The Reduction of Society", in Philosophy, 57,
pp.51-75.
Moore, G.E. (1922) Philosophical Studies, (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd.: London).
Nagel, Ernest (1961) The Structure of Science. (Routledge & Kegan
Paul: London).
Nagel, Thomas (1965) "Physicalism", in Philosophical Review. 74, 
pp.339-356.
  (1979) Mortal Questions, (CUP: New York).
  (1979a) "Vhat is it like to be a bat?" in Nagel (1979),
pp.165-180.
  (1979b) "Subjective and Objective", in Nagel (1979),
pp.196-213.
Papineau, David (1985) "Social Facts and Psychological Facts", in G. 
Currie and A.E. Musgrave (ed.s) (1985) Popper and the Human 
Sciences. (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht), pp.57-71.
  (1988) "Matter Over Mind", review of Daniel C. Dennett, The
Intentional Stance.in TLS, August 19-25, p.911.
Peacocke, Christopher (1979) Holistic Explanation. (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford).
Pettit, Philip (1984) "In Defence of a New Methodological 
Individualism: Reply to J.E.Tiles", in Ratio, XXVI, No.l, pp.81-87.
Popper, Karl R. (1968) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, "New 
Appendices X: Universals, Dispositions, and Natural or Physical
Necessity", (Hutchinson: London), pp.420-441.
Post, John F. (1983) "Response: Comment on Teller", in Horgan (ed.)
(1984), pp.163-67.
- 206 -
Putnam, H. (1969) "On Properties", in Rescuer (ed.) (1969), 
pp.235-254.
Reseller, N. (ed. ) (1969) Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel. 
Synthese Library, (D.Reidel Publishing Co.: Dordrecht).
Ruben, David-Hillel (1985) The Metaphysics of the Social World, 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul: London).
Schaffner, Kenneth (1967) "Approaches to Reduction", in Philosophy 
of Science. 34, pp.137-147.
Searle, John (1984) Minds. Brains and Science. (BBC: London).
Shoemaker, Sydney (1984) "Causality and Properties", in Shoemaker
(1984), Identity. Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays. (CUP:
Cambridge), pp.206-233.
Sibley, Frank (1959) "Aesthetic Concepts", in The Philosophical 
Review. Vol.68, pp.421-50.
Sosa, Ernest (1984) "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient 
Causation", in French et al (ed.) (1984), pp.271-282.
Teller, Paul (1983a) "A Poor Man's Guide to Supervenience and 
Determination", in Horgan (ed.) (1984), pp.137-162.
  (1983b) "Comments on Kim's Paper", in Horgan (ed.) (1984),
pp.57-61.
  (1985) "Is Supervenience Just Disguised Reduction?" in
Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXIII, No.l, pp.93-99.
Tiles, J.E. (1984) "On a New Methodological Individualism", in 
Balia, XXVI, No.1, pp.71-79.
Tuomela, Raimo (1985a) Science. Action and Reality: The
Philosophical Foundations of the Scientific World View. (D.Reidel 
Publishing Co.: Dordrecht)
  (1985b) "Social Action", in Gottfried Seebass and Raimo
Tuomela (ed.s) (1985) Social Action. Theory and Decision Library, 
43, (D.Reidel Publishing Co.: Dordrecht), pp.141-167.
  (forthcoming) "Collective Action, Supervenience, and
Constitution", pp.1-30.
Vatkins, J.W.N. (1953) "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation", in 
Alan Ryan (ed.) (1973) The Philosophy of Social Explanation, (OUP: 
London).
- 207 -
  (1984) Science and Scepticism. (Hutchinson: London).
Williams, Bernard (1985) "Formal and Substantial Individualism", in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1984-5, pp.119-132.
- 208 -
